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 ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines issues of international technology transfer (ITT), focusing on the 
exploitation of foreign technology between countries with contrasting strengths and 
capabilities. The tendency in ITT is that it has mostly been limited to the triad countries 
and to some latecomer economies in East Asia. An explanation for this tendency is that 
the extent of this shared common ground between countries directly affects a recipient 
country‘s capability to exploit and absorb foreign knowledge. This thesis examines 
cases of ITT which successfully occurred without such common grounds and offers 
explanations for specific cases.  
 
The conceptual framework was developed to explain how such extraordinary 
capabilities are created in order to overcome barriers to technological transfer. In 
addition, several other mechanisms and special factors are hypothesised as candidates 
for explaining the technology transfer process as one involving bridging and 
overcoming the barriers. These hypotheses are examined in relation to the Korean-
Russian technology transfer, the main target of the investigation. Korea and Russia are 
countries that had no interaction prior to or during the Cold War period and shared little 
or no common ground. Nonetheless, after 1990 Korean firms have actively attempted to 
exploit Russian technology and some of them, though not many, have succeeded in 
exploiting and commercialising Russian technology. 
 
Important contextual issues for this examination are the military and mission-focused 
body of Russia‘s technological knowledge and the often cheaper importation of Western 
technology. Taking these contextual issues into account, this thesis identifies two 
principal issues that were overcome in the cases of successful technology transfer: a) the 
tacitness of Russian technological knowledge and b) the locality of the Russian ―context 
of origin‖ in terms of the socio-cultural, economic, and political environment.  
 
The empirical content of the thesis involves a mixed approach with document analysis, 
interviews, a survey, and case studies. The research results show that the public agency 
programme‘s facilitating role as an intermediary (developed by the Korean government) 
creates the extra capacity to bridge the gaps involved in adapting Russian technology. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. RESEARCH ISSUES 
This thesis examines the processes of international technology transfer (hereafter ITT) 
by developing and extending the concept of ―absorptive capacity‖ (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). In this thesis, ITT is defined as the external acquisition of foreign technology, 
excluding technology transfer that occurs via direct foreign investment where non-
indigenous technology may be used by organisations in the recipient country.  
 
In Cohen‘s and Levinthal‘s (1989) discussion of the absorptive capacity concept, they 
assert that the alternative to developing ―necessary technology‖ through internal 
indigenous efforts is to acquire such technology from other who have developed it in 
order to adapt such necessary technology developed by others. It is assumed that 
developing technology internally is not easy because these activities are always 
uncertain and risky. As a result, adapting externally developed technology is often 
considered to be an attractive option. By acquiring technology externally, the firm 
acquiring the technology may avoid or reduce the risk of engaging with an uncertain or 
unknown field. What is even more surprising is that such late adopters of external 
technology may, sometimes, reap greater benefits than its original developer did by 
enjoying a free-ride on the frontier effort of prior innovation activities. This free ride is 
referred as the second mover advantage (Epstein, 2006; Lieverman and Montgomery, 
1988). Outsourcing of technology is not something that only takes place within 
domestic boundaries: it also takes place across countries. For those firms that lack 
capabilities and experience with internal technology development, exploiting and 
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acquiring external knowledge may be the only possible option to build their own 
technological capacity. 
 
The existing literature establishes both theoretically and empirically that ITT occurs 
through particular patterns, channels, motivations, and mechanisms at both in the 
domestic and international level. My review of the literature found that many of the 
studies on ITT primarily focused on successful results of technology adoption or 
acquisition. As such, scholars have tried to identify and isolate the key factors 
influencing such successful results including firm capability, the role of public policy, 
the nature and level of technology in the country, and transfer transactions with both 
macro-level quantitative analysis as well as micro-level case studies (Mowery and 
Oxley, 1995; Trott and Seaton, 1995). The target of the majority of ITT studies has been 
the adoption of ITT in the triad countries (the countries of United States, the European 
Union, and Japan) and certain latecomer economies in East Asia, where most of the 
innovations over the last 40 years have taken place. According to a report of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter OECD), 96% of 
the assessed 1,250 technological alliances undertaken from 1980 to 1989 were 
conducted with only the triad countries (OECD, 2004). 
 
According to RAND (2001), researchers are motivated to collaborate with foreign 
partners who share similar conditions and backgrounds, and who possess 
complementary capabilities and resources. Based upon these results, I hypothesise that 
an important basis for ITT is the extent of this shared common ground, the similarity of 
conditions and backgrounds, between countries and partners, which directly affects a 
recipient‘s capability to exploit and absorb foreign knowledge. I propose that it is easier 
14 
 
 
  
for countries with more common ground in cultural, technological or experimental 
terms to effectively exchange technological information and knowledge. The converse 
hypothesis is also proposed: those countries that share less common ground have more 
difficulty in exchanging such information and knowledge. In this case, the common 
ground not only includes technological similarities but also involves socio-economic, 
cultural, and political compatibility, as well as geographic proximity. The RAND (2001) 
report shows that EU countries, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and countries 
with colonial relations have historically achieved better results from ITT initiatives than 
countries without such common ground and relationships.  
 
In this respect, the triad countries and certain latecomer countries in East Asia, such as 
the Asian Tigers, share similar socio-economic, cultural, and technological compatibility, 
as well as similar conditions and complementary resources for implementing ITT. Also, 
countries that exploit the technological strengths and knowledge of partner countries 
seem to have greater capability to exploit and absorb external knowledge. This 
phenomenon is explained and defined as absorptive capacity, first introduced by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989). For this reason, even though most of the latecomer countries have 
been making every effort to encourage the inflow of foreign technology for their own 
economic growth, successful results have often fallen short of expectations (Li and 
Kozhikode, 2008).In this regards, understanding how the Tiger countries built their 
internal capability to effectively exploit foreign technology has been an important 
pursuit for scholars studying innovation from an absorptive capacity perspective.  
 
While reviewing the ITT literature employing such assumptions, a question occurred to 
me. If successful cases of ITT have in fact occurred between partners who share no such 
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common grounds, how could this be explained? Did they succeed solely by accident? 
Did the recipients, in successfully adapting technology from contrasting partners, have 
some ―extraordinary capability‖ to overcome all barrier sand constraints? Extraordinary 
capability can be defined as some special capability accumulated within firms that are 
especially effective in overcoming the difficulties in the process of absorbing external 
technology. Or were there some mechanisms or special factors which allowed them to 
bridge the gaps and difficulties arising from a lack of common ground? In short, if 
valuable S&T knowledge exists in countries sharing no such common ground, how 
might these barriers, which ordinarily act to prevent the access and use of this 
knowledge and information, be overcome?  
 
If conjectures about the emergence of an era of open innovation, in which a greater 
share of technologies are available to others without impediments from intellectual 
property rights, are correct, national boundaries will become less distinct, and firms will 
need to consider exploiting the world-wide stock of scientific knowledge more actively. 
If they only exploit the knowledge stock in countries with similar common social and 
cultural ground, they will miss valuable technological opportunities. I concluded that 
tackling this issue of ITT through systematic research would be a meaningful 
contribution to widening our perspective and understanding of ITT. Also, if some of the 
latter research questions (in chapter 5) might be positively answered, there would be the 
opportunity to draw meaningful policy conclusions to aid in exploiting and extending 
our scientific and technological knowledge from around the globe. 
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1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The primary aim of this study is to identify and understand the underlying processes and 
mechanisms that make successful ITT between partners not sharing a common ground. 
For this reason, it is very important to find proper cases to elaborate the condition my 
study aims to. In order to focus on the central theme and make my research more 
feasible, I limited the scope of my research to a single domain: Korean firms‘ 
exploitation of Russian technology since the 1990s.  
 
The exploitation of Russian technology by firms in capitalistic economies is often 
considered very difficult (Dyker, 2004). The difficulties of exploitation, noted by Dyker, 
stem from the different nature of Russia‘s socio-economic and innovation system, as 
well as the nature of its technological knowledge from a Western perspective. These 
difficulties make ITT from Russia less attractive for firms in capitalistic economies. 
Historically, Russia had created a particular type of strength in technology development 
and innovation that met its national goal of building a powerful R&D sector appropriate 
for a socialist state (OECD, 1997). The question of what the concept ―appropriate for a 
socialist state‖ might mean can be legitimately raised, since the various socialist states 
emphasised different types of R&D activities. For Russia, two elements were 
particularly important: (1) using technology successes for the propaganda purpose of 
demonstrating the superiority of the socialist system, and (2) emphasis on developing 
military technology in part because of the extraordinary costs in human life and 
property of World War II (Cowan and Foray, 1995). Therefore, economic development 
was oriented towards large-scale industrialisation and expansion of the military-
industrial complex. For this reason, after the end of the Cold War, only special areas of 
Russian technology such as those from military, nuclear, and aerospace, etc., have 
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received much attention from Western countries (OECD, 1994). Despite this condition, 
some Korean firms, though not many, have achieved considerable success in making 
use of Russian technology, regardless of the gaps and difficulties. This raises the 
question of how they managed this achievement.  
 
Even though Russia and Korea are two sharply contrasting countries, they fortunately 
share some complementary strengths and resources for ITT. This seems to have 
motivated Korean firms to adopt Russian technology as a supplemental or alternative 
source of external knowledge, which had previously relied heavily on imported 
technology from advanced countries. Russia has a high level of advanced scientific 
knowledge, but little of it commercially linked (Dyker, 2001; Michailova, 2011). On the 
other hand, Korea has extensive capabilities in advanced industrial applications, but 
possesses a weak scientific knowledge base, largely because of its legacy pattern of 
following instead of leading in innovation. Table 1-1 shows the strengths of Russia and 
Korea, and illustrates the complementarity of these strengths. 
 
Table 1-1: Comparison of S&T strengths between Korea and Russia 
Korea Russia 
Downstream Upstream 
Applied Research Basic Research 
Private Sector Public Sector 
IT, etc. Aerospace, etc. 
Source: Author 
 
Korea has strategically focused on downstream technology that enhances applied 
technology and production capabilities as a way to compete with advanced countries in 
global markets (Kim, 1997b; Kim and Dahlman, 1992). However, Korea‘s advanced 
industrial structure demands ever more complex and sophisticated technology, requiring 
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fundamental knowledge across the entire spectrum of innovation from basic science to 
applied technology (MOST, 2001; Chung, 2006). Fortunately, Russia, to some extent, 
may be able to provide complementary strengths, and this turns out to be an ample 
foundation for technological exchange. Taking this into consideration, Korean firms 
may be reasonably planning to exploit Russian technology as a strategy for diversifying 
their sources of advanced scientific knowledge. And considering the technological 
exchanges from a Russian perspective, its hunger for foreign financial support and lack 
of intellectual property recognition in early 1990s were the drivers that stimulated 
cooperation between the two countries (MOST, 2001 and 2004). 
 
In addition, we will examine the case of Korean exploitation of Russian technology for 
implications affecting other latecomers who are currently coping with technological 
partners other than their traditional counterparts, notably the triad countries, the three 
developed markets of Japan, North America, and Western Europe. As such, this thesis 
may shed light on the nature of the gaps between contrasting systems of innovation, and 
identifies the measures that may prove helpful in overcoming barriers and gaps in 
exploiting or absorbing technological knowledge from partners who share little or no 
common ground. 
 
1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter 2 discusses the background of the conceptual framework, which is catching up. 
The issues of catching up are direct components of the conceptual framework, but they 
provide a relevant background for explaining how and why Korean firms were 
motivated to exploit Russian technology. The Korean approach to Russian technology 
seems to be influenced by the legacy of the catching up paradigm although there are 
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some differences in pattern and process of acquiring external technologies. The 
concepts of latecomer, product life cycle, and social capability are discussed from the 
perspective of catching up. 
 
Chapter 3 explains the relevant literature that is assembled to make the conceptual 
framework employed in this thesis. This literature serves to explain how Korean firms 
succeed in Russian technology transfer by overcoming the gaps and barriers. These are 
(1) absorptive capacity, (2) national innovation systems (NIS), and (3) barriers in ITT. 
These three concepts are the main components of the systemic capacity for 
technological absorption (SCTA), the conceptual framework discussed in chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 4 explores how the two contrasting and complementary innovation systems of 
Korean and Russia emerged. This chapter gives an overview of the processes undergone 
by both countries, of the nature of innovation systems, and how these relate to the 
Korean-Russian technology transfer. This chapter is not intended as a comparative study 
of the two economies. Its purpose is to analyse the features of the innovation systems 
and capabilities of each of the economies in order to explain the nature of barriers to 
technology transfer in the contrasting systems of innovation which are core components 
of the conceptual framework.  
 
Chapter 5 serves to introduce the SCTA which is the conceptual framework of this 
thesis. The SCTA concept is proposed to explain the situation and cases where 
technology acquisition through ITT requires the involvement of public actors as 
intermediaries in order to overcome the gaps between contrasting partners. The concept 
is focused specifically on the facilitating and bridging roles that intermediaries play in 
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assisting technology recipient firms. The principal barriers to ITT are characterised as 
arising from the tacitness of knowledge that must be acquired and adapted in the ITT 
process and the distinctive qualities of technology arising from ―locality‖, the context of 
the technology to be acquired and adapted. Both tacitness and locality are ―gaps‖ that 
are addressed by the ―capacity‖ in the SCTA concept and which are bridged using this 
―capacity‖. The SCTA concept is based upon a process having four stages: (1) 
recognition, (2) acquisition, (3) assimilation or transformation, and (4) exploitation. 
These processes provide a framework for gathering Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Chapter 6 explains the research methodology of this thesis including the rationale for 
choice of countries (Korea and Russia), the choice of methodological approach, and the 
process of selecting surveyed firms as well as the particular case studies employed in 
this thesis. 
 
Chapter 7 gives details of the survey results. The survey is based on results of a survey 
of 93 firms. These are firms that have been involved in the Korean-Russian technology 
transfer, and the majority of them have benefited from cooperation with public 
organisations and programmes. Data analysis is based on descriptive statistics, 
correlations and factor analysis. A detailed analysis of Korean-Russian technology 
transfer projects is presented in order to establish how Korean firms perceived the 
difficulty of adapting Russian technology, and what were the factors overcoming the 
difficulties in absorbing and exploiting Russian technology.  
 
Chapter 8 contains case studies with information from the intermediary‘s point of view. 
Two public agency programmes developed by Korean government are introduced in 
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order to discuss the link between role of the Korean NIS and the intermediary role in 
facilitating the local firms‘ technology transfer activities. 
 
Chapter 9 examines four successful Russian technology transfer projects which are 
discussed and analysed in order to develop a deeper understanding of motivation, gaps, 
and processes for Russian technology transfer, to explore the utility of the SCTA 
framework and to identify the role of intermediary organisations in enhancing firms‘ 
absorptive capacity.  
 
Chapter 10 summarises the findings, implications, conclusions and contributions, both 
from conceptual and empirical perspectives. It also acknowledges the limitations of the 
analysis and suggests some further possible lines of research. 
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide conceptual background to explain how and 
why Korean firms were motivated to exploit Russian technology. In recent years, Korea 
has had remarkable success in technological innovation, and has attained the position of 
global market leader in some major industries such as semiconductors, mobile 
communication devices, and automobiles (Kim, 2008). Nonetheless, in terms of 
building its own technological capacity, the Korean pattern of innovation activities can 
still be considered to be engaged in a catching up process (Lee and Cheng, 2011). 
 
Korea has considerable experience in ITT, however, much of this experience is 
particular to adapting working commercial technology rather than further developing 
and transforming technology produced in a non-commercial context or for which only 
―proof of concept‖ type knowledge exists. The Korean use of Russian technology 
follows a different pattern and process than technology acquisition processes from the 
triad countries. Nonetheless, ITT involving Russia still seems to be influenced by the 
legacy of the catching up paradigm. Korean firms are accustomed to learn from others, 
and the Korean government is also active in supporting firms‘ ITT activities 
 
Thus, some concepts of catching up may contribute to underpinning the motive for this 
study by improving the understanding of the Korean-Russian technology transfer. And 
they could also provide some of the relevant concepts from the literature for the 
conceptual framework discussed in Chapter 4. In this regards, this chapter discuss why 
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and how catching up takes place by latecomers and what make differences in 
latecomer‘s catching up performance. The concept of product life cycle, second and first 
mover advantage, and social capability are discussed to elaborate the catching up 
concepts and the background of the Korean Russian technology transfer. 
 
2.2. CATCHING UP AND LATECOMERS 
It is accepted that one major pattern of industrialisation of a latecomer economy has 
been the adoption and application of technology developed by other advanced 
economies (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). In other words, a latecomer country‘s industrial 
development and technological progress heavily relies on exploiting an international 
pool of already available technologies from Western advanced countries (Madison, 
1995; Gerschenkron, 1962).  
 
Many successful latecomers have combined the importation of foreign technology with 
indigenous efforts devoted to building their own technological capability (Kim and 
Dahlman, 2001; Kim and Seong, 2010; Lee and Lim, 2001).These efforts were 
complemented by improvements in domestic infrastructure and investment in education 
and training activities with sound policy measures. Success also requires an institutional 
set-up which is able to exploit these opportunities, and which complements them with 
domestic technology accumulation (Radosevic, 1999). This suggests that the specific 
processes and their contexts are very critical in understanding why some countries have 
successfully used the pool of foreign technologies and why others have not. East Asian 
countries, including Korea, are exemplary models among the latecomers of successfully 
catching up to technologically advanced nations.   
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The process and mechanism by which latecomer firms managed to enter international 
markets through technological catching up has been examined by several authors, e.g. 
Amsden (1989) and Kim (1980). Each of these studies highlights the utilisation of 
foreign sources of knowledge in economic development leading to catching up with the 
triad countries in particular industries. Hobday (1995) and Kim (1997a) explored in 
more detail the catching up process of firms in East Asia's lately industrialised 
economies. Since the 1960s, these countries have been quite successful in adapting 
foreign technology from the triad countries by importing mature, packaged, and 
codified forms of technologies from mature industries through the channels of technical 
assistance, licensing, acquiring turnkey industrial plants, and DFI (Kim, 1980).  
 
Latecomer countries also serve as production locations for advanced countries‘ firms 
and, through this process, companies in latecomer countries have successfully acquired, 
assimilated, and sometimes improved transferred foreign technologies, repeating the 
process with higher-level technologies and products (Kim, 1999). Assembly processes, 
product specifications, technical personnel, and components and parts are all taken on 
by the companies in latecomer countries. Once learned by one or several companies, 
production and product design is diffused within the country. This process holds true for 
both well-established and newly-developed technology. This involves both the transfer 
of technology and a substantial investment in R&D and education. Once a substantial 
number of industries have reached this stage, the latecomer countries may be considered 
to have succeeded in catching up, at least in technological terms (Caloghirou et al., 
2004). Through such processes and efforts, firms in latecomer countries accumulate the 
technological capability to compete with firms from advanced nations in some global 
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industrial markets. These firms have also made strenuous efforts to enhance their own 
R&D capabilities, while simultaneously adapting and improving foreign technology. 
 
2.3. SECOND AND FIRST MOVER ADVANTAGE 
This section discuss more specifically why and how catching up take place from the 
perspective of the second mover advantage. The complexities of first mover advantage 
are also discussed.  
 
It has been observed that the emergence, growth and dominance of a large number of 
firms from emerging economies have had humble beginnings. However, over a 
considerable period of time, these firms have become competitors for the global 
leadership position with respect to market share (Li, 2011). For example, Korea‘s 
Samsung Electronics, a global leader in mobile phones, memory chips, digital 
televisions, and consumer electronics, is a good example. Samsung was a latecomer, 
starting far behind the multinational incumbents in terms of their technological and 
production capabilities (Mathews, 2006; Kim and Seong, 2010). They rapidly 
accumulated technological capabilities by learning, combining, and integrating imported 
technology. Samsung continues, in many cases, to take the position of being a fast 
follower rather than a front-runner, waiting until technological risk is lower and market 
demand clearer before devoting great amount of financial resource and technological 
effort to overtake front runner firms (S. Hwang, personal communication, April 15, 
2010). However, in certain cases, such as memory chips and flat panels, Samsung has 
aggressively pursued the challenge of achieving a front-runner position by incurring 
high technological and financial risk. 
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This advantage utilised by latecomers is known as the second mover advantage (Epstein, 
2006). Second-movers can leverage forerunner‘s investments and efforts by following 
and imitating their best practices, while at the same time avoiding their mistakes. 
Considerable barriers may exist, but second-movers may be able to surpass the 
forerunners with intense efforts, luck and by developing more effective institutions 
(Dean & Master, 1991). Second mover‘s follower strategy is not only for latecomers 
who lack technological capabilities. Even well established firms can choose to be a ―late 
entrant‖ for strategic reasons. They can delay their entry into an industry until 
technological and market trends are clear, and then move in with superior forces to take 
the lion‘s share of the market. For example, Shamsie, Phelps and Kuperman (2004) 
argue that firms are more likely to attract customers to ensure their survival, even if they 
enter later, based on a study of 165 late entrants in 15 different new product categories. 
 
As successful latecomers approach the technological frontier, they may come to face a 
situation where a strategic choice needs to be made between continuously following the 
second mover‘s advantage or switching to pursue a first mover‘s advantage. By the 
1980s, as a small number of large Korean firms had become potential competitors in the 
international market, while the catch up model of innovation became more difficult 
because of foreign companies‘ reluctance to transfer technologies to Korea (OECD, 
2009). Accordingly, leading South Korean firms appeared to confront a strategic 
dilemma about whether to continue with a catch up strategy whether to try to compete 
on the basis of new products supported by in-house R&D (Hobday, Rush and Bessant, 
2004).    
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In similar contexts, Mathews (2002a; 2003) uses Penrose‘s resource-based view (1959) 
to analyse learning and competitive advantages of the second mover firms. He asserts 
that second mover firms do not have to adopt a passive stance in relation to global 
developments. They can make strategic choices and, by making such choices with 
conscious understanding of their latecomer advantages, they can expect to become 
players in the global economy, and thereby contribute to the development and upgrading 
of technologies from countries which they seek to emulate. 
 
However, the optimism regarding the potential benefits for catching up is not held by all 
scholars. For example, it is claimed that prior capital, knowledge, and skills are required 
to produce the new capital, knowledge, and skills associated with catching up strategies 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The dynamics of this process help explain how the rich 
get richer, while the poor get poorer, and the gap continues to widen for those left 
behind. This argument is related to what is now known as the first mover advantage, 
which is gained by the initial occupant of a market segment, and which may be referred 
to as the role of technological leadership (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). This 
advantage may stem from the fact that the first entrant in the market is able to gain 
control of resources and the rules of the game, shielding them from competitors, and 
then retaining the advantage by protecting their R&D through patents (Grant, 2003). 
The technological pioneers can indeed retain their advantage if they protect their R&D 
through patents or if they successfully keep them as trade secrets, or if they continue to 
move forward more rapidly than rivals (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988).  
 
Over time, innovation front runners have created numerous barriers, denying or 
complicating the entry for latecomer competitors (Perez and Soete, 1988). These 
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barriers include the establishment of technological standards, the construction of 
complex supply networks, the creation of superior distribution and support networks, 
patent and copyright protections, and other factors. Even latecomers that have 
accumulated their own capabilities may be able to develop a product without violating 
the network of patents established by the front-runners. 
 
The process of catching up does not always have equal effect across companies, due to 
the dynamics of capitalist markets and the leaders‘ strategies. In short, catching up may 
be impeded or delayed by patent barriers; in consequence, the costs of catching up must 
include the processes of inventing around existing barriers which go beyond patents. 
For example, Toyota‘s innovations stemmed from a search for ways to save on 
investment costs in automobile manufacturing. This was done by finding new methods 
of production that overcame the advantages (and barriers to entry) of the large scale 
investments of Western firms.  
 
In short, catching up processes involve the resolution of the contradictory conclusions 
of the first and second mover advantages, between the indefinitely long leadership by 
leading firms and successful challenging strategies by second movers. When first mover 
advantage prevails, catching up will be blocked. When second movers can secure 
distinct patent and productive advantages, they are likely to be able to overcome first 
mover advantage and to be successful in catching up. The next section discusses the 
complementary changes that are necessary for catching up to occur from an 
organisational viewpoint.   
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2.4. PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE 
The concept of Product Life Cycle seems to be very useful in explaining the success 
that some latecomers have in catching up. This concept is about how technological 
progressive industries evolve from birth through maturity.  
 
The Product Life Cycle concept states that, once a product‘s technology matures, its 
production moves away from the point of the original invention. Ultimately, that 
product may come to be imported into the country where it was originally invented 
(Vernon, 1966). Vernon‘s argument was associated with the fact that mature technology 
could benefit from wage differentials and the lower costs of adaptation in the transfer 
process.  
 
This concept can be understood in relation to the activities of multinational corporations. 
A global production network created by multinational corporations, as well as the 
interconnected global economy, has boosted international knowledge diffusion, 
providing new opportunities for capacity formation by local suppliers in latecomer 
countries (Ernst, 2002). In other words, an international division of labour created by 
Foreign Direct Investment can provide the opportunities for latecomers to form 
collaborative relationships with multinational corporations. A good example is when 
multinational corporations in advanced countries relocate production plants to 
developing countries in order to achieve cheaper production costs and larger volumes of 
production (Blanc, 1999). 
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Utterback and Abernathy (1975) developed a model showing that firms follow different 
pattern of technological development along the phases of a technological trajectory. 
They distinguish three phases of the evolution of technology within an industry: fluid, 
transition, and specific. The fluid stage is characterised by diverse technological 
opportunities and risks (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994). The market 
for a specific technology is not settled at this point and therefore the level of 
technological uncertainty remains very high. The change of product design and function 
is frequent and failure rates high. When the market for the technology stabilizes, 
surviving first developer firms enjoy first-mover advantage. The transition phase occurs 
as the technological risks decrease and the needs of the market are more clearly 
understood. At this point, a highly standardised product can be produced. Technological 
knowledge becomes codifiable and transferrable. In the third phase, technological 
possibilities related to the dominant design are gradually exhausted (Gardiner and 
Rothwell, 1985). Price competition becomes intense, with some firms trying to 
differentiate their products for niche markets in order to avoid price erosion. Production 
processes are automated and integrated for efficiency, with the side effect that the 
production process may become so rigid that it is difficult to improve. At this stage, 
developer firms may begin to relocate their production facilities to lower cost areas. A 
window of opportunity for latecomers opens at this point. Kim (1980) added to this 
perspective by noting that it is possible to enter during the second phase if a very 
intense effort is made to reduce the development time in order to achieve a competitive 
position as one enters in the third phase. 
 
The literature is full of examples of how latecomer firms catch up by initially adopting 
mature low level technology and then improving it to a higher level of performance or 
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productivity (Kim, 1980, 1997a; OECD, 1992; Dahlman et al., 1985). As discussed 
before, latecomer firms normally acquire mature foreign technology in packaged form, 
complete with turnkey plants, assembly processes, product specifications, technical 
personnel, parts, and components (Kim, 1999). During this process, the technology is 
diffused throughout the receiving country, and other firms not involved in the 
importation process also benefit. Firms in the receiving country may discover ways to 
improve imported technology by reverse engineering their designs and then modifying 
them. In this process, latecomer firms find themselves at the beginning of a new product 
life cycle. When a substantial number of a latecomer country‘s industries reach this 
stage, the country is considered to have succeeded in catching up. This is why 
developing countries are sometimes said to reverse a technology‘s trajectory from 
matured to emerging. Kim (1980) or Hobday (1995), examining the experience of more 
recent catching-up economies, have emphasised the role of creative imitation and 
development of these adopted technologies to address how these more modern 
latecomer countries and their firms achieved even greater benefit from their adoption of 
foreign technologies. 
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates both the product life cycle process and the reversing of a 
technology‘s trajectory (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Utterback and Kim, 1986; 
Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Firms acquire mature foreign technologies during the 
early phase of industrial development, and in the second phase, intermediate technology 
like process development and product design technologies. And in the third phase, R&D 
is applied to develop emerging technologies (Hobday et.al., 2004). 
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 Figure 2-1: PLC process and the Reversing of a Technology 
 
Source: This figure is modified by Authour (Kim, 1997) 
 
Although useful, these patterns are not universal, and they have encountered criticism 
from those who believe that the PLC concept fails to take the idiosyncratic nature of 
industries into account (Day, 1981). Innovation in latecomer countries must be 
understood differently from innovation in lead countries. The strategic goal of leaders is 
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to maintain their lead, while that of latecomers is to catch up (Amsden, 1998; Mathews, 
2001).  
 
A similar line of argument was developed by Akamatsu (1962) who paints the metaphor 
of ―flying geese‖ to describe industries as they rise and fall and move from country to 
country. He asserts that a complementary international setting is conducive to the 
division of labour, and that it contributes to success in catching up. The paradigm 
postulated that some Asian nations will catch up with the West as part of a regional 
hierarchy where the production of commoditised goods continuously moves from more 
advanced countries to those not as advanced. The lead ―goose‖ in this pattern is Japan. 
The second tier of nations consists of the newly industrialised economies of Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. This argument implies that the countries in the 
lagging tier attempt to learn the policies of the countries in the front tier. Chiang (2008) 
analysed the international diffusion of information technology based on this flying 
geese model using the production and trade data for the period 1980-2005. According to 
the data analysis, the production of IT goods was led by the USA, followed by Japan, 
which was again followed by Taiwan, South Korea, and China. Akamatsu‘s idea is 
similar to Vernon‘s in that the international diffusion of technology related to 
standardised assembly allows countries with lower wage rates to boost their economy.  
 
However, this idea of the product life cycle and flying geese has been shown to have 
some limitations. In some industries, highly automated production systems and process 
engineering reduce the cost of labour. This argument suggests that the cost advantage of 
latecomers alone does not provide a sufficient condition for catching up. Wealthier 
countries are able to preserve their competitiveness in manufacturing areas with higher 
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investment in production facilities, accelerating the pace of innovation and developing 
complex supplier networks. 
 
Lee and Lim (2001) also argue that successful latecomers will ultimately confront the 
need for more expensive technology necessary for obtaining a higher level of 
technological building capacity. At later stages of development, successful latecomers 
become potential rivals of leading countries. As this occurs, incumbent firms may 
become reluctant to transfer their technology. Therefore, a competitive advantage based 
on cheap labour cannot be sustained when numerous latecomers are succeeding in the 
―catching up‖ process. 
 
In summary, there are a number of different factors that might prove relevant for the 
catching up strategies of latecomer countries. Catching up countries (and firms) must 
consider their potential to achieve a second mover advantage at an early stage of the 
product life cycle and their ability to exploit their experience and growing capabilities to 
establish a first mover advantage in later stages of the product life cycle, initiating a new 
product life cycle. For any particular country, the nature and timing of entry is not 
dictated by this outline of strategic opportunities, nor are the possibilities mutually 
exclusive. Latecomer countries may engage, to a certain extent, in several different 
strategies depending on available resources and context. Overall, the entry timing and 
product life cycle models underscore the alternatives of 1) learning from Foreign Direct 
Investment and the diffusion of this learning through the economy, 2) fostering targeted 
efforts to exploit second mover advantages that may lead to a position of market 
strength and the ability to eventually become a first mover, and 3) the processes of 
creative imitation and adaptation leading to a second mover advantage. However, as I 
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will argue in next section, the single most relevant factor for catching up strategies is the 
social capability of countries and firms, as defined by their social capacity to adapt and 
effectively exploit novel technologies from abroad. 
2.5. CATCHING UP AND SOCIAL CAPABILITY 
The number of unsuccessful cases of catching up is much larger than successful ones 
(Fagerberg et al., 2006). Unsuccessful results are attributed to poor public policy, 
inability to adapt to external technology, and a flawed approach to economic plans 
(RAND, 2001). This is especially true in regards to poor transfer of technology from 
industrialised nations. Successful ITT is closely linked with firms‘ capabilities, 
including their indigenous efforts, policies, and institutional surroundings. This section 
discusses strands of the literature that are based on the ideas of social capability to 
enhance educated human resource, strong expansion of indigenous efforts, and 
latecomer‘s learning capability. 
 
There are a number of studies that attempt to explain the role of social factors in how 
and why technological catching up takes place (Hobday, 1995; Kim, 1997a, 1999; Kim 
and Nelson, 2000). But scholars have diverse perspectives on the matter.  
 
With his argument for the importance of nationalism and ―mobilisation‖, a kind of 
solidarity of purpose, Gerschenkron (1962) claimed that latecomer countries may be 
able to accelerate their growth rates and skip several stages by building strong 
institutions, making effective government intervention and public policies. 
Gerschenkron emphasised the importance of public policy, the role of government, and 
learning in the process of catching up. This also involves embracing the attributes and 
qualities of people and organisations that influence economic and technological 
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opportunities. This argument is supported by scholars who have observed that though 
East Asian countries have access to the same set of technology as developing countries 
in other regions, the difference in economic performance has been huge. Through this 
argument, it is seen that East Asian countries‘ attention to policy detail and investment 
in technological learning explains much of their success in catching up (Lall, 2000; Kim 
and Nelson, 2000). Other factors include the priority given to investments in education 
and the intensity with which educational achievement was pursued and important 
technological shifts in electronics, the automobile industry and shipbuilding. 
 
This argument for the importance of policy and technological learning is linked with the 
concept of social capability. Choosing appropriate policies and success in technological 
learning imply a related set of social factors and processes. The explanation of catching 
up could be restated as requiring exploitable technological opportunities (a ―gap‖ that 
can be addressed) combined with an adequate social capability to take advantage of 
those opportunities. From this perspective, the factors of successful technology transfer 
may be considered partly as a reflection of a national social capability involving the 
capability to absorb, effectively use, and improve imported technology. Some countries 
make good use of external opportunities by effectively absorbing, utilising, and further 
developing imported technology. Others do not. 
 
Abramovitz (1989) emphasises the importance of social capability, indicating the ability 
to absorb new technology and attract capital investment. Gerschenkron (1962) focuses 
more on the role of public policy, indicating governmental substitution for missing links 
in the facilitation of economic and social development. Dyker (2001) explains that 
social capability covers the elements in social and political infrastructure such as 
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educational systems, the banking system, and the political system. The concept of social 
capability provides the basis for arguing that the concepts of NIS (national innovation 
system) and NAC (national absorptive capacities) are relevant to the prospects for 
catching up. And according to the social capability perspective, effective catching up 
requires more than just the acquisition of technological capability: it also requires social 
capability to smoothly absorb and improve those transferred technologies. This is 
closely related to social capital, which places an emphasis on social trust and 
participation of a society. It is useful to consider effective performance as a dependent 
on already-mastered ―social‖ and ―physical technology‖ (Nelson and Sampat, 2001). 
Mazzoleni and Nelson argued that social technology is embodied in organisational 
forms, bodies of law, public policies, codes of good business and administrative 
practices, customs, and norms. The concept of social technology is closely linked with 
the social capability. 
 
A shortcoming of the ―social capability‖ perspective is that it is difficult to assess. Thus, 
it risks implying that those societies that are successful in catching up have social 
capabilities and those are not successful, do not have social capabilities. Focussing on 
specific elements of social capability is one way to avoid this circular reasoning. 
Technological catching up appears to require an educated population and firm-specific 
capabilities accumulated within the process of innovation activities, both of which 
support the technological learning process (Hobday, 1995). The successful latecomer 
economies including Korea and Taiwan support the proposition that investments in 
education and training programmes can make a major contribution to catching up 
(Wong, 1999).The rapid expansion of higher technical education, seen in follower 
countries such as Korea and Taiwan, directly results in an increase of employment 
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opportunities for engineers and scientists. Thus, for these countries, industrial, 
technological and educational policies are complements, not substitutes, and the ability 
to carry out these policies in a sustained and coordinated fashion explains their 
economic success (Dollar and Sokoloff, 1994). 
The accumulation of educated human resource is also likely to require mobility in 
education and training. The combination of studying abroad and hosting foreign experts 
such as professors or technical personnel has offered important human resource inputs 
for Korea‘s catching up efforts (Shin, 1996). Human resource policies implemented as 
educational policy and international mobility in training have a synergistic effect in 
building the absorptive capacity of latecomer firms. By having a more highly educated 
workforce, it is possible to draw upon a greater range of problem solving capabilities to 
address the problems of adapting technologies acquired from abroad, and this 
adaptation is further augmented by having individuals who have been trained or worked 
within foreign contexts. 
 
2.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
During the latter decades of the 20
th
 century, there was an increasing amount of effort 
devoted to catching up based on increased research effort, and this research effort was 
central to the strategies of firms that entered the technological race during this period. 
Through reviewing the concept of catching up in this chapter, there are two important 
perspectives that address this concept and experience. A first perspective focusses on 
how latecomer firms overcome disadvantages such as the lack of technological know-
how, scarce human resources, and access to well-established markets. The concepts of 
product life cycle and second mover advantage describe the context and mechanism 
employed in catching up. The other perspective focusses on the role of the state and 
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public environment in the firms‘ process of catching up including the concept of social 
capability.   
These two perspectives, the product life cycle and the second mover advantage, on the 
one hand, and the social capability, on the other, do not exclude each other. On the 
contrary, latecomer countries might engage in these two kinds of catching up strategies, 
depending on their context and resource endowment. However, the social capability 
perspective is of particular relevance for analysing technology transfer processes, 
especially in the context of partners with significantly diverse social settings. In 
particular, the social capability perspective underscores the fact that, in the context of 
technology transfer, the collaboration between individual actors and institutions is a key 
defining factor of success. This is so because the technology transfer process, as will be 
argued in other parts of this thesis, is comprised of complex and stage-specific needs 
that may require that firms be assisted by specific partners in order to navigate this 
process. This is why another way to look at the process of catching-up is that it is a 
process of co-construction or co-evolution between the capabilities of individual firms 
and the interactions of these firms with a larger social context which includes other 
firms, the government, and other domestic actors (e.g. public research laboratories and 
universities) as well as the interactions with the larger world. The next chapter identifies 
the concepts that are necessary for elaborating this larger context leading to a specific 
framework for considering how ITT may be made more effective.  
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CHAPTER 3. KEY CONCEPTS EMPLOYED IN 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the concepts assembled to construct the conceptual framework 
employed in this thesis. These concepts are absorptive capacity, national innovation 
systems, and the barriers in ITT. The empirical context of this technology acquisition is 
examined in Chapter 4 and the conceptual framework, discussed in Chapter 5, focusses 
on public contributions (through specific parts of the NIS) to enhance local firm‘s 
capability (absorptive capacity) by reducing the barriers in the process of technological 
absorption from Russian partners through operating public agency programmes 
(intermediaries). In this case, the role of a public agency programme in providing an 
intermediary or bridging role that operates as the conduit for successful technology 
absorption is explained detail in chapter 8. Thus, these three concepts are components of 
the SCTA, the conceptual framework developed and employed in this thesis. The 
discussion of these concepts and their complementarity in this chapter provides the 
rationale for the SCTA framework. 
 
3.2 ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY  
The differences in the catching up performance among latecomers are an important 
issue. A plausible explanation for differences in the success of absorbing foreign 
technologies is due to the variation of firms' abilities to absorb and exploit technology 
from foreign sources. This ability is called absorptive capacity, introduced by Cohen 
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and Levinthal (1990), and defined as the ability to recognise the value of external 
knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. 
 
It is not possible to clearly separate the sources of absorptive capacity from the factors 
involved. Education, indigenous development efforts, and technological experience and 
the learning provided by this experience all contribute to absorptive capacity. However, 
Cohen and Levinthal‘s definition of absorptive capacity highlights capabilities that are 
not self-evidently the consequence of an educated work force, indigenous technology 
development efforts, or technological learning. In particular, the ―ability to recognise the 
value of external knowledge‖ appears to be a cognitive capability that does not 
necessarily immediately follow and is not directly produced by the factors discussed 
above. Similarly, the abilities to commercialise, while partially gained through efforts to 
commercialise indigenous developments, imply further ―forward looking efforts‖ in the 
process of latecomers' acquisition of external technology (Li & Kozhikode, 2008). 
 
The following sections introduce the absorptive capacity concept, and connect it with 
ITT, examining this concept using the set of constructs and activities associated with it. 
This section also discusses mechanisms, interactions and structures within organisations 
that assist in building and maintaining absorptive capacity.   
 
3.2.1. Concept of Absorptive Capacity 
The concept of absorptive capacity has greatly evolved since its introduction. The 
concept is used in analyses conducted within several disciplines (Schmidt, 2005). It has 
been further developed by efforts to improve its theoretical foundations and it has been 
supported by a wealth of empirical evidence. Organisational learning and the capability 
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to adopt incoming knowledge creates a framework to analyse this diverse organisational 
and intra-organisational phenomenon. For this reason, Cohen and Levinthal‘s seminal 
paper has been cited more than 1,300 times and more than 600 papers have been 
published incorporating the concept of absorptive capacity in ISI journals (Volberda et 
al., 2010). 
 
In general, the term is used broadly to indicate a firm‘s receptivity to technological 
change and to measure its ability in making use of outside knowledge (Mu & 
MacLachlan, 2010). However, as established by Cohen and Levinthal the core concept 
of absorptive capacity emphasises that external knowledge is not freely and effortlessly 
absorbed. Effort, expertise, and strategy on the part of the firm are required to identify, 
assimilate, and exploit this external knowledge. One of the claims suggested by Cohen 
and Levinthal was that this capacity is primarily determined by a firm‘s prior related 
knowledge. Thus, investment in R&D is important for accumulating new knowledge 
and might contribute to absorptive capacity. In effect, absorptive capacity is treated by 
Cohen and Levinthal as a special kind knowledge that is itself generated, e.g. ―by 
having already developed some absorptive capacity in a particular area, a firm may 
more readily accumulate what additional knowledge it needs in the subsequent periods 
in order to exploit any critical external knowledge that may become available‖ (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990: 136). 
 
3.2.2. Absorptive Capacity and Prior Knowledge 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) hypothesise that an organisation‘s absorptive capacity 
depends on the absorptive capacity of its individual members and, as above, that prior 
knowledge is necessary for an organisation to identify and assess external knowledge. 
44 
 
 
  
In effect, Cohen and Levinthal propose that absorptive capacity is a distinct type of 
intangible capital, a stock of which may be accumulated through various inputs. 
However, indicators of this capability or measures of performance in its accumulation 
are less clear. For example, they do not propose a direct link between absorptive 
capacity and the proportion or number of highly educated employees, the performance 
of R&D or the ways in which technological learning is facilitated or blocked. 
Nonetheless, the intangible capital of absorptive capacity does seem to be related to 
each of these forms of knowledge accumulation. It also seems to be consistent with the 
larger ―resource based‖ theory of the firm which considers firms‘ capabilities as unique 
bundles of resources yielding sustainable returns above normal profits (Garud and 
Nayyar, 1994). 
 
What we do know is that Cohen and Levinthal propose that the firm‘s knowledge allows 
for better identification of the value of external knowledge, as well as a better 
understanding of appropriate product and service application. To the extent that this 
knowledge is related to an educated workforce, it would encourage the hiring of 
educated workers beyond immediate productive use. To that extent, it is related to R&D 
that would encourage continuing R&D efforts to adopt well established or new 
technology from outside. To the extent that this knowledge is built through experience, 
it would suggest beginning to accumulate productive experience as soon as possible.   
 
Aside from the lack of a specific prescription for how to accumulate absorptive 
capacities, there may also be some problems with the accumulation of this type of 
knowledge. The nature of prior knowledge may also serve as a barrier to absorbing new 
knowledge from outside. ―Firms often fail to identify and absorb valuable new external 
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knowledge because they are hampered by their embedded knowledge base, rigid 
capabilities, and path-dependent managerial cognition‖ (Todorova and Durisin, 2007, 
777). In other words, old knowledge may impede the absorption of new knowledge. For 
example, many analogue camera firms have failed due to their failure to effectively 
develop digital product offerings (Lucas and Goh, 2009). Their vast amount of analogue 
knowledge obscured the value of emerging technological opportunities in a digital era. 
 
Furthermore, the absorptive capacity concept has some application limitations in 
explaining latecomer firms‘ performance in absorbing and assimilating foreign 
technology. Most of these latecomer firms started with no, or very little, prior 
knowledge relevant to international competitive performance in the specific industries 
which they were seeking to enter. However, differences between latecomer firms in their 
performance in absorbing and assimilating foreign technology were very large. Since 
latecomers‘ R&D investment is mostly targeted at internalising and modifying 
transferred technology rather than creating their own knowledge, it seems that there was 
little or no direct linkage between knowledge accumulated through R&D and the type of 
knowledge that would be needed for building absorptive capacity.  
 
In a similar fashion, catching up focusses attention on the adaptation of specific 
technologies which may impede a more general accumulation of absorptive capacity 
stemming from productive experience or the qualities of the labour force employed. For 
these reasons, the absorptive capacity concept needs to be further developed if it is to be 
applied to explain the experience of latecomer country technology acquisition and 
adaptation. Doing so requires more closely examining absorptive capacity as a problem-
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solving capability and the socio-cultural context of building absorptive capacity, the 
subject of the next two sub-sections. 
 
3.2.3. Absorptive Capacity as a Problem Solving Capability 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argued that although learning capabilities involve the 
development of the capacity to assimilate existing knowledge and problem solving 
capabilities represent a capacity to create new knowledge, the two capabilities have a 
similar mode of development. Experience or performance on one learning task may 
have a positive effect on subsequent learning tasks. The prior possession of relevant 
knowledge and skills gives rise to creativity. They also argued that whether it be 
absorptive capacity for learning or problem solving, mere exposure to the relevant prior 
knowledge is not sufficient. Rather, the intensity of efforts is critical for the 
development of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
 
Kim (1997a, 1997b, 1998) emphasises that absorptive capacity depends upon the firm‘s 
existing knowledge as well as the intensity of efforts. For Kim, the absorptive capacity 
concept is understood as the capacity to identify and solve technological problems by 
utilising external knowledge. His argument is largely based on observation of the 
Korean experience. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the building process for Korean firms' 
technological capability is based mainly on learning and absorbing from more advanced 
foreign countries. Kim's term (1997) ―intensity of effort‖ refers to the amount of energy 
expended by the organisation's members to solve problems. According to Kim, it is 
insufficient merely to expose firms to the relevant external knowledge without exerting 
47 
 
 
  
effort to internalise it. The effort intensifies interaction among the organisation's 
members that in turn facilitates technological learning at the organisational level. Kim's 
view presents absorptive capacity as an organisational capacity that ensures a 
competitive advantage by strategically achieving goals through problem solving efforts. 
He emphasises that learning how to solve problems is built up after many practice trials 
on related problems. Thus, considerable time and effort directed toward basic problem 
solving is required before moving on to more complex issues. 
 
Korean firms aim to improve imported technology, which is a process known as 
―creative imitation.‖ In this process, there are various problems in need of solving in 
order to continue their process of improvement. Solving new problems may require 
intensity of efforts. Kim (1997) argued that the successful development of the 64K 
DRAM was a combined outcome of high prior knowledge gained from new scientists 
and engineers recruited from the U.S. (thus, an educated worker input), and high 
intensity of in-house efforts in assimilating and developing new DRAM products.  
 
The term ―effort‖ is an input oriented concept, and it is not assured that ―effort‖ will 
yield ―capability‖. In order for efforts to have a better chance of producing capabilities, 
it is necessary for the intensity of efforts to be guided by strategic direction about which 
problems to address, how these problems may fruitfully inform the adaptation process, 
and how lessons learned from solving these problems may be used for critically 
assessing other knowledge or possible acquisitions of equipment. Employees in Korean 
firms are well-known for working long hours, the longest among the members of OECD, 
and being part of a highly aggressive business culture. However, according to Kim‘s 
analysis, it is not the effort, as such, that is the secret to Korea's success. Learning at an 
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organisational level requires hard work by the individual, but more importantly, 
strategic direction in the leading of each individual. Such leadership forms a team with 
an excellent work ethic, enthusiastic to solve problems as a mean to success. Kim 
(1998) analyses the way Hyundai use ―migratory knowledge‖ to increase the intensity 
of organisational learning. An existing knowledge base increases the ability to search, 
recognise, and accurately represent a problem. Base knowledge is applied to problem 
solving, combined with the assimilation and application of new knowledge. A firm's 
capability to absorb knowledge from external sources is a pillar in the process of 
transforming existent knowledge into new knowledge, and its conversion into new 
value. 
 
3.2.4. Absorptive Capacity in a Socio-Cultural Context 
Some scholars have argued that the fundamental structural characteristics of absorptive 
capacity can be deployed most efficiently within a relatively homogenous culture 
(Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Lin and Berg, 2001). It is more likely that a group of 
individuals will adopt the concept in organisational context if the underlying 
characteristics of absorptive capacity are aligned with the features of their national 
culture. A national cultural environment creates social reinforcement contingencies that 
foster the pursuit of behaviour in organisations that fit (Steenkamp et al., 1999; Lin and 
Berg, 2001).  
 
Rosenberg and Steinmueller (1994) argue that national culture influences corporate 
culture. Nations and cultures that diminish the priority of individualism are 
characterised by strong ties formed within group. Individuals are expected to define 
themselves by the adherence to their social group. Research has shown that 
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organisations in these cultures are characterised by high degrees of informal 
communication and interaction, thereby matching the inherent nature of absorptive 
capacity (e.g. Chen et al., 1998). According to Doney et al. (1998), cooperation can be 
stronger in such group-oriented cultures, and a culture's dimensions directly affect the 
absorptive capacity of organisations within it. Hence, in Western cultures, considerable 
emphasis is placed on assuring that structural mechanisms are in place for fostering 
communication and cooperation since these may more often be a source of malfunction. 
Although there are exceptions, group-oriented cultures inherently show a high degree of 
communication and strong, continuous interaction between organisation members. 
These general observations have been further supported by a range of empirical 
organisational studies within the absorptive capacity research tradition.
1
 
 
Zahra & George (2002) theorise that ―social integration mechanisms can facilitate the 
sharing and eventual exploitation of knowledge‖ (p.194) The integration of individuals‘ 
absorptive capacity in to an overall organisation's absorptive capacity can only be 
accomplished if these mechanisms are installed and intensive communication sharing is 
effective (Lane et al., 2006). This is especially important given that absorptive capacity 
is a multilevel construct. By means of communication, the acquired knowledge can 
advance in the process through assimilation, transformation, and final exploitation 
(Lane et al., 2006).  
 
                                                                                                                                  
1
 The reader should notice that features of group-oriented cultures such as strong 
communication and interaction are indeed an advantage in the context of absorptive capacity. 
However, these same traits can represent a challenge when it comes to fostering innovation. 
Group-oriented cultures might experience problems associated with ―group-thinking‖ and 
rigidity that stem from the consensus driven dynamics of this kind of cultures. On the contrary, 
non-group-oriented cultures might more easily adapt to disruptive and innovative practices. 
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More concretely, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) identify R&D, manufacturing, marketing, 
and design as major pillars of communication. Lane et al. (2006) considers an 
organisation‘s ability to share information as one of the major conditions necessary in 
achieving a high degree of absorptive capacity. These insights are confirmed by 
empirical studies that show the importance of cross-functional teams (Meeus, 
Oerlemans and Hage, 2001), allowing for the conclusion that formal integration 
mechanisms are crucial in order to guarantee the success of absorptive capacity (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000). 
 
Developing internal R&D capabilities and human skill with the use of external 
knowledge sources produce high added value and innovation. Efforts in establishing 
interaction mechanisms and openness to knowledge sharing are not a substitute for 
internal efforts, but rather a complement to the creation of new value. The concept of 
absorptive capacity presupposes opportunities in the external environment which 
suggests the need to look at actors outside the firm that may contribute to the 
identification, acquisition, adaptation, and utilisation of useful knowledge. It is also 
possible for these actors to play an important complementary role to the absorptive 
capacities of the firm. These issues have been considered in the innovation systems 
literature, the subject of the next section. 
 
3.3. NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS 
The concept of NIS was developed and advanced by Freeman (1987), Lundvall (1992), 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1993), and Edquist (1997) in order to explain the systemic 
nature of innovation and identify the role of institutions and organisations in the 
processes of innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2006). NIS may be understood as a set of 
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interconnected institutions contributing to the development and diffusion of new 
technologies by creating, storing, and transferring knowledge. Both individual actors 
and contextual factors are important elements of NIS for the creation and use of 
knowledge (Sharif, 2006). 
As the linear model of innovation, in which new technology is assumed to develop 
directly from scientific accomplishments, was discredited through the 1970s and the 
1980s, innovation was increasingly understood as an interactive process. Interactions 
involving nonmarket relationships as well as the process of product innovations were 
considered, which framed innovations in a systems perspective, and studies took into 
account the interactions among universities, industry, the education and training system, 
and financial markets (Lundvall, 1999). 
 
While the NIS concept was first developed in academia, it is closely linked with policy 
issues and a discussion of these issues with policy analysis groups such as the OECD 
(Sharif, 2006). The rapid take up and use of the concept seems to have been the 
consequence of the fact that many of the key proponents of the concept occupied roles 
in both areas. According to Keith Smith, however, the concept can better be described as 
a policy concept rather than a theoretical concept because the principal application of 
the NIS is in the practical issues surrounding national administrative structure for S&T 
development (as quoted in Sharif, 2006. 750). 
 
Kaiser and Prange (2004) applied the concept of NIS to analyse the effect of science 
and technology policy in the German biotechnology sector. They adopted basic 
indicators of NIS which included regulation, the financial system, public policy 
regarding technology and innovation, the research and education systems, and corporate 
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activities. According to their analysis, in the case of regulation, two major changes 
including a centralization of regulatory competencies within the German Federation 
along with the Europeanization of biotechnology regulation resulted in biotechnology 
regulation being organised across various territorial levels having multi-level 
characteristics (Kaiser and Prange, 2004). This type of analysis provides more practical 
implications for establishing and implementing science and technology policy than the 
neoclassical equilibrium analysis or growth accounting (Sharif, 2006).  
In the context of ITT, dissimilar national systems of innovation need to be considered. 
For example, in the transfer of technology from Russia to Korea, an analysis of the 
dissimilarity of Russian and Korean NIS will help to understand the process of ITT. The 
dissimilarity affects the nature of innovations produced in each system, along with the 
supporting institutions available to help in ITT, and the enabling capacities for firms to 
absorb external knowledge. Though this is the central focus for considering the Russian 
NIS, all three factors are reasons for examining the Korean NIS.  
 
3.3.1. NIS as the Government Role 
The NIS approach may sheds a light on the government‘s role in the innovation process. 
NIS reflects the politics and policies that promote the innovative process of nations. It 
provides a useful contribution to the systematic understanding of various economic 
developments of countries. Empirical studies suggest that a well-developed innovative 
system is essential for the catching up process of countries (Fagerberg and Srholec, 
2008). One of the important reasons for the rapid catching up of East Asian countries is 
the active role of their governments (Hobday 1995). However, this does not mean that a 
government can develop or design an entire NIS. As Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) point 
out, some parts of a system can be consciously designed by a government, but many of 
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the relationships defining an NIS have to evolve through experience and to be 
customised to the specific circumstances of the country. 
 
The concepts of NIS can be described as a formal economic institutional approach 
which examines the relationships between the national institutions of finance, education, 
law, science and technology, corporate activities and government policies (Cvetanovic 
and Sredojevic, 2012; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). Another approach to defining the 
nature of NIS focuses on the importance of socially embedded knowledge and learning, 
and analyses the nature of business and social relations in a nation reflected in the way 
links between technology suppliers and users encourage shared learning (Dodgson, 
2008). With these emphases on institutional and knowledge and learning, the NIS 
approach has gradually replaced prior models based on the ―application‖ of scientific 
knowledge to commercial purposes, the so-called linear model, with a systems 
perspective on innovation which emphasises the interdependencies among the various 
agents, organisations, and institutions. This transformation leads policymakers to a 
different view of how government can stimulate the innovation performance of a 
country (Groenewegen and van der Steen, 2006).  
 
More specifically, the role of government and the public sector is very important as they 
serve as facilitators in creating competitive advantage. One starting point for examining 
a country's NIS can be to examine elements of NIS such as public agencies, universities, 
private firms, and governments (Cvetanovic and Sredojevic, 2012; Katal, 2008). Public 
agencies support and perform R&D while universities focus more on training scientists 
and engineers. Private firms that invest in R&D and in the application of new 
technology are regulated by an array of laws that define intellectual property rights 
54 
 
 
  
(OECD, 1997). However, the public research budget of some countries is directed at 
academia. Other countries have larger and more articulated public research systems and 
universities play a more specialised role, sometimes involving close links with industry 
(Goldhor and Lund, 1983). 
 
Government and the public sector provide complementary assets needed by firms to 
enhance innovation capability often by providing the proper institutional and 
infrastructural environment. These assets typically include high levels of domestic 
investment in human capital, tax incentives for R&D expenditure, and stable 
macroeconomic policy. According to OECD (1997), linkages between the public and 
private research sectors are also among the mechanisms that allow institutional 
interactions to take place and knowledge to flow in NIS. These linkages involve joint 
industry research, technology diffusion, and transfer of personnel.  
 
The relative importance of public research sectors serving as a source for industrial 
knowledge varies considerably depending on the importance of these institutions in a 
national setting. In some countries, public research institutions serve as the main source for 
developing and diffusing applied technology necessary to an industry. The importance of 
public research, for example the contribution of university research funded by the U.S. 
National Institute of Health, as a source of new ideas fuelling innovation is emphasized 
(Toole, 2012). And universities and public research organization are key institutions in the 
process of catching up (Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007). Moreover, the quality of a nation's 
public research infrastructure and its links to an industry are very important. In fact, the 
public research sector may be considered important as an indirect source of applied 
economic knowledge as well as a direct source of scientific and technical discovery 
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(Bartzokas, 2007; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007). 
 
3.3.2. NIS in Supporting ITT 
Although, the supportive roles of the NIS in innovation are well recognised, the ways in 
which the NIS might support ITT are less comprehensively examined in the literature.  
In this sub-section we will examine some of the ways in which the NIS might support 
the ITT process. This is followed in the next sub-section (3.3.3) by a more specific 
discussion of how the NIS might support firms‘ absorptive capacities. 
 
Policies aimed at improving a firm‘s absorptive capacities have sometimes focussed on 
effective networking. Such policies put the stress on the role of joint research and other 
technical collaboration between enterprises and public sector institutions. Networking 
schemes that help promote research and advance technology partnerships within a 
government are quite valuable, as is evident in the technology transfer between Korea 
and Russia. 
 
The degree of support provided by NIS and their policies for ITT varies depending on 
the size of firms, the level of economic development, and the nature of transferred 
technology (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). For example, NIS in developing countries plays 
a more active role in supporting a local firm‘s exploitation of foreign technology. 
However, public intervention is less likely to occur for large firms in advanced countries 
that already have strong capabilities in seeking and accessing needed foreign knowledge. 
However, Kim and Dahlman (1992) argue that with the help of NIS in latecomer 
economies, firms both large and small exploit relatively mature technology through 
licensing, turnkey plants, and capital goods. In this case, NIS does not directly affect a 
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firm‘s ITT activities. Nevertheless, NISs in these countries‘ make contributions 
indirectly by fostering well-trained scientists and engineers, and by providing physical 
infrastructure and financial support (Mowery and Oxley, 1995).  
 
An NIS is likely to be affected when firms change their innovation practices and the 
way in which they collaborate with external partners, sharing complementary resources 
(Wang et al., 2012). The supply of external knowledge is largely determined by a well-
equipped and functioning NIS (Wang et al., 2012). Even for firms trying to adopt 
external knowledge from other countries, a well-functioning NIS is important to provide 
various indirect policy measures, as witnessed in some latecomer countries. The role of 
the external environment is to support the provision of R&D manpower, competence 
building, networking, and financing of the innovation process. All are crucial NIS 
activities. Firms wishing to make use of external knowledge are keenly aware of the 
importance of a strong NIS. These organisations know that they depend upon the use of 
inter-organisational collaborative agreements and networks to link knowledge flows. A 
preference for open innovation will create a demand for a strong NIS (Wang et al., 
2012).   
 
Notably, innovation networks, especially those that promote inter-firm cooperation for 
technology intensive sectors, are based on a balance of strong cooperation and 
flexibility. As Powell (1990) has argued, networks are both different from markets and 
hierarchical organisation, in such a way they can provide the diverse resources 
(organisational, financial and knowledge-based) without the limitations imposed by 
being either purely guided by short-term profit making, or by bureaucratic hurdles. 
Given this, networks are especially important for the development of technology 
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initiatives, where trust, intense information sharing and cooperation are critical for the 
firms‘ success (Giuliani, 2010; Burt, 2011, Granovetter, 1985). However, in practice, 
developing countries tend to have weak or poorly governed networks that tend to 
weaken firms‘ absorptive capacity and flexibility (Velho and Saenz, 2002).  
 
It is clear that there is a positive connection between a firm‘s participation in national 
innovation networks and its innovation performance. This kind of participation 
flourishes in an environment with strong public-private cooperation within a NIS 
environment. Only if there are strong ties among all of the key innovation players can 
an NIS respond to challenges like the current pressure to boost the effectiveness of 
technology markets. By the same token, the more firms participate in innovation 
networks, the more important those networks become. The process itself moves the 
locus of innovation out of a single firm into the network. 
 
3.3.3. NIS and Absorptive Capacity 
The enhancement of firms' innovative capacity is a major priority in developing national 
innovation policies and helps to explain the considerable and persistent interest in the 
NIS perspective. By improving access to appropriate networks, firms are able to 
identify relevant technology and information, and to adapt such knowledge, for their 
own needs. This is done because of a firm‘s need to upgrade their technical, managerial, 
and organisational capabilities or to invest in internal R&D, personnel training, and 
information technology. Ultimately, the purpose is to improve a firm‘s ability to acquire 
domestic or foreign information and technology and absorb it on a continual basis. In 
general, technology policies should not only seek to diffuse equipment and technology 
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to firms but also to upgrade a firm‘s ability to find and adapt technology according to 
their needs. 
 
The experience of Korea and other Asian countries that have successfully engaged in 
catching up draws attention to the role of government policies in supporting the 
absorptive capacities associated with the inward transfer and exploitation of technology 
developed in other countries. Their national absorptive capacity is attributed to 
successful ITT, strong public policies, and solid government support (Dahlman and 
Brimble, 1990). This capacity relies on investments in the scientific and technological 
knowledge and education in labour force, along with innovation and economic policies. 
A strong national absorptive capacity is related to the public sector components of NIS 
including public agencies and policy programmes that support local firms‘ ability to 
adapt and exploit foreign technology. Additional features that may be present include 
training of scientists, providing favourable institutional framework, and investing in 
relevant infrastructure. By doing this, domestic abilities to adapt and adsorb foreign 
technology are possible and national absorptive capacity can be enhanced (Roessner et 
al., 1992). 
 
The concept of absorptive capacity was originally developed to apply to firm level 
activities. However, the national level of absorptive capacity is also discussed in relation 
to the concept of NIS (Hervas-Oliver et al., 2012). Firms‘ absorptive capacity may be 
enhanced by the external environment of the firm. It can be done by interactions within 
NIS. The definition of absorptive capacity, as offered by Mowery and Oxley (1995) is 
―a broad set of skills needed to deal with the tacit component of transferred knowledge 
and the need to modify this imported knowledge‖. They focus on a capacity that can be 
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applied at a national or economic level and utilised to adopt and develop new 
technology. The concepts of NIS and of absorptive capacity share similarities with the 
concept of social capability used by Abramovitz (1986). Thus, it is a useful extension of 
the firm-based concept of absorptive capacity to propose the concept of national 
absorptive capacity, which is the enhancement of a country‘s ability to absorb and adapt 
foreign technology through public policies, and investments in education and 
infrastructure. The level of national absorptive capacity is not an aggregating of 
individual firms‘ absorptive capacities, but a nation‘s systemic capacity. This is because 
a nation‘s social and institutional norms, standards, and framework in conjunction with 
public policies and strategies help firms to create and increase their capacity to absorb 
external knowledge.  
 
It is a reasonable conclusion that the development and enhancement of national 
absorptive capacity relies greatly on public policies and involvement. To make it 
effective, it requires two levels of approach. One is a general approach in which a well-
established policy, educational, and infrastructural environment helps firms to enhance 
their absorptive capacity. The other is to help by providing specific and detailed 
assistance to a firm asking for assistance. 
 
This conclusion is drawn based on cases of East Asian latecomers‘ successful 
exploitation of foreign technology. East Asian latecomers have created local absorptive 
capacity, allowing their economies to adapt and incorporate foreign technology 
(Dahlman and Brimble, 1990). National absorptive capacity requires a broad array of 
skills, including the ability to identify the value of and apply the tacit components of the 
transferred technology, as well as to modify foreign-sourced technology for domestic 
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application. This capacity relies on investments in the scientific and production labour 
force, tax benefits for R&D expenditures, and an institutional framework assisting a 
firm‘s innovation activities (Alam and Bagchi, 2011).  
 
In the past sections, I have discussed at length the concept of NIS to underscore the 
systemic character of technology transfer. Similarly to absorptive capacity, the NIS 
concept addresses the capacity of a firm or a national system, respectively, to identify 
and effectively adopt and implement a technology solution developed by others. 
However, the NIS concept emphasises the fact that the absorptive capacity of a firm can 
be greatly augmented by the integration of a set of institutions that aid firms in the 
specific stages and needs of a technology transfer project. As a consequence, even if a 
particular firm does not currently have the appropriate absorptive capacity for a given 
technology or partner, an effective NIS can intervene to expand the frontiers of 
possibility for this and other firms. Ultimately, a NIS can serve as an integrated network 
for technology transfer with distant partners.  
 
3.4. BARRIERS TO ITT 
Mansfield (1975) argued that it is important to distinguish between vertical technology 
transfer and horizontal technology transfer, where the former means transmission of 
knowledge from basic research to applied research, and from development to production 
and the latter the transfer of technology from one place, organisation, or context to 
another. The difficulties and costs of ITT are much greater than those for the case where 
only vertical or horizontal transfer is involved (Mansfield, 1975). 
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The nature of technology makes technology transfer difficult enough in domestic 
situations, and it is even more so in the international arena. In other words, the ability to 
utilise outside sources of knowledge is often difficult due to the organisational or 
individual context with which it is associated (Szulanski, 2000; Von Hippel, 1994).  
 
Scholars such as Brown and Duguid (1991) and Kim (1999) have deeply examined the 
entire processes of learning and have concluded that learning requires numerous 
institutional arrangements. This is necessary because the innovation process needs 
systemic direction at multiple levels as well as a multitude of connections with local 
institutions and the local environment. There is no blueprint for the ideal institutional 
arrangements that will deliver effective technological transfer and adaptation, 
particularly with respect to the tacit knowledge elements of technology. Inevitably, 
institutions will be shaped by their technological conditions, socio-economic setting, 
and political regimes. Thus, attempting to transplant them from one country to another 
generally fails (Rodrik and Subramanian 2003). 
 
From the standpoint of the technology recipient, effective technological learning is very 
important for the success of an ITT project. The concept of absorptive capacity implies 
that there are likely to be gaps between a firm‘s absorptive capacity and the required 
level of absorptive capacity for successful absorption of the technological knowledge.  
These gaps result in difficulties or barriers to technology transfer. In the following sub-
sections, three concepts related to those gaps that raise barriers to ITT are examined: 1) 
gaps arising from distance between the parties engaged in ITT, 2) gaps arising from 
different tacit knowledge of the parties, and 3) the potential role of intermediary 
organisations in overcoming these gaps.   
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3.4.1. Gaps from Distant Locations 
Technological change is the outcome of local innovation systems, including socio-
cultural, economic, political, and geographical dimensions (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988). In 
order to make technology transfer successful, it is very important to develop the 
capability to overcome the impediments caused by these diverse dimensions of 
differences. Because gaps or impediments arising from the socio-cultural dimension are 
embedded within a technology itself and transfer organisations, the performance of 
international technology transfer may vary due to differences in the underlying socio-
cultural compatibility (Na-Allah and Muchie, 2012). Some examples of such socio-
cultural dimension are attitudes to risk, distribution of power and rewards in the 
recipient organisation, location in the individualistic-collectivistic culture spectrum with 
regard to absorbing and diffusing imported technology, physical proximity, and ease of 
communication (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Gibson and Smilor, 1991). 
 
Kedia and Bhagat (1988) proposed a conceptual model, as shown in Fig. 3.1, for 
understanding cultural constraints on technology transfers across nations. According to 
this model, there are two groups of factors which are causally related to the 
effectiveness of ITT: the characteristics of the technology involved and differences in 
organisational cultures between the transacting organisations. There are also factors 
presumed to be moderating influences on the causal relationship. These include societal 
culture-based differences and absorptive capacity or the existence of a sophisticated 
technical core in the recipient organisation. However, this model seems to be ambiguous. 
For example, there are some difficulties in distinguishing between impediments arising, 
on the one hand, from differences in the organisational cultures between the transacting 
organisations and, on the other hand, from societal culture-based differences. In terms of 
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barriers or difficulties involved in ITT, the characteristics of the technology and 
differences in culture between different NIS could be a cause of barriers. In addition, 
however, the absorptive capacity of the recipient organisation, as defined by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990), and not illustrated in Fig. 3.1, could provide a basis for effective 
technology transfer. In other words, Kedia and Bagat‘s model, illustrated by Figure 3-1, 
argues for a deterministic model of effectiveness of technology transfer in which socio-
cultural context matters more than individual differences between firms in their 
capacities to overcome barriers. 
 
Figure 3-1: A conceptual model for understanding cultural constrains on internal technology transfer 
 
Source: Kedia and Bhagat (1988) 
 
Differences inhibiting ITT sometimes stem from factors related to political and legal 
factors such as laws, trade policies, tariffs, licensing regulations, and other economic, 
technological, and social factors (Munari, Sobrero and Malipiero, 201; Kedia and 
64 
 
 
  
Bhagat, 1988; Perez and Soete, 1988). It seems reasonable to assume that technology 
transfer projects that span larger cultural differences at an organisational or national 
level will generally have a lower rate of success in comparison with projects with 
smaller differences. This is due mainly to the higher potential for misinterpretation of 
information by the recipient firm. Person or process-embodied technology is more 
difficult to transfer and diffuse than product-embodied technology in relation to cultural 
differences at organisational and societal levels (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Lin and Berg, 
2001). For example, the cultural value system of Germany, which places values on 
assertiveness and achievement, is different from that of India, which places value on 
social relationships (Steenkamp, Hofstede and Wedel, 1999). Therefore, a transfer of 
technology may disturb one such cultural value systems and is more likely to be resisted 
(Keller and Chinta, 1990). 
 
Keller and Chinta (1990) argued that examining both the barriers and impediments to 
technology transfer, and the bonds or bridges that can alleviate these blockages, help in 
understanding the context in which ITT occurs. They proposed an integrative 
framework of ITT as shown in Fig. 3.2. In this framework, there are four groups of 
factors influencing the success of technology transfer: content of transfer, barriers, 
bonds, and mode of transfer. The content of transfer includes machinery, personnel, and 
methods. For barriers, two categories of factors are suggested. The first category is 
political and legal factors such as laws, trade policies, tariffs, or licensing regulations, 
and the second category is economic/technological/social factors. Adopting the terms of 
Kedia and Baghat (1998) discussed above, the barriers may also include the differences 
in political, legal, economic, and social factors between the organisations or countries. 
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Further analysis of the implications of localised knowledge involves definitions of 
various types of ―distance‖ between sellers and recipients – distances in terms of culture, 
practice, and experience can be defined and are often correlated with physical distance. 
That is, longer distances often involve larger changes in culture, practice and experience. 
This makes technology acquisition a localised and path-dependent learning process. 
This concept is drawn from the innovation system perspectives best summarised by 
Freeman (2002). He states that technological organisations are ―embedded in a much 
wider socio-economic system in which political and cultural influence as well as 
economic policies helps to determine the scale and direction of all innovative activities‖ 
(Freeman, 2002: 195). Countries with similar socio-economic systems, including their 
industrial structure, share more common ground than those with dissimilar systems. In 
addition, it is commonly recognised that technological progress is a highly path-
dependent process that evolves along specific trajectories that have become embedded 
in a country‘s environment. Consequently, every country has a certain degree of 
technological context that is specific to that country. Those countries with similar 
technological context can communicate their technological knowledge move easily than 
those with different contexts (Bae, 2005; RAND, 2001). 
 
Firms in a source country may attempt to exert control over technological resources by 
putting restrictions on the movement of technological information. A firm within such a 
source country may patent a large number of related products and market only a limited 
range of products in order to decrease potential competitive pressures. Furthermore, if a 
license is negotiated for a particular product, a firm in the source country may limit the 
conditions and fields of use for such a product.  
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Figure 3-2: An integrative framework of international technology transfer 
 
Source: Keller and Chinta (1990) 
 
There are also thousands of industrial standards that are required for a modern economy 
to function. Some recipient countries may lack the necessary compatible industrial 
standards that exist within a source country. Industrialised countries have standards for 
things such as electrical voltage, metrication of weights and measures, threading of 
fasteners, dimensions of roadways or railroads, radio and television frequencies, 
building codes, etc. (Keller and Chinta, 1990). In some cases, particularly in some of the 
electronics industries, these compatibility standards are also accompanied by intellectual 
property, which may create additional barriers. Assimilation and transformation costs 
must be taken into consideration if the recipient country does not meet such standards.  
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3.4.2. Gaps Stemming from the Tacit Nature of Knowledge 
The effectiveness of technology transfer may depend on the characteristics of the 
technology being transferred. Successful technology transfer does not merely consist of 
transferring proprietary information and rights to the other party; it also includes both 
the transfer of technological information and the capability to master that technology 
(Rosenberg, 1982: 249). A significant part of technology is tacit and is embodied in 
individual and organisational routines. It is therefore inherently difficult to transfer a 
tacit component of knowledge without local investments in learning, which is how 
knowledge becomes re-embodied in the receiving organisation (Lawson and Lorenz, 
1999).  
 
For transfer to occur, this technological knowledge must be re-embodied in the 
receiving organisation. The term ―re-embodiment‖ refers to the fact that the same 
knowledge does not exist in the two organisations, but that the knowledge of the 
receiving organisation is sufficient to modify, extend and improve the technology in 
ways that are, at least in principle, equivalent to those existing in originating 
organisations. Because the knowledge is not the same, it may in some cases prove more 
effective. This effectiveness depends more on the evolution of the technology and the 
uses to which it is applied than it does on pre-existing knowledge about the technology 
since, after transfer has occurred, the receiving organisation has its own base of 
knowledge for making applications and improvements.  Whether, using this new 
knowledge base, these applications and improvements will be superior or inferior is 
uncertain and hence the re-embodiment of technology is not only difficult but also has 
uncertain outcomes. The re-embodiment problem makes technology difficult to 
reproduce and transfer (Radosevic, 1999b). 
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There are other aspects that contribute to the difficulty of technology transfer. In many 
cases, it is not economically rational to make technology readily transferable. If it were, 
then the ability to appropriate returns might be limited. Even in industries where 
knowledge is highly codified, the very understanding of this codification assumes 
continuous interpretive knowledge (Styhre, 2003). It may be more cost efficient to have 
successive generations of people learning on a person-to-person basis rather than 
codifying the interpretive knowledge (Cowan, David and Foray, 2000). 
 
These basic observations about the difficulties of knowledge transfer have been 
considered by a number of authors, often using slightly different terminology or 
understandings of the re-embodiment problem. For example, Polanyi (1958) takes a 
slightly different approach to tacit knowledge. He views tacit knowledge as a personal 
form of knowledge that individuals may obtain only through direct experience rather 
than through a medium such as a manual book or blueprint. He further encapsulates the 
essence of tacit knowledge in the well-known phrase ―we know more than we can tell.‖ 
According to his argument, tacit knowledge is held in a non-verbal form; therefore, the 
holder cannot provide a useful or verbal explanation to another individual. He contends 
that tacit knowledge is the elusive and subjective ―awareness‖ of an individual that 
cannot be easily articulated into words. From Polanyi‘s perspective the articulation of 
tacit knowledge into documents (what is later called codification) is either an 
impossible task or one that results in substantial destruction of the original knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1966). It is this difficulty of diffusing tacit knowledge into other forms of 
explicit knowledge that requires the recipient to have the capacity to adequately absorb 
this tacit knowledge. Grant and Gregory (1997) analyse this issue with cases studies 
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dealing with manufacturing technology transfer. They conclude that the extent of the 
transfer of tacit knowledge often has a major impact on the effectiveness of technology 
transfer. 
 
Another approach to the re-embodiment problem comes from the knowledge 
management field. Within this field, the common view that knowledge is a valuable 
organisational resource has become widely recognised and accepted (Empson, 2001). 
Consequently, there has been an increasing interest in the tacitness dimension of 
knowledge. Tacit knowledge is viewed as one of the hardest aspects to manage as it 
cannot be formally communicated. Thus, the issue of tacit knowledge has been dealt 
with in many disciplines by many authors. It is considered to be relatively unexplored 
and not fully understood (Zack, 1999) compared to that of the work on explicit 
knowledge (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998; Holtshouse, 1998). 
 
Yet another approach to the ―re-embodiment‖ problems is Gibson and Smilor (1991) 
who suggest a three-level involvement model of technology transfer (see Figure 3-3). At 
level I, the transfer process is largely passive through materials such as research reports 
or journal articles which contain technological information. At level II, efforts are made 
to make certain that the technology is made available to the recipients of the technology. 
At level III, technology is applied for the profitable use of the technology in the market 
place as well as in intra-firm processes. At this level III, which is closely related to the 
effective transfer of technology as described in Kedia and Baghat (1988) or success of 
technology transfer in Keller and Chinta (1990), interpersonal communication is 
emphasised (Gibson and Smilor, 1991), which again suggests that the transfer of 
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codified knowledge is not enough and the transfer of tacit forms of knowledge is 
important for the success of ITT. 
 
Figure 3-3: Technology transfer at three levels of involvement 
 
Source: Gibson and Smilor (1991) 
 
3.4.3. Role of Intermediaries Overcoming the Gaps 
As noted at the outset of this thesis, a hypothesis concerning ITT is that it is influenced 
by differences arising from the unique context of socio-cultural systems and the 
distinctive qualities of technology. These differences may be defined as ―gaps‖. An 
important issue that must be considered in dealing with ITT involving distance and 
tacitness gaps and thus solving the ―re-embodiment‖ problem is how these gaps may be 
bridged by intermediaries. Intermediaries promote a firm‘s ITT activities by providing 
supportive services and information. If an intermediary is involved in public sector, it 
may have authority to make a favourable legal and institutional environment for ITT. In 
dealing with innovation, they fill structural holes between different groups and build a 
bridge for knowledge to be transferred more smoothly (Burt, 1992; Sarvary, 1999). 
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Knowledge which is tacit in the way suggested by Polanyi (1966) may immediately call 
for an intermediary who can help structure the experience of individuals in the receiving 
organisation to reproduce the tacit knowledge. Intermediaries may also serve as 
boundary spanners between technology sources and their recipients, taking knowledge 
from one domain and applying it in another (Polanyi, 1966). What they are ―spanning‖ 
is the gaps between the two different organisations collective and individual knowledge. 
As the distance between the parties in terms of language and culture, and the physical 
distance, increases, the boundary to be spanned becomes more complex. This amplifies 
the importance of the intermediary (Kostova and Roth, 2003). 
 
Another term used in the literature is that of the ―middleman‖ (Kodama, 2008). Kodama 
views the role of the middleman as essential in the informal dissemination of knowledge 
that facilitated technical improvements in agriculture and textiles, and the processing of 
wool. Middlemen spent much time observing the best practices of each of these 
industries and then disseminating those practices to help raise the average or typical 
practice in firms with which they were more closely allied and thus benefitted from the 
resulting greater competitiveness of these firms. In both the past and present, successful 
intermediaries help both buyers and sellers by reducing their clients‘ searching and 
bargaining costs, thus earning their fees within the pressures of the market. In addition, 
they mitigate market failures caused by imbalances in the information available to 
buyers and sellers.  
 
The importance of intermediaries may have increased in recent decades due to the 
increased need for translating and transferring knowledge (Boon et al, 2011). The 
variety of intermediaries is growing, and now includes consulting service organisations, 
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incubators, technology licensing offices, science parks, etc. (Van Lente et al, 2003). 
Intermediary functions grow to meet the needs of specific innovation systems. They 
now operate upstream in the innovation value chain, gathering intelligence on new 
developments. They also operate downstream in activities such as IP management and 
commercialisation (Ulset, 1996). The roles of intermediaries include: adapting 
specialised solutions to the needs of firms, connecting players within a technology 
system, identifying appropriate collaborative partnerships, and creating and maintaining 
relevant databases on technology, markets, competitors, etc. Intermediaries‘ clients on 
both sides of each transaction are discovering new needs for their services and 
demanding to have those needs filled (Boon et al, 2011). In all of these cases, the 
intermediary is acting in ways that will alleviate the ―re-embodiment‖ problem by 
spanning or building bridges to traverse gaps in knowledge, understanding, and 
capabilities. 
 
The roles that intermediaries perform in the technology transfer process between large 
and small firms are often organised in an entity known as a technology licensing office. 
These roles include: identifying partners in technology transfers; packaging the 
technology to be transferred; selecting suppliers to make components for the 
technology; providing support during the negotiation process; and advising on the terms 
of contracts and licensing agreements. It is noteworthy to observe that many universities 
and public research institutes have established internal technology licensing offices.
2
 
Ideally, such intermediaries help turn potential competitors into potential partners by 
                                                                                                                                  
2Technology licensing offices established by public sector organisations may perform rather 
differently, with some more interested in ―rent seeking‖ for returns on public sector research 
while others play a more effective role industrial development, see Llerena et al. (2003). 
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building trust and preserving confidentiality. They may mitigate the risks of disclosing 
sensitive technological information by analysing and evaluating each partner objectively. 
 
3.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed key concepts of the conceptual framework employed in this 
study. This chapter draws upon the existing literature on absorptive capacity, problem 
solving, and socio-cultural differences. The concept of absorptive capacity is relevant to 
understanding the Korean use of Russian technology. This concept helps to explain the 
degree to which latecomers in both advanced and developing countries may succeed in 
augmenting their technological capacity with external knowledge. In addition, it is 
especially useful in understanding the successful transfer of technology between Russia 
and Korea. 
 
The role of NIS in assisting local firms in absorbing external knowledge has also been 
discussed. A distinction is made between the role of the public and private sectors in 
providing optimal conditions for technology transfer. The public sector is seen to act 
through public R&D agencies and through law and regulation, while the private sector 
operates through R&D firms. As discussed, the NIS approach may shed light on the 
government‘s role in the innovation process. In this thesis, the NIS concept is important 
in explaining the Korean government‘s role in assisting ITT across gaps resulting from 
differences in context and experience, elements that are identified with tacit knowledge 
and the shortcomings of codification.   
 
Finally, the relation between the barriers that arise as a result of the gaps between 
dissimilar NISs, such as gaps from the distant locations and different experiential 
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backgrounds that create different tacit knowledge, have been discussed in terms of 
barriers. However, these barriers create opportunities for intermediaries to span or 
bridge these gaps. The gaps from dissimilarities between the NISs of Russia and Korea 
stem from both locational and tacit knowledge perspectives and this is why they are key 
concepts to be examined and tested in this thesis. In addition, the relative importance of 
gaps arising from location and tacitness is, ex ante, unknown and remains to be assessed 
in the empirical work of this thesis. The next chapter will discuss in more detail about 
how absorptive capacity, NIS, and barrier ITT comprise the conceptual framework of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the empirical background characterising the 
Korean-Russian technology transfer process. It demonstrates the nature of ITT between 
Korea and Russia and how it differs from traditional ITT between developed and 
catching up economics. It also examines the nature of the gaps between the two 
countries. The Korean approach to the exploitation of Russian technology is illustrated 
in order to capture the macro level conditions and background shaping Korean firms 
involvement in such ITT. The ways in which Russia‘s unique S&T system leads to 
difficulties for Korean firms in the process of ITT are also considered. This chapter is 
organised in three sections, each of which presents an empirical facet of the Korean 
Russian technology transfer. These are: (1) the Korean absorptive capacity, (2) the 
nature of the Russian Innovation system, and (3) the evolution of Korean-Russian 
cooperation.  
 
4.2. KOREAN ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY  
This section addresses the empirical background of Korean absorptive capacity as part 
of the context that influences the success of Korean-Russian technology transfer. 
Specifically, this section addresses how Korea has built up the necessary infrastructure 
and policy framework leading to Korea‘s search for foreign sources of innovation. This 
section also reviews how Korea has accumulated technological capability throughout 
Korea‘s modern history. A large part of Korean success in the development of 
technological capability has relied upon foreign suppliers of fundamental technology. In 
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the process of adapting foreign sources of fundamental knowledge, Korean firms have 
accumulated unique technological capabilities and knowhow in making effective and 
strategic technology adaptation. The Korean government also provides various policy 
measures to assist ITT activities and thereby strengthens national innovation capacities. 
The history of Korean firm experience in ITT and the role of the Korean government in 
assisting firms‘ efforts in the process of technology transfer are keys to understanding 
Korea‘s success in ITT. 
 
4.2.1. Korean Achievements in Industrial Development 
Modern industrialisation in Korea actually began during the colonial period, when the 
Japanese government managed the peninsula‘s economy as an integral part of its empire 
(OECD, 2009). However, the majority of Korean academic society and people believe 
that during the Japanese occupation period, the nation‘s autonomous introduction of 
industrial developments was limited by Japan‘s isolationist policies and increasing 
militarism (Hong, Yim and Seo, 2007). 
 
After the colonial period had ended, Korea‘s economy had fallen to the point of collapse 
during the Korean War (1950-53). In the 1950s, Korea was a nation ―with a shattered 
past and a bleak future‖ (Kim and Dahlman, 1992). Despite this, Korea managed to 
achieve a high and sustained rate of economic growth beginning in the 1960s. The 
annual growth rate of real GDP of Korea was around 8 percent from 1961 to 2000 (Shin 
and Chang, 2003). This achievement is often called the ―Miracle on Han River‖. The 
phrase comes from the ―Miracle on the Rhine‖, used to explain West German‘s rapid 
reconstruction after the Second World War (Lee and Yoo, 1987). 
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Korea‘s full-fledged industrialisation actually began in the early 1960s (Yi, 1999). At that 
time, Korea had neither the technological capacity nor locally accumulated capital and 
Korea‘s only abundant resource was labour. In order to initiate industrial development, 
utilising its labour with foreign technology and capital was a natural and perhaps the only 
available step. In order to pay for foreign technology and attract foreign investment, Korea 
adopted a strategy of export promotion that would accelerate growth though resource 
allocation in line with the comparative advantage of Korea in making effective use of well-
trained labour (MOST, 1987). When Korea began to launch an export-oriented economy, the 
targeted imported technologies were mostly at a mature stage of development. Those mature 
technologies Korea needed for export-oriented industries could be acquired through direct 
foreign investment or foreign licensing. But in the early years of industrialisation, formal 
technology transfers such as foreign direct investment or licensing of foreign technologies 
were restricted and the Korean government promoted technology transfer through the 
procurement of turnkey plants and capital goods (Kim & Dahlman, 1992). 
 
Most of the foreign licensing was related to technical assistance for training local engineers 
to operate the turnkey plants. The government emphasised import-substitution while giving 
tariff exemptions on the import of capital goods. Therefore, Korea acquired a large part of 
foreign technology through informal channels when the country exported basic natural 
resources and simple products (Shin and Chang, 2003). The acquisition of foreign capital 
equipment was accompanied by increasing capabilities in reverse-engineering to reduce 
technological dependence and reduce capital acquisition costs (Chung, 2006). Amsden 
(1989) and Kim (1999) described the Korean case as industrialising through technological 
learning. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s, Korea developed an indigenous base for research and 
innovation in order to be competitive in global markets. Thus, the innovation policy focus 
shifted toward strengthening the national system of R&D (Bartzokas, 2007). In addition, a 
gradual opening of the domestic market forced Korean firms to improve their own R&D 
capabilities. During these decades, the Korean domestic market no longer served as a safety 
net for national firms and this increased the pressure on firms to compete internationally. In 
order to succeed in this international competition, Korea could no longer rely on a cheap and 
hardworking labour force.   
 
As seen in the table below, Korea‘s top export items were iron ore, tungsten, and anthracite 
coal in 1960s. In 1980, they were textiles, electronics and shoes. In 2000, high technology 
and capital intensive products became top export items such as semiconductors and 
computers, petrochemicals and mobile telecom devices. To change its pattern of export from 
mineral resources to sophisticated manufactured goods, Korean firms were required to 
enhance their technological capabilities rapidly and they relied heavily on foreign sources of 
technological knowledge to do this.  
 
Table 4-1: Changes in Korea’s top-7 exported products 
Ran 1960 1980 2000 
1 Iron ore Textile Semiconductors 
2 Tungsten Consumer Electronics Computers devices 
3 Anthracite coal Shoes Petrochemical Products 
4 Squid Vessels Mobile telecom handset 
5 Live fish Synthetic resin products Vessels 
6 Graphite Metal products Steel plates 
7 Plywood Plywood Apparel 
Source: STEPI (2005). 
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4.2.2. Korean Public R&D System 
The establishment of a public R&D system is another important aspect of understanding 
Korea‘s successful achievement in innovation. The Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST), a government ministry responsible for promoting S&T, was launched in 1967. 
And it may be considered as a particularly important shift in Korea‘s post-war economic 
development (MOST, 1987). MOST placed the highest priority on the establishment of 
―the Long-Term Comprehensive Plan for S&T Development‖ which functioned to 
define and promote future directions for the development of S&T (MOST, 2008). The 
plan aimed at achieving the highest level of S&T among newly industrialising countries. 
This plan established policy measures to boost Korea‘s own R&D and the creative 
improvement of foreign technology. These measures included the nurturing of scientists, 
engineers, and the private sector‘s technology development activities, and the 
development of original technology (Kim 2002). 
 
The fostering of government-funded research institutes (GRIs) was one of the most 
notable aspects of Korea's S&T development process (Lee, Kim, and Sohn, 2005). The 
nation's universities had focused on educating individuals for technical careers while 
firms were keen on developing productive rather than innovative capabilities during the 
1960s and ‘70s. For each, R&D efforts were outside of their core activities. To respond 
to this, the Korean government adopted a strategy to set up research organisations in the 
form of GRIs. As the name suggests, these were not, strictly speaking, national institutes, 
but were semi-autonomous and largely privately funded. However, the private funding 
was often ―directed‖ by the government which could exert control over firms due to its 
capacity to channel foreign investment, according to interviews with those responsible 
for policy making during this period (D. Lim, personal communication, December 1, 
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2011; S. Jang, personal communication, December 3, 2011). The centrality of private 
funding was preferred because the government believed national institutes were 
inappropriate for meeting industrial needs. National institutes inevitably have rigid 
operating systems with regard to promotion, salary, and other issues.   
 
One of the important Korean GRIs that set a pattern for later GRIs was the direct result 
of the US-Korean political relationship. At a summit meeting in 1965, President 
Johnson of the United States and President Park of Korea reached an agreement related 
to the foundation of KIST (KIST, 2006). This was mostly because the US wanted to 
provide assistance for Korea in exchange for her participation for the Vietnam War. In 
their joint statement, it was announced that the United States had agreed to provide 
Korea with financial and technical assistance for the establishment of an industrial 
research institution (D. Hyun, personal communication, October 7, 2007). KIST 
persuaded Korean scientists and engineers working abroad to return home, incentivising 
them with high salaries, housing and sabbaticals to be used for research. KIST was 
equipped with modern facilities and researchers operating autonomously without direct 
control by the government (Choi, 2003). As Korean industry became more sophisticated, 
many GRIs were spun out from KIST or established separately for meeting industrial 
needs (Song, 2007). 
 
As a system with features that are unique to Korea, the GRIs function as a major 
medium for implementing S&T policies and for creating a national capacity for 
innovation. Although they are public research institutes, their role in the 1960s and 70s 
was to assist the private sector as technological solution providers. While informally 
promoting technology transfer, Korea also tried to utilise international S&T cooperation 
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to build technological absorptive capacity. In the 1960s and the early 1970s, these GRIs 
made great efforts to utilise foreign aid for S&T capability building (Kim, 2002). In the 
1980s, the Korean government proactively launched national R&D programmes in 
response to the technology protectionism of advanced countries and market penetration 
by developing countries. Through the national R&D programmes, the government 
became more directly involved in facilitating the development of core technology (Kim, 
2008). A series of national R&D programmes was launched from1982 onwards through 
MOST (MOST, 2007). This national R&D programme played a leading role in 
advancing the R&D system in Korea. It provided an opportunity for R&D projects to be 
promoted at the national level. Firms, universities, and GRIs participated in the projects 
of the programme. As a result, the country‘s R&D capability was significantly improved. 
The programme also had a significant effect on the later development of national R&D. 
With various ministries and agencies promoting national R&D programmes in the 1990s, 
a system for promoting national R&D programmes was developed in which each 
ministry and agency planned and promoted independent programmes (Lee, Hwang and 
Choi, 2012).  
 
Table 4-2: Key strategy, activities, and players of Korean technological innovation by period 
Source: STEPI (2005). 
 
 
 1960~1970s 1980~1990s 2000s 
Strategy 
Importing and improving 
foreign advanced technology 
Catching up with 
advanced countries 
Shifting to a creative 
mode 
Core activities 
Supporting technology for 
industry 
Developing technology 
for high 
Developing basic & 
original technology 
Key players 
Government-funded research 
institutes (GRIs) 
GRIs, private 
enterprises, universities 
Private enterprises, 
universities, GRIs 
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4.2.3. From Catching-up to Post Catching-up 
Korea‘s phenomenal economic growth since the beginning of 1960s was possible 
through the effective building and utilisation of technological capability. Korea‘s 
experience is different from that of industrially advanced countries. Because Korea‘s 
technological capability building made it possible for outside sources of knowledge to 
flow in rather than depending on indigenous efforts to generate new technology to the 
nation, Korea seems to be unique in terms of absorptive capacity – i.e. the ability to 
recognise the value of outside sources of knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it for 
economic use (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
 
To understand the process of Korea‘s technological capability building, the concept of 
the technological trajectory associated with the product life cycle discussed in Chapter 2 
is useful. It explains the evolutionary path of technology development in industrialised 
economies in terms of three stages: emergence, consolidation, and maturity. In the 
emergence stage, product technology changes rapidly and the risks of technological and 
commercial failure are high. In the consolidation stage, process technology rather than 
product technology changes rapidly and production costs decrease following the rapid 
improvement of process technology. In the maturity stage, almost every aspect of 
technology is stabilized so that further improvement in critical parameters is difficult. 
But the sequence reverses for developing countries. It begins with the mature stage and 
then proceeds to the consolidation stage (Kim, 1980). 
 
As Korean firms began to make products that involved sophisticated process technology, 
their former mode of technological learning seemed insufficient to allow competitive 
entry into foreign markets. Korean firms needed to change their technological learning 
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strategy, which had been effective at the maturity stage, to one in which more 
―upstream‖ capabilities were present. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Kim (1997b) explains that the normal pattern of early 
technological development in Korea and some of the other Asian countries was that of 
imitation and creative adaptation. In the imitator pattern, local firms started with small 
and rather primitive technology developed by them and gradually upgraded both 
processes and products through operating experience and using technical information 
and ideas that came from observing foreign technology. 
 
During the industrialisation process, Korean industries were considered to take the 
―path-following mode‖; thus, science, technology, and innovative activities were 
focused on development and applied research (Lee and Lim, 2001). This was achieved 
through effective adoption of foreign developed technology. Technological innovation 
attained through the catch up process involved imitating pre-existing technology. 
However, in order to promote a higher level of technological innovation, it was 
important to increase the autonomy of researchers. The same may be said for the 
promotion of creativity. These elements of the Korean NIS were achieved due to the 
pattern established by the GRIs which attempted to foster both individual researcher‘s 
autonomy and creativity (Amsden,1989; Kim, 1997a). In addition, this system created 
greater flexibility for meeting challenges arising from changing technology – e.g. the 
development of new technologies such as display technology and fibre optics. 
 
The introduction of foreign technology contributed to increasing corporate facility 
investment and production capacities, and to developing industries. The preferred type 
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of technology importation was the turnkey method, in which all the technology and 
equipment for constructing and operating factories were imported. The turnkey method 
was used in most of the chemical, fertiliser, cement, steel and paper-mill plants 
established in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Cheng and Lee, 2011). Because relatively 
large investments were poured into these factories, Korean firms lacking in technology 
capacity often relied completely on foreign firms. These firms were equipped with 
relevant experience and technology that allowed them to reduce risks and minimise the 
time required to enter into full operation. Even though turnkey operations had proven 
helpful, Korean firms still managed to absorb imported foreign technology very quickly, 
independent of foreign support. Adoption of technology through machinery importation 
has played a key role in Korea‘s rapid economic growth. The government not only 
allocated and supported these large-scale investments but also actively encouraged 
imports of foreign capital goods. The government also provided incentives, such as duty 
exemptions, to boost the international export businesses‘ competitiveness. 
 
During that era, technological innovation was mainly oriented toward solving problems 
by leveraging foreign technology. Entering the 21st century, Korea started to 
successfully emerge as a leader in industries such as semiconductors, digital electronics, 
handsets, and ships. Unlike the innovations pursued in the time of catching-up, post 
catch-up innovation has involved the establishment of a new innovation path, which in 
turn requires a new approach. Creating new technology has also required a new social 
system in which new technology is being developed and utilised.  
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Table 4-3: Evolution of Korean innovation mode  
 Path-Following Innovations Path-Creating Innovations 
Goals 
To solve predefined issues 
in an existing trajectory (catch-up) 
To solve new issues in a new  
trajectory (post catch-up) 
Method of acquiring 
technology 
Imported + self-developed Self-developed + outsourced 
Source: adapted from Choi (2003) 
 
In order for a new technology to become established, a context for the emerging 
technology needs to be created. Therefore, post catch-up innovation requires 
technological innovation to occur in tandem with human resource development, 
standard setting, industrial development, and regional development. This implies that 
the development and execution of innovation policies in the post catch-up era requires 
an integrated approach, as well as the placing of technology in a broader framework. 
Since the late 1990s, Korea‘s innovation policy has shown these characteristics in 
various aspects. However, these new characteristics are not easily diffused or 
institutionalised due to the enduring legacy of ingrained practices acquired during the 
catch-up period. As a result, the post catch-up period that began in the late 1990s bears 
many of the hallmarks of the earlier catch-up period. 
 
Lee and Lim (2001) argue that successful latecomers will ultimately confront the need 
for more expensive technology necessary for obtaining a higher level of technological 
capacity building. At later stages of development, successful latecomers become 
potential rivals of leading countries. As this occurs, incumbent firms may become 
reluctant to transfer their technology. Therefore, a competitive advantage based on 
cheap labour cannot be sustained when numerous latecomers are succeeding in the 
―catching up‖ process. 
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Korea has achieved a frontier position in many industrial areas; it faces the same 
problems and difficulties in advancing the frontier as the countries that are already at the 
frontier. Addressing these problems involves diversifying the sources of technological 
knowledge and enhancing its own knowledge base. Among East Asia‘s successful 
catch-up economies, Korea has been particularly aggressive in engaging in ITT with 
former communist economies as an extension of the search for alternative or 
supplementary source of external knowledge. Since the early 1990s, some of the large 
Korean firms indeed began to compete on the basis of their own leading-edge products 
and systems (Hobday et al., 2004). Korea was forced to seek new sources of innovation 
knowledge, complementing its traditional sources from the triad and enhancing its own 
knowledge base. In this situation, Russia appeared to be a very attractive partner and a 
possible source of scientific knowledge for Korean firms following the end of the Cold 
War era.  
 
As Amsden (1989) and Kim (1997a, b) have argued, Korean achievements in successful 
and rapid industrialisation involved a high degree of the government involvement, 
learning and the creative improvement of borrowed technology. According to interviews 
with individuals involved in the early stage of Korean-Russian technology transfer, it 
was assumed this Korean legacy would make a positive contribution. In other words, it 
was initially assumed that Korean firms had already developed the SCTA capabilities 
needed to exploit Russian technology (Kim, 2000; Lee, 2001; Bae, 2005).  
 
4.3. NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN INNOVATION SYSTEM 
This section discusses the nature of Russian technology and Russia‘s innovation system 
in order to understand the nature of the gaps in respect of the Korean-Russian 
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technology transfer. The aim is to provide a better understanding of the nature of 
Korean-Russian gaps stemming from tacitness and locality. Russian technology 
inherited the main characteristics and problems of Soviet science and technology. These 
characteristics are useful to recall in understanding the locality aspect of Russian 
technology and the resulting gaps between Russian and Korean technology.  
 
Former communist economies have had to cope with a heritage that put science and 
research on a different footing from that of their Western neighbours. With weak civilian 
application, their research sector has suffered severe cutbacks in government funding 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Notwithstanding the collapse of many elements of its 
S&T system, Russia is still widely regarded as an S&T powerhouse. They possess a 
number of leading-edge product and process technologies, as well as a broad range of 
technological capabilities (Hong, Jeong and Kang, 1998). The high level of scientific 
knowledge with little commercial linkage and industrial application makes Russia a 
suitable partner for Korea.  
 
4.3.1. Characteristics of Russia’s S&T System 
The Soviet Union placed a high priority on S&T and built a huge assembly of research 
institutes, educational programmes, and production enterprises (Sandberg, 1992).The 
major goal of Soviet science was to create a powerful R&D sector appropriate for a 
socialist state. This created a particular S&T and innovativon system which is different 
from capitalist economies (Dezhina, 2006; Gokhberg, 2004). The objectives of R&D 
were, among others, supporting military and space programmes and technological self-
reliance (Radosevic, 2003). 
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Figure 4-1 shows a diagram of the Russian Innovation system. The R&D actors include 
three main sectors: education, science, industry. The education sector includes public 
and private universities. The science sector includes state institutes, private 
organisations, military and space parks, and international R&D. The industrial sector 
includes state companies, large private firms, SMEs, and international firms. The 
government provides funds and policy directions through various departments and 
agencies. 
 
Overall, Russia‘s R&D investment level has been lower than the average R&D 
investment level of OECD countries as shown in Figure 4-2. While GERD of the United 
States and Japan remained between 2.5 to 3.0% of GDP in 1990s, that of Russia stayed 
around 1% of GDP in the same period.  
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Figure 4-1: The Russian Innovation System 
Source: 
OECD (2005), Fostering Public-Private Partnership for Innovation in Russia 
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Figure 4-2: Gross R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
This relatively lower level of R&D investment of Russia may be understood through the 
framework suggested by Radosevic (2003). As shown in Figure 4-3, the characteristics 
of post-Soviet R&D can be depicted as the interaction of survival strategies, 
restructuring policy, and preservation policy (Radosevic, 2003).  
 
Figure4-3: Factors shaping post-Soviet R&D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Radosevic (2003) 
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The preservation of science potential means efforts to solve the most acute problems of 
funding scientists without a major change to the role of the science establishment in the 
economy. An example of the policy attempts to preserve national science is the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and the branch academies, which still retain their traditional 
position regarding state R&D funding and operating as an association of institutes, 
without undergoing any major changes in their structure and organisation inherited from 
the Soviet era. 
 
This element of science preservation is accompanied by a competing element of 
restructuring which is also needed in the long-term to successfully make the transition 
to a global market economy. Radosevic (2003) argues that restructuring elements of 
S&T policy include, among others, new criteria for public funding of R&D, 
privatisation of R&D, and new forms of institutional support for S&T. One of the most 
notable changes in the R&D system is the introduction of programme and project 
funding, in addition to the old institutional (per capita) funding. Restructuring policy 
needs to be balanced with preservation policy, so that the former does not overwhelm 
and destabilise the latter. A further and related element to restructuring, but one that is 
often undertaken directly by scientists and technologists consists of ―survival strategies‖ 
such as promoting commercialisation through spin-offs which are expected to drive the 
R&D potential via economic payoff.  
 
Table 4-4 shows a comparison of major economic indicators for Russia, China, Brazil, 
India and the USA in 2009. Russia‘s GDP per capita is 2,805 USD in 2009 which is a 
little higher than that of China but lower than Brazil. But in terms of the indicators 
related to S&T capabilities such as GERD, patent applications, and number of 
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researchers per million population, Russia seems to have much higher level of potential 
than Brazil. And Russia has more researchers per million population than China, but the 
number of patent applications is much lower than that of China. These economic 
indicators suggest that Russia has a much higher potential in S&T, which is not fulfilled 
compared to other countries of similar income level.  
 
Table 4-4: Comparison of major economic indicators in 2009 
 Russia China Brazil USA 
GDP per capita (constant 200 USD) 2,805 2,206 4,419 37,106 
GERD (as % of GDP) 1.24 1.44b 1.10b 2.82a 
Patent Applications by residents 25,598 229,096 4,023b 224,912 
Researchers per million population 2,602 1,071b 694a 4,663c 
a
 Data available for 2008 
b
 Data available for 2008 
c
 Data available for 2008 
Source: Adapted from Klochikin (2012) 
 
Academic institutions responsible for basic sciences were founded and engaged at a 
world class level. Industry evolved in a favourable climate for labour and resource 
purposes, but not reflecting consumer needs (Seo, 1998). Soviet heavy industry was 
credible in steel and petrochemicals while less so in machinery and very weak in 
electronics (Seo, 1998). The results was an S&T complex that was suitable for some of 
the needs of a large industrial country with a broad spectrum of research and high 
quality scientific personnel but not suitable for other needs such as building mass 
production systems for mass consumption (Lee, Kim, and Sohn, 2005). The collapse of 
the Soviet economy, particularly the industrial and military complex to which most 
Russian R&D investment was directed in the early 1990s led to a considerable fall in 
R&D levels, and in the number of research workers (Kihlgren, 2003).  
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R&D spending decreased sharply in the period between 1990~1992. Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D decreased in 1992 to 30% of the level in 1990. After 1992, relative 
expenditures on R&D stabilised at levels around 0.7 – 0.9% of GDP, the increased to 
more than 1% since 2000. After a sharp decline in the initial stage of the economic 
transformation, total R&D expenditures of Russia have grown steadily, but, in spite of a 
rebound and recovery in the R&D investment level, the bulk of R&D is still carried out 
within a large number of public organisations and financed through the government 
budget (Radosevic, 2003; OECD, 2005). Foreign firms invest in Russia according to 
their global strategies considering comparative advantage and risk/reward ratios for 
different types of investment, and except in a few areas including information and 
communication technology and oil explorations, this has generally not led to serious 
investments such as establishing R&D facilities in Russia. 
 
Russian technology is developed in a specific context which is little linked to commerce 
(OECD, 1994). Some features of the Soviet legacy, in regards to technology transfer, 
remain important in present-day Russia. There is much ―over-development‖ of specific 
skills that are not seen as necessary in the context of a Western viewpoint (Katkalo, 
1993). The priorities and capabilities of the military-industrial complex have resulted in 
the development of a range of technological capabilities and specific high-tech products. 
The isolation of the Soviet Union resulted in the development of some technology 
which may have never been developed under the competitive pressures of markets 
(Dyker, 2001). However, this technology now has the potential to contribute crucial 
elements of technological diversity to the global technological system.  
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In centrally planned systems, the bulk of R&D had been paid for by the state and 
executed in laboratories and institutes that were geographically separated from 
production units. In the West, the growth of in-house R&D could be explained by the 
uncertainty of outcomes, the specific tacit nature of technological knowledge, the 
importance of such knowledge for competitive advantage, and acknowledgement of the 
need to link R&D with other specialised business functions as part of a process of 
continual organised learning.  
 
For Russia, the main source of funding for basic research was the government. This was 
justified due to the impossibility of devising incentives that could reconcile the interests 
of private agents in appropriating the outputs of basic research with the general 
economic and social interest. The collapse of the Soviet economy brought down a 
system that was based largely on technological prestige and bureaucratic planning. 
Financial crises, deterioration of equipment, unemployment, and higher wages in other 
sectors drove large numbers of researchers away from S&T in Russia.  
 
To summarise, the present Russian government is facing a difficult task: building a 
market-based national innovation system while preserving some parts of what remain of 
the Soviet S&T system (Klochikhin, 2012). Radosevic (2003) argued that Russia‘s R&D 
system is in a situation of low level equilibrium which is the outcome of balancing 
between restructuring and preservation policies coupled with the modest success of 
survival strategies. The efforts to preserve science potential play an important role in 
preventing a continuous decline in the real value of the R&D budget. It is reflected, for 
example, in Article 15 of the Law on Science and the State S&T Policy which mandates 
funds for scientific research and experimental developments to be allocated from the 
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federal budget at a level of not less than 4% of the federal budget expenditures. 
Restructuring policy includes new criteria for public funding of R&D, the privatisation 
of R&D, and new forms of institutional support for S&T (Radosevic, 2003). Though 
some of the former strengths were lost in the turmoil of the 1990s, a large element of 
them seems to have been preserved. And the current stage of reform seems to be aiming 
at preserving the S&T potential of the country and providing adequate regulations for 
the results of innovation activity such as the legislation of the new Patent Law, part of 
the Civil Code on intellectual property, and others (Klochikhin, 2012). 
 
4.3.2. Russian Gaps from a Western Perspective 
There is an important contrast between Russia and other catching up economies. The 
Soviet Union had reached an advanced state of industrialisation and military technology. 
Many catching up economies have had to develop their technologies and industrial 
capabilities from a much lower technological level. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to the Russian situation. It is advantageous to have a base of technology, 
and, more importantly, trained scientists and engineers. On the other hand, the Soviet 
legacy of non-competitive practices, as well as obsolete equipment and facilities, is a 
liability (Sandberg, 1992). This disadvantage seems to be viewed as a major gap from a 
Western perspective. 
 
Besides gaps from a technological perspective, several other issues remain between 
Russia and their Western partners, and these also might be considered as gaps for them. 
There is a widespread fear among the S&T establishment that the impact of 
globalisation on Russian S&T will result in the liquidation of their independent S&T 
base (Holden, 2011). Western partners perceive an unsatisfactory legal framework, 
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political instability, and a unique technology culture as major problems in cooperating 
with Russia (Dyker, 2001). The transition to a market-based economy made no 
significant changes in the distorted patterns of financing inherited from the former 
Soviet Union. The government still finances the predominant share of R&D expenditure, 
with only one third of spending coming from industry (Hong, Yim and Seo, 2007). This 
is significantly lower than in advanced OECD countries where business is the main 
source of spending on R&D.  
 
Institutional rigidities remain a major constraint on Russian R&D (Kim, 2000). There 
are few opportunities for their private sector to use R&D investments to increase 
economic performance. As a result, the bulk of R&D continues to be performed by 
academies of sciences (Song, 2005).  
 
It is also noted that the Russian national innovation system is significantly unbalanced 
in that R&D units, enterprises and innovation infrastructures are isolated from each 
other, posing a need to pursue an innovation strategy promoting network links among 
the NIS components. One aspect of this weakness is the separation of teaching and 
research, which has been criticised as the major barrier to providing good training 
scientists and engineers (Lee, 2005). Another major aspect of this weakness is related to 
technology diffusion. Russian government continues to take measures to stimulate 
domestic demand for innovation goods and services as well as supply-side promotion 
by supporting a technology-push strategy (Klochikhin, 2012). 
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4.4. EVOLUTION OF THE COOPERATION 
4.4.1. Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, large Korean firms began to compete with their own leading-edge 
products and systems as a result of successful technological catching up (Hobday et al., 
2004). Korean firms had been forced to seek new sources of innovative knowledge, 
complementing their traditional sources in the triad countries. Among East Asia‘s 
successful catching-up economies, Korea has been particularly aggressive in engaging 
in ITT with former communist economies. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, this has 
served as an extension to Korea‘s search for alternative sources for external knowledge. 
To Korean firms, Russia had appeared to be a very attractive source for scientific 
knowledge (Hong, Jeong and Kang, 1998; Kim, 2000, MOST, 2001, 2004). 
 
With a greater openness to formerly socialist economies, a new pool of scientific 
knowledge and partners for ITT greatly expanded, and countries from transitional 
economies joined the world capitalistic markets and became part of the regional and 
global networks of innovation (Radosevic, 1999c). They became new potential business 
partners to the rest of the world. Even though Russia‘s overall standing in terms of its 
economic and industrial status had remained low, unlike other developing economies 
(such as in Asia, Africa, and South America) it had substantial scientific knowledge 
stocks in areas of basic science and applied technology. 
 
Even though Korea and Russia shared a basis for technology transfer, they had difficulty 
implementing ITT (Hong, Jeong, and Kang, 1998). It was more difficult for Korean 
firms to exploit and absorb Russian technology than technology from other nations that 
shared a similar system and structure (Y. Kim, personal communication, October 6, 
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2008). Having had no interaction before or during the Cold War, Korean and Russian 
firms and government agencies shared little or no common ground. Korean firms had 
difficulty in absorbing Russian technology, due to their long period of separation. 
Despite its latecomer status, Korea nevertheless shared many aspects of compatibility 
and proximity with technology acquired from the triad countries.  
 
Korea has not yet been able to develop the technology needed to fully respond to the 
rapidly changing world market. Russia, on the other hand, has an abundance of highly 
educated human resources in the field of science and technology, with a huge stock of 
scientific knowledge and research facilities, and world-class advanced technology in the 
aerospace and fundamental industries. However, Russia finds it difficult to make full 
use of such technology due to their lack of experience in technology commercialisation. 
Russia has the potential to act as a supplier of fundamental scientific knowledge to the 
rest of the world, but also needs to find a business model that will give them an 
economic return for doing so. Korea has the ability to integrate its outstanding 
manufacturing infrastructure and new technologies. They, however, lack novel advanced 
technology in many areas. Korea and Russia share contrasting, but complementary 
grounds. The realisation of mutual strategic ground in their S&T systems suggested the 
possibility of a successful symbiotic relationship. Doing so, however, involves both 
capacity and institutional development. 
 
4.4.2. History of Korea-Russia S&T Cooperation 
S&T cooperation between Korea and Russia was promoted by a complementary 
cooperation strategy that integrated Russian basic science with the industrial and 
commercial technology of Korea. Indeed, there were mutual benefits gained from this 
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strategy, since Russia wished to commercialise their scientific potential and Korea 
wanted to add value to their industry by securing fundamental technology from Russia. 
Since the early stages of normalisation of diplomatic relations between Korea and 
Russia beginning in September 1990, the Korean government has promoted 
technological cooperation with Russia (D. Lim, personal communication, December 1, 
2011). According to the agreement for Korea-Russian S&T cooperation (concluded on 
December 1990, and in effect as of December 1991), the Korea-Russia joint S&T 
commission was established at vice-minister level. In addition, in June 1992, Korea and 
Russia signed a protocol on S&T cooperation that allowed the Koreans to access 
Russia's plans to convert military industries into civilian ones. Through this agreement, 
various S&T cooperative projects were promoted at the highest governmental levels 
(Song, 2007) 
 
Table 4-5: Major projects of Korea-Russia S&T cooperation 
Year  Project Description 
1992 
Exchange of science 
and technical manpower 
A total of 512 professionals from Russia by the year 2000 
1994 Joint coordination centre 
6 centres are currently integrated into the Korea-Russia 
science and technical coordination centre. 
1998 ISTC Programmes 
Supports the CIS Research Centre with international aid. 
Invested US$ 3 million to 41 projects by July 2007, 
1992 International joint research 
Many projects are promoted as international cooperative 
projects with support from the Ministry of Education, S&T 
and also the MKE 
Source: MOST (2004). 
 
The major forms of scientific and technological cooperation have been:  
 Joint research projects in high-priority fields of science and technology,  
 Exchange of scientists and specialists,  
 Establishment of joint R&D centres,  
 Joint commercialisation of the results of R&D, and  
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 Information exchange on the two countries‘ status and development of their 
government policies concerning science and technology. 
Public research institutes and universities in both countries are key participants in these 
cooperative projects. Joint research projects are launched by applying to the appropriate 
department of the Joint Committee with a mutually-chosen research subject. 
Applications are considered by the Joint Committee during its annual meetings and, if 
approved, included in the Programme of Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
between the countries, thereby qualifying for governmental sponsorship and financial 
support. Several dozen joint research projects have been completed since the inception 
of scientific and technological cooperation between Russia and Korea (Hong, Yim, and 
Seo, 2007). Another form of cooperation has been the creation of Russia-Korea joint 
research centres, with sponsorship from leading Russian research institutes (MOST, 
2001, 2004). However, the actual collaboration between two countries was still at a 
preliminary exploratory stage, since both sides were still searching for potential joint 
R&D opportunities and scientific information that could be exchanged. 
 
With the momentum generated by the Korea-Russia summit meeting in 1997, industrial 
and economic cooperative bodies were launched to expand the cooperative relationship 
between the two countries. Korea adopted a strategy of introducing and 
commercialising Russian technology in order to improve the global leadership of its 
firms, and to reduce its technological dependence on other developed countries. In order 
to expedite the transfer of Russian technology and effectively engage in more advanced 
forms of technological collaboration, a few important policy measures were 
implemented (S. Jang, personal communication, December 3, 2011). First, a special 
organisation or institute for collaboration in S&T between the two countries was 
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established, named KRSTC (Korean-Russian Scientific and Technological Centre). Its 
mission was to first take an inventory of Russian technology and then effectively link 
that to Korea's commercialised technology. This centre is important because cooperation 
through a reputable organisation serves to better find and promote cooperative projects 
with a partner such as Russia, as opposed to depending on smaller domestic 
corporations that lack expertise in Russian business culture. Moreover, the Korean 
government provided various fiscal and financial incentives to promote the transfer and 
commercialisation of Russian science and technology. The Korea-Russia industrial 
cooperation committee was organised to expand scientific industrial technology 
exchange, with the goal of accelerating the global market penetration of Korean firms. 
 
Meanwhile, non-government technical cooperation with Russia was also vigorously 
pushed forward. At the private sector level, a number of direct agreements between 
Korean firms and Russian science institutions or firms were successfully reached 
(MOST, 2004). Besides major corporations such as Samsung, LG and Daewoo, small 
businesses have also succeeded in technical development and commercialisation of 
technology developed in cooperation with Russia.  
 
4.4.3. Cooperation Setbacks 
Despite the promise of these efforts, most of Korea-Russia S&T cooperative projects 
were relatively short-term, small-scale projects (Hong, Yim, and Seo, 2007). 
Furthermore, interviews and survey results showed that many successful Korean-
Russian technology transfer projects were generally not revealed publicly, as many 
firms wished to keep their business relationships private. In the opinion of the Korean 
Russian Industrial Technology Programme (KRITP) manager, the reason is that Korean 
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firms prefer that consumers be familiar with the technology of domestically developed 
products (K. Kim, personal communication, April 1, 2010). 
 
Korea promoted cooperation with Russia in both long-term and short-term horizons. In 
the short-term, the primary policy goal was to transfer needed Russian technology to 
Korea, taking full advantages of the opportunity provided by the transition period of 
Russia. Accordingly, manpower resources were exchanged and joint research projects 
were conducted in order to accelerate the technology transfer that private firms needed 
to meet the demands of domestic industries. The long-term policy goal was to establish 
a reciprocal coordination system and infrastructure that would enable constant 
cooperation in enhancing R&D and developing state-of-the-art technology for the next 
generation (D. Park, personal communication, May 3, 2012). 
 
However, the Korean-Russian technology transfer projects simply imported technical 
know-how and researchers temporarily from Russia. As a result, the opportunity of 
progress toward the long-term goals of reinforcing research capability and innovating 
through the acquisition of advanced research development seemed to be limited (Hong, 
Yim, and Seo, 2007). In addition, the number of opportunities to develop useful 
technology through short-term projects decreased as the situation in Russia took a 
sudden change in 2000, which was when Western countries and China began to heavily 
promote a series of major projects. For example, China promoted the Techno Park 
project to receive advanced original technology from Russia. To effectively compete 
with these initiatives, Korea sought new policy initiatives (Bae, 2005) 
Another problem is that Korea lacks experts who can adequately promote cooperation 
with Russia. So far, the Korean-Russian S&T cooperation has been promoted by 
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government departments, local-government affiliated organisations, and other 
institutions of various types (MOST, 2004). The level of cooperation has been on the 
rise, but projects are not going smoothly and sometimes are not successful because of 
differences in language, culture, and scientific and technical systems between Korea and 
Russia. Small corporations promoting cooperative projects often fail to deliver results, 
primarily because they lack expertise in Russian culture (Hong, Yim, and Seo, 2007).  
Furthermore, when an institution lacks expertise in technical cooperation with Russia, it 
tends to attach too much importance to simple, short-term technical research projects, 
due to a lack of pilot surveys or other background information.  
 
It is a fact that Korea has only had established diplomatic relations with Russia for 20 
years, and therefore a shortage exists of professionals who can promote Korean-Russian 
S&T cooperation. A solution would be to reinforce the government organised Korea-
Russia S&T centres that promote technology exchange. 
 
4.4.4. Public Agency Programmes for Overcoming the Gaps 
As a way to overcome the difficulties and barriers in technology transfer from Russia, 
the Korean government has taken a slightly different approach since the late 1990s (M. 
Kim, personal communication, December 7, 2011). The Korean government launched a 
number of public agency programmes to support Korean firms who are attempting to 
exploit Russian technology. Some government ministries and local governments 
launched programmes. Each of these programmes has its own purpose, target, and 
procedures with the goal of smoothly facilitating the transfer of technology between 
Korea and Russia. These programmes aim to systematize the transfer of technology by 
coordinating interactions between government agencies, public research institutes, and 
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private firms under the umbrella of a governmental agreement of both countries and 
public policy direction.  
 
They provide relevant S&T information, technological support, and infrastructure for 
testing for domestic firms to use to seek, acquire, transform, and exploit Russian 
knowledge by engaging in the public agency programmes (Bae, 2005). The programmes 
are specifically designed to bridge wide gaps where there are multiple differences 
between countries, as is the case with Korea and Russia. A vast amount of Russia‘s 
scientific knowledge stock appears attractive to Korean firms, but unfamiliarity and the 
dissimilarity of both Russia, the country itself, and Russian technology made Korean 
firms hesitate in approaching them (Bae, 2005). These programmes are not designed to 
function at the level of individual firms or at the national level, but to provide a new, 
systematic framework for the absorption of foreign technology. The design of this 
framework is a natural outgrowth of an examination of the processes, patterns, and 
mechanisms of technology transfer between Korea and Russia.  
 
4.4.5. Evolution of Korean-Russian Technology Transfer 
In the early 1990s, MOST was very actively engaged in Russian technology transfer in 
respect of acquiring national strategic technology. But now in the 2000s, the Ministry of 
the Knowledge Economy (MKE) also participates in assisting Korean firms (H. Park, 
personal communication, November 17, 2011). 
 
In the early 1990s, important benefit that Russian partners had received from their 
Korean counterparts had been related to funding, but in the 2000s Russian partners 
learned from Korean firms how to use their technology in the industrial sector (MOST, 
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2001). There now appear to be some joint ventures between Russian scientists and Korean 
firms, which suggests that a two-way knowledge exchange is involved. The patterns of 
complementarity and the structuring of ITT between the two countries have been evolving 
for the past twenty years (S. Jang, personal communication, December 3, 2011). 
 
After the advent of the Putin administration in 2000, the number of Russian scientists or 
engineers going abroad in order to maintain their employment in some type of scientific 
or technical activity has fallen (Bae, 2005). Now that Russia has a semi-market 
economy, Russians have begun to prioritize the commercialization and industrialization 
of new technology. This can be explained in terms of institutional and attitudinal 
changes between the two countries. The social, political, economic, and innovation 
environments of the two countries have changed. The Russian side no longer hungers 
for funds with the same degree of urgency, and Korean large firms no longer rely solely 
on external technology. Several of those interviewed for this thesis observed that in the 
early 1990s, the Russian side did not benefit from Korean side except by receiving 
funds, but by the 2000s Russian partners were learning from their Korean partners how 
to employ their technology in the industrial sector.  
 
In the early 1990s, large firms such as Samsung and LG were the main actors in 
acquiring Russian technology, but in the 2000s, Korean small and medium sized 
enterprises have become more involved in technology acquisition, often through being 
the main participants in programmes sponsored by public agencies (Kim, 2000). Korean 
small and medium sized enterprises try to develop new technology or solve 
technological problems. However, large firms still actively implement Russian S&T by 
establishing R&D centres in Russia. In the 1990s, transferring Russian technology was 
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done entirely through person-to-person communication and interaction. Even though 
collaborations have been implemented as contracted projects, inviting Russian scientists 
to come to Korea was a core part of the contracts negotiated in this period. The Korean 
government and Korean firms invited or hired Russian scientists and engineers. In the 
2000s, Russian technology transfer is still very much dependent upon human social 
interactions, but hiring Russian scientists is now very rare (MOST, 2001). Short-term 
visits or distance collaboration are increasing rapidly. This suggests Russian technology 
has become a more codified form of knowledge and that Korean firms have increased 
their absorptive capacity so that the reliance on human interactions is less necessary. 
 
4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
To summarise this chapter, Korea‘s industrial and technological achievement has relied 
heavily on imported technology from advanced countries. This is not a simple 
purchasing process, but involves learning and absorbing through indigenous efforts. 
From the beginning of the Korean catching up period in the early 1960s, Korea acquired 
and assimilated foreign technology in mature, packaged, and codified forms through 
technical assistance, turnkey industrial plants, and licensing. Korea repeated this process 
with higher-level technologies and sophisticated industrial products. Ultimately, Korea 
arrived at such a highly competitive position in the global market that technology 
transfer with advanced countries became more difficult. Korea was forced to seek new 
sources of innovation knowledge, and Russia appeared to be one of the best sources of 
fundamental knowledge for supporting such innovation. 
 
Even though Russia and Korea are different in almost every imaginable aspect including 
socio-economic system as well as political system, they share some complementary 
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strengths and resources. Russian has strength in upstream scientific knowledge, but 
Korea is strong in downstream industrial application. This complementarity suggests 
that Russian partners may also have the opportunity to increase their own absorptive 
capacity through S&T cooperation between Russia and Korea. The existence of the joint 
ventures is an example of such opportunity. Therefore, this raises an important question: 
what are the effects of S&T cooperation on the innovation capabilities of Russia? This 
question, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis, due to both observational limits 
(limited access to Russian partners in the project‘s described) and to time and resource 
constraints in conducting this research. It is an important avenue for studies in the future.  
 
A finding from this research (discussed in more detail in the empirical results chapters, 
Chapters 7 and 8) is that Korea-Russia S&T cooperation has proven to be rather limited 
to relatively short-term, small scale projects. Because of the potential value of Russian 
technology, methods for improving ITT were seriously considered by government 
policy makers. In order to further improve the results of technology transfer, the Korean 
government launched a series of public agency programmes, acting as an intermediary 
to assist Korean firms in acquiring Russian technology. Through programmes, 
government agencies, and public R&D institutes, firms interacted and collaborated in a 
systemic way that provided local Korean firms with information, technological know-
how, and infrastructure. Local firms were enabled to seek, access, acquire, and 
transform external knowledge from Russia, even though there were major differences 
between these countries. 
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 CHAPTER 5. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  
 The Systemic Capacity for Technological Absorption 
(SCTA) 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and discuss the conceptual framework that is 
employed to examine the construction of absorptive capacities in the Korean context, 
and which will be referred to as the Systemic Capacity for Technological Absorption 
(SCTA). This conceptual framework draws upon the assembly of the literature and 
empirical background discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, particularly the role of Korean NIS 
actors in facilitating ITT from Russia. These include the role of intermediary 
organisations used to bridge the gaps arising from the dissimilarities in the NIS of the 
two countries and the complexities of adopting and utilising the knowledge produced in 
the Russian context which are influenced by the existence of gaps stemming from 
locality and tacitness. 
 
As mentioned Chapter 1, this thesis examines the processes of ITT by extending the 
concept of absorptive capacity. The existing literature on absorptive capacity is 
primarily concerned with firm-level processes. This thesis adds to the understanding of 
firm-level absorptive capacity by drawing on the significance of institutions identified 
in the NIS approach, examining the existence of these institutions and the roles that they 
may play in complementing and reinforcing firm-level absorptive capacities. 
Consideration of the role of intermediaries plays a complementary role to examination 
of firm-level absorptive capacities. The SCTA has been developed to deepen the 
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analysis of the transfer of Russian technology into Korean context. It focuses on how 
this has been facilitated and, in particular, how this capacity plays a role in filling 
knowledge gaps, bridging differences, and overcoming difficulties in this process.  
 
Before discussing the SCTA, a number of research questions and hypotheses are 
introduced based on the discussions of previous literature and empirical review chapters. 
Doing so here is a way to make clear the relation between the conceptual framework 
and the analysis of the empirical results.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The discussion of previous chapters suggests certain research questions to be pursued in 
this thesis: 
 
RQ 1. Given that gaps exist between the knowledge developed in Russia and the 
absorptive capacity of the recipient Korean firms (reflecting Korean firms‘ prior 
knowledge base which was developed and accumulated in a different market context), 
do the nature of gaps between technology donor and recipient influence the success of 
technology transfer? More specifically, in the context of ITT, do very large gaps serve 
as a barrier to technology transfer?  
 
RQ 1 takes forward the premise drawn from the literature that there are gaps arising 
from locality and tacitness that impede technology transfer. However, the literature is 
vague about the nature of these gaps and their extent. Hence, answering RQ 1 will 
involve gathering and evaluating evidence on the nature and extent of gaps that, in 
practice, have influenced technology transfer from Russia to Korea. 
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RQ 2. Unlike the triad countries from which technological knowledge has been 
transferred to Korea, the Russian S&T and innovation system was different from that of 
capitalistic economies. To what extent were Korean firms‘ motivated to attempt to meet 
this new challenge? 
 
RQ 2 begins with the premise that the transfer of applicable Russian technology to 
Korea might be difficult and asks why Korean firms might seek such transfers. This 
question is grounded in the empirical background of Chapter 4 which demonstrated that 
Korean firms have historically most often relied on triad countries but that in the recent 
period have sought to diversify their technology sourcing. However, this background is 
insufficient to establish the extent of effort devoted to this technology sourcing 
diversification by private firms.   
 
This empirical background is also insufficient to rule out the possibility that observed 
cases of Russian technology transfers are solely due to government programmes seeking 
to demonstrate such activity. Hence, answering RQ 2 will involve examining the nature 
of these technology transfers to identify the efforts made by firms and the outcomes of 
transfer projects.  
 
RQ 3. For the Korean firms that succeeded in technology transfer, how did they 
overcome the gaps faced?  
 
RQ 3 takes up the examination of successful transfer projects to ask how the transfer 
was achieved. In particular, it draws upon the concept of SCTA developed in this 
chapter to examine how systemic capabilities for absorption might play a role in the 
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achievement of transfer. A central issue to be examined in answering this question is 
whether intermediaries, particularly those organised by the Korean government, have 
played a useful or even essential role in successful cases of technological transfer. The 
alternative is that transfers would have occurred without the existence of intermediaries 
or the larger systemic capabilities for absorption which are part of the SCTA concept.  
Thus, the answer to RQ 3 involves both an examination of the factors underlying 
successful technology transfer of Russian technology to Korean firms and a test of the 
usefulness and validity of the SCTA concept. 
 
5.3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Based on the discussions from the literature review and empirical background, four 
hypotheses are proposed by way of pursuing answers to the research questions. Each 
hypothesis is related to the SCTA framework. In this thesis, the term hypothesis means a 
broader statement that provides key concepts relating to the SCTA, and formulating a 
specific statement of the argument intended for empirical test. 
 
Hypothesis 1. The success of technology transfer is a function of gaps between the 
transferred technology and the absorptive capacity of the recipient firm which reflect 
gaps of tacitness and locality. Thus, it is hypothesised that larger gaps in tacitness and 
locality of technological knowledge will prevent ITT.  
 
In discussing ITT, it is important to capture the nature of technology and its relationship 
with technology transfer. Exploiting technology from foreign countries often involves 
overcoming wide technological and socio-cultural differences. The differences are huge 
when countries share little common ground in terms of culture and production 
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experience. The nature of these differences is characterised in this study as involving 
―locality‖ and ―tacitness‖ gaps.  
 
The concept of locality and tacitness gaps as used in this thesis arises from the idea that 
there are barriers and difficulties in ITT process arising from the dissimilar conditions 
and context of ITT partners. Specifically the ―locality gap‖ involves socio-cultural, 
geographical, and political distance that creates a difference between the source and 
recipient of ITT. In other words, it is a non-technological barrier arising from different 
culture, language, and socio-economic systems. Ideas and knowledge circulate more 
easily between two parties when they have close geographical and social proximity 
(Saxenian, 1994; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Fosfuri et al., 2001).  
 
The ―tacitness gap‖ involves the difference in technological knowledge that comes from 
different legacies and contexts of the respective innovation systems between the source 
and recipient countries. In other word, it is technological barrier caused by the different 
context of technology from dissimilar NIS.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, some features of the Soviet legacy remain unique with 
regard to the context and quality of Russian technology. These include difficulties in 
valuing, understanding, and modifying transferred technologies. The two concepts of 
locality and tacitness gaps cover both technological and non-technological matters in 
the ITT process, and these gaps are likely to be more critical when dealing with partners 
with dramatically contrasting innovation systems. It is for this reason that these specific 
gaps are identified and characterised among the many other differences that might have 
been chosen as needing to be bridged in order for effective ITT to occur. 
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In addition, it is hypothesised that the capabilities and methods for overcoming these 
two types of gaps should be different. This leads to an investigation of the different 
roles that intermediaries may play in assisting the ITT process. 
 
Hypothesis 1 focusses on the potential to prevent ITT. As discussed in Chapter 4, there 
are major differences between Soviet and Korean technologies, institutions (including 
the NIS) and market orientation which are taken to create the potential for major gaps of 
both types: locality and tacitness. As discussed in the next chapter, the ideal situation 
would be to compare the performance of ITT more generally and specifically to conduct 
a comparative study of successes and failures to isolate the effects and assess the 
balance between these two types of gaps In practice, however, a sample of such cases is 
unavailable so the focus is on those projects which are undertaken and have had 
outcomes that are observable, i.e. the cases where the gaps have been overcome. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The combination of the absorptive capacity of a recipient firm and the 
capabilities of an intermediary, which is described in this thesis using the concept of the 
SCTA (defined and described below in Section 5.4), is more effective in bridging the 
gaps than the absorptive capacity of the firm acting alone in the process of ITT. 
 
Learning incentives within a firm will have a direct effect on its R&D spending. Factors 
affecting a firm‘s incentives to learn or its incentives to invest in absorptive capacity via 
its R&D expenditures include the quantity of knowledge to be assimilated and exploited 
and the difficulty of learning. The difficulty of learning will depend on the 
characteristics of underlying scientific and technological knowledge, but it is difficult to 
specify a priori such characteristics of knowledge affecting the difficulty of learning 
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(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The gaps or barriers with regard to ITT discussed in 
Chapter 2.6 may exemplify the factors affecting the difficulty of learning, given the 
current level of absorptive capacity of a firm. 
 
But in the Korean-Russian case, Russia‘s unique socio-economic system and 
technological knowledge generate large gaps. Recipient of this technology must have 
very high absorptive capacities. The recipient‘s ability to learn, absorb, and assimilate is 
the decisive factor that makes a difference in the successful execution of ITT (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1999). Overcoming these technological and socio-cultural gaps requires 
the recipient firms to develop the extra-ordinary absorptive capacity needed to 
understand and master the transferred technology. 
 
In this context, the fact that a firm seeks help from innovation intermediaries in the 
process of ITT implies that it has incentives to utilise the capabilities of the 
intermediaries in addition to its own absorptive capacity. And the availability of 
intermediaries that can help firms to effectively recognise, assimilate, and exploit 
external knowledge or transferred technology will reflect the characteristics of the 
national innovation system of the recipient county.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, intermediaries may promote a firm‘s ITT activities by 
providing supportive services and information, and if an intermediary is involved in the 
public sector, it may have authority to create a favourable legal and institutional 
environment for ITT. Such services can be thought to function as boundary spanning 
roles between technology sources and their recipients, taking knowledge from one 
domain and applying it in another. This can be one of the many dimensions by which a 
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firm‘s absorptive capacity may be enhanced with the addition of the capability of the 
intermediaries according to the needs and purpose of the firm. 
 
Thus, the synergistic effect from firm-specific knowledge and the complementary 
knowledge co-produced by the intermediary and the firm will give rise to a higher and 
broader level of absorptive capacity that should lead to more effective bridging of the 
gaps or difficulties involved in the process of ITT. 
 
It is assumed that although impressive internal capabilities for absorptive capacity were 
built in the context of transfers from triad economies, Korean firms were unable to use 
these specific capabilities successfully to meet the challenge of importing Russian 
technology largely due to the substantial locality and tacitness gaps. Prior knowledge 
and experience are one of the primary means of enhancing a firm‘s absorptive capacity 
and success in technology transfer (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). It is hypothesised that 
firms with prior knowledge and experience in technology transfer from a specific 
country will report and experience narrower gaps in tacitness and locality as compared 
to those firms without such knowledge and experience. These firms would have more 
success in bridging the gaps.  
 
Hypothesis 3. The bigger the gaps, the more important the role of intermediaries is. 
Innovation intermediaries provide an extension to the absorptive capacity of firms to 
help to reduce the gap in tacitness and locality involved in the process of internal 
technology transfer.  
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Tacitness and locality gaps require the construction of relationship-specific 
complementary capital and that the costs and feasibility of doing this are affected by the 
existence of an intermediary. 
 
The recipient‘s ability to learn, absorb, and assimilate determine the difference in 
performance of ITT (Cohen and Levinthal 1999). Overcoming these technological and 
socio-cultural gaps requires the recipient firms to develop an extra-ordinary absorptive 
capacity in understanding and mastering the transferred technology. In this context, it is 
inferred that the basis for successful technological transfer is influenced by tacitness and 
locality gaps.  
 
But in the case of the Korean-Russian technology transfer, the tacitness and locality 
gaps are very large. Russia‘s socio-economic system and the technological knowledge 
stemming from the centrality of the military industrial complex led to important gaps in 
terms of the suitability of the technology for commercial use. These differences 
compared with market based economies are examined in terms of tacitness and locality 
gaps. The recipient of this technology must have a very high absorptive capacity. 
However, it is hypothesised that if the gaps in tacitness and locality are too big, even a 
high level of absorptive capacity may be insufficient to overcome the impediments 
created by tacitness and locality gaps. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, intermediaries may promote a firm‘s ITT activities by 
providing supportive services and information. If an intermediary is involved in the 
public sector, it may have the authority to create a favourable legal and institutional 
environment for ITT. Such services are believed to function as boundary spanning roles 
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between technology sources and their recipients, taking knowledge from one domain 
and applying it in another.  
 
Considering that a firm‘s absorptive capacity depends on the individuals who stand at 
the interface of the firm and the external environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and 
an intermediary may extend a firm‘s absorptive capacity by enhancing this boundary 
spanning or gatekeeping function. As the distance between the parties in terms of 
language and culture and the physical distance both increases the boundary of 
supportive service to be spanned becomes more complex and firm specific. This 
amplifies the importance of the intermediary role which may help extends the 
absorptive capacity of the recipient firm. High levels of tacitness and locality gap may 
require higher and greater firm-specific knowledge and complementary knowledge co-
produced by the intermediary and the firm. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Absorptive capacity consists of the stages of recognition, acquisition, 
assimilation and transformation, and exploitation. Each stage requires different types of 
support from intermediaries. This hypothesis helps provide a more detailed explanation 
to the question ―what do intermediaries do?‖ which is an elaboration and reinforcement 
of the claim that intermediaries are essential. 
 
The variety of intermediaries such as consulting service organisations, incubators, 
technology licensing offices, science parks is growing (Van Lente et al, 2003) to meet 
the needs of specific innovation systems, both upstream and downstream in the value 
chain (Ulset, 1996). Howells has proposed a typology of intermediation in the 
innovation process. The types include foresight and diagnostics; scanning and 
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information processing; knowledge processing, generation, and combination; 
gatekeeping and brokering; testing, validation, and training; accreditation and standards; 
regulation and arbitration; intellectual property protection and management; 
commercialisation; and assessment and evaluation (Howells, 2006). Moreover, these 
types are covered by various organisations, which suggests that different forms of 
intermediaries are needed to support the innovation process and some form of 
intermediaries are more suited to supporting a specific aspect of absorptive capacity. For 
example, an intermediary conducting assessment and evaluation would be able to 
support a firm in ―recognising the value‖ aspect of absorptive capacity, while another 
intermediary operating in commercialisation may be able to extend a firm‘s exploitation 
aspect of absorptive capacity. 
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggested three elements involved in absorptive capacity: 
recognizing the value of new information, assimilating, and commercial application. 
Zahra and George (2002) proposed four dimensions/capabilities of absorptive capacity: 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation. Todorova and Durisin‘s 
model of absorptive capacity (2007) is based on Cohen and Levinthal (1990). All of 
these models include assimilation and commercial exploitation. Todrova and Duris‘s 
model (2007) is useful to explain internal transfer of technology in that input and output 
stages are provided. And formal activities like contracting involved in the process of 
internal technology transfer seem to be distinct from the recognition of the value. In 
Zahra and George‘s conceptualization (2002), assimilation and transformation are 
presented as separate dimensions; the roles included in the assimilation dimension 
(interpretation, comprehension, and learning) seem to overlap with those in the 
transformation (recodification) dimension in the process of internal technology transfer. 
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In applying these models of absorptive capacity to external technology transfer such as 
Korean-Russian technology transfer, the process of internal technology transfer may be 
described as a sequential process that involves the stages of recognition, acquisition, 
assimilation or transformation, and exploitation. At each stage, the degree of knowledge 
gaps and needs for intermediary support may be different from one firm to another. Due 
to the nature of knowledge, the gap in the stage of recognising the value of knowledge, 
for example, will be more easily bridged by an intermediary performing the function of 
scanning and information processing than are conducting the role pf intellectual 
property protection and management. Gaps arising from tacitness are more 
technological in nature and may require very sophisticated technological knowledge to 
overcome. The different technological capability of the intermediary may be needed in 
bridging this type of gap.  
 
5.4. THE SCTA CONCEPT  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the thesis examines the process of ITT by developing and 
extending the concept of absorptive capacity. The existing literature on absorptive 
capacity is primarily concerned with firm-level processes. This thesis adds a firm-level 
understanding to ideas derived from the NIS approach, addressing institutions and 
policies that are able to enhance local firms‘ absorptive capacities. These institutions 
and policies may complement and reinforce firms‘ own absorptive capacities. 
Intermediaries may also play a complementary role to firm-level absorptive capacities. 
The SCTA framework has been developed in order to explain how the transfer of 
Russian technology into the Korean context was facilitated by intermediaries (primarily 
public sector organisations with an intermediary mission) and, in particular, how this 
120 
 
 
  
capacity plays a role in filling knowledge gaps, bridging differences, and overcoming 
difficulties in this process.  
The framework is created based on four hypotheses discussed above. These hypotheses, 
to the extent that they may be validated, lead to the conclusion that in order to overcome 
the contrasting nature of the socio-economic and technological systems in the Korean 
and Russian technology transfer, (1) the role of the intermediary (third party assistance) 
is critically important, and (2) such an intermediary role is closely linked with Korean 
NIS and public policies.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, these technologies from Russia have not been developed 
with an aim of optimising price and performance in relation to competitive market 
conditions. They also have not been integrated in large-scale production and distribution 
systems aiming to address global markets. Such a country-specific technological feature 
makes technology transfer difficult enough in domestic situations, and even more so in 
the international arena (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Keller and Chinta, 1990). 
 
As mentioned in the empirical background chapter, the context of Russian technology 
development suggests that there are likely to be greater uncertainties and a greater need 
for adaptation when acquiring these technologies than when acquiring technology from 
other contexts where market processes dominate. At the same time, because the context 
of their development has been less constrained by the need to satisfy market demands, 
these technologies may have features or characteristics that have not been adequately 
explored or developed in market-dominated contexts. 
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For this reason, when technology is transferred, implementation may fail due to the 
underlying socio-cultural and technological mismatch. Russian technology may be 
viewed as having great or even unique difficulties when technology transfers are 
attempted. This is true when it takes place between Russia and other countries with 
capitalist economies. Technologies developed in those capitalist economies are mostly 
private-led, civilian-purposed, and market-oriented. The SCTA explains how with 
Russian technology such characteristics is successfully transferred and absorbed by 
Korean firms through the creation of a particular systemic capacity. This systemic 
capacity is created through the interaction between a firm‘s capability and external 
assistance provided by government policy. 
 
This framework explains how the Korean-Russian divides in ―locality‖ and ―tacitness‖ 
may be bridged. The SCTA may be defined as a mechanism and process of public 
agency involvement in order to enhance local firms‘ abilities to absorb external 
knowledge when adapting from countries whose culture and language differ 
substantially in terms of ―locality‖ gaps. The SCTA also plays a key role in accessing, 
acquiring, nurturing, and integrating external technology within a firm‘s existing 
capability, which is related to the problems of knowledge transfer more generally where 
the ―tacitness‖ gap is important. The SCTA highlights the role of public R&D agencies 
and institutes as intermediaries for bridging these gaps. 
 
It is important to stress that the SCTA framework is based on a particular level of 
analysis. It is not on the macro level of the NIS, nor is it on the micro level of a firm‘s 
absorptive capacity. Rather, it is on a meso-level that the absorptive capacity created by 
a public and private partnership is built with the aim of leveraging various and not ―pre-
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selected‖ private firms‖ capacity to bridge the gaps involved in adapting Russian 
technology. This approach facilitates ITT, which is done by enhancing the local 
systemic capability for exploiting external technology. 
 
How can the role of the SCTA be differentiated from the roles of NIS and government 
policy? The governments of nearly all developing countries have been involved, in a 
major or minor way, in promoting inward transfer of technology from advanced 
countries and in supporting the private sector‘s technological development through the 
implementation of various policy measures (Narula and Dunning, 1998). This is slightly 
different from the specific capabilities considered within the SCTA framework. 
Although the existence of the SCTA becomes apparent in examining and attempting to 
explain the unique circumstances of Korean-Russian technology transfer, it is an idea 
that might be generalised with further research to consider other processes of ITT, 
particularly where the resources of individual firms are not adequate to bridge 
differences between the source and destination of the technology transfer. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, through a range of public agency programmes, the Korean 
government provides information and technical assistance to Korean firms in order to 
find the right partners (overcoming the locality gap) and interpret scientific knowledge 
(bridging any tacitness gap) in establishing ITT from Russia. The evidence presented in 
the empirical chapters suggests that the Korean-Russian gap would not have been 
bridged without the existence of public agency programmes. The SCTA provides a 
framework for thus direct public involvement in technology transfer projects that fill 
and close gaps between local firms and foreign technology suppliers. However, the NIS 
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contributes a critical indirect input to the SCTA in the form of fostering well-trained 
scientists and engineers (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). 
 
The constituents, boundaries, and functions of the SCTA are clearly limited as they are 
based on the public agency programmes discussed in Chapter 4. The SCTA is also 
involved in targeting the creation of system or programme level absorptive capacities, 
integrating capabilities from government agencies, public research institutes, and firms. 
The SCTA is especially necessary when transferring external technology from foreign 
countries whose technologies reflect the tacitness and locality gaps that arise from 
contrasting systems of innovation. In summary, the SCTA is a framework used to create 
unique ITT capability which is implemented in the Korean case by a specifically 
designed public assistance package. This package bridges the gaps of socio-economic 
and technological systems in the process of transferring foreign technology from 
countries that have contrasting, rather than common, characteristics.  
 
5.5. KEY FEATURES OF THE SCTA 
5.5.1. The SCTA as a Sequential Process 
The SCTA concept is developed based on observations and features that extend the 
existing absorptive capacity perspective. The SCTA involves linear routines stemming 
from the time-based process activities involved with ITT. Technology transfer is not an 
instantaneous event, but a time-based process involving several stages. These range 
from the initial recognition of technological value and opportunity, to application of the 
transferred technology to a product or service. Absorptive capacity is also a time-based 
process that consists of knowledge recognition, assimilation and commercial 
exploitation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Recognition, assimilation, and application of 
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transferred technology take place in linear sequence as shown in Figure 5-1. The 
knowledge source and prior knowledge act as a pre-condition, stimulating the external 
knowledge adoption. 
 
In outline, the SCTA is a process similar to that of absorptive capacity. However, the 
nature of Russian technology requires an additional alternative stage of 
―transformation‖. The SCTA is therefore a process-based framework that may be 
divided into (1) recognition, (2) acquisition, (3) assimilation or transformation, and (4) 
exploitation. Each of these stages is worth considering in a little more detail in the 
context of Korea‘s ITT from Russia. 
 
Figure 5-1: Process nature of the SCTA  
 
Source: Author 
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Recognition describes the stage in which a firm searches and discovers which 
technology is best to adopt. Experience with knowledge search is a key antecedent in 
absorptive capacity. The recognition stage has important implications for the 
accumulation of absorptive capacity. There is a strong path-dependent component in 
such a process. Firms that have been involved in R&D related activities have shown 
higher rates of accumulation of this ability (Fosfuri and Tribo, 2008). The technologies 
developed in Russia are marked by their ―origin of socialist economy‖ (Michailova, 
2011; Michailova and Jormanainen, 2011; Vlachoutsicos, 2011). This signals the 
possibility of substantial locality and tacitness gaps. These gaps reflect Russia‘s unique 
socio-political and cultural context. In this stage, it is important to evaluate the quality 
of the Russian technology and to recognise the potential value in solving technological 
problems. 
 
Acquisition describes the stage in which recipient firms contact and negotiate with their 
counterparts to make formal or informal arrangements for technology transfer and 
adoption. During the Cold War period, there were wide differences between Korea and 
Russia. Various systems including legal, administrative, and business environments 
were largely affected. The heritage of this period is that Russia‘s local context presents 
differences that required Korean firms to seek external assistance in understanding and 
dealing with these differences. Individual firms did not have the incentive to learn and 
negotiate institutional and administrative arrangements for acquisition in the post-Cold 
War period and therefore benefitted from the existence of a public agency willing to 
help build the relevant expertise. 
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Assimilation describes the stage in which recipient firms learn and master the scientific 
and technological knowledge from their counterparts. This may be done through 
technology licensing, personnel exchange, and joint research projects. Russian 
technology is not ready-made and packaged, so the capability of Korean firms to master 
and understand the technology is highly important. The strongly tacit nature of Russian 
technology requires innovative approaches to transferring technology. Specifically, 
means to facilitate human-to-human technology transfer appear to be more effective in 
these conditions than non-human channels such as manuals, tools or blueprints 
(Howells, 1996). 
 
Transformation is an alternative stage to assimilation. Transformation is necessary when 
the transferred technology needs further development before application may take place. 
Firms inevitably transform their transferred knowledge when it cannot be assimilated or 
directly applied. In transferring Russian technology, transformation is the nurturing, 
modifying, and appropriating process that makes the raw ingredients (scientific 
knowledge) useful. Some applied Russian technologies do not need significant 
nurturing or modification. In this case, assimilation is the more appropriate term for 
describing them.  
 
Lastly, exploitation describes the stages in which a firm creates genuine business 
opportunities or applies technology within products or processes for a competitive 
advantage.  
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5.5.2. The SCTA as a Multi-Dimensional Activity 
The SCTA is a multi-dimensional construct. The construct is made up of a complex set 
of activities involving multiple actors and interactions. The actors include the 
government, public organisations as intermediaries, private firms, and Russian 
organisations. This suggests that that the SCTA is a broader concept than absorptive 
capacity, having multi-actor and systemic features which are all internalised in the case 
of absorptive capacity but which raise coordination issues when considered from an 
inter-institutional perspective. The SCTA is comprised of a set of multi-organisational 
structures, routines and processes, and their interactions, mechanisms, and 
consequences. The SCTA also affects many actors within the NIS. The process of 
technological absorption is realised in the long run by not only by the firm‘s individual 
learning processes, but also by interaction and communication between actors. Although 
this view is implicit in Cohen and Levinthal and has been developed further in 
subsequent literature, e.g. Zahra and George (2002), it is particularly relevant for 
considering the alignment between Korean and Russian NISs, including technology, 
research organisations, and technology transfer transaction.  
 
In this chapter, the SCTA is described as a multi-dimensional and sequential process, 
representing multiple actors‘ involvement. Figure 5-1 explains the SCTA by extending 
the absorptive capacity framework. The intermediary helps to leverage a firm‘s 
absorptive capacity to overcome locality and tacitness gaps. These gaps form due to 
contrasting knowledge sources within the process of technology transfer. 
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Figure 5-1 identifies how each stage of the process of ITT provides an opportunity for 
interaction with the intermediary, with the entirety of these processes and interactions 
being the scope of analysis of the SCTA.  
5.5.3. The SCTA as Path-Dependent Activity 
The SCTA is understood here to be path dependent. This is an implication of the two 
ideas of sequential and multi-actor processes. If the SCTA is developed over time and 
has multiple features or dimensions, some may develop at different rates. Because these 
dimensions or features are inter-connected and mutually influential, the overall 
performance of the SCTA will differ depending on the order and extent to which its 
various components have developed in the past. This is not simply a case of ―history 
matters‖ but one in which the actual nature of the SCTA may be different as the result of 
the particular path of its development. Hence ―locking in‖ the development of the SCTA 
according to its past course of development is a key feature defining its path dependence. 
In this respect, the specific experience of Korean firms in developing high levels of 
capabilities for identifying and absorbing foreign technology from the triad economies 
created significant forms of ―lock in‖, which government policy measures and 
programmes may play a vitally important role in overcoming.  
 
5.6. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Despite Korean firms‘ capability for absorbing foreign technology, simply duplicating 
ITT implementation processes utilised with Korea‘s traditional counterparts, the triad 
countries, seems not to guarantee successful ITT (Kim, 2007). Instead, greater 
capability and more complex processes seem to be required in overcoming barriers 
between countries with contrasting systems and environments. 
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The intermediaries‘ role in the SCTA is developed to explain how greater capacity and 
improved processes are created in order to overcome barriers. Specifically, Korean 
firms‘ internal efforts alone were insufficient. To address this shortcoming, 
extraordinary capability was created with assistance from the public sector, including 
government agencies and public R&D institutes as intermediaries. The intermediary 
role is closely linked with NIS and public policies. The SCTA concept provides a 
framework for identifying how this intermediary intervention serves to overcome gaps. 
 
The SCTA concept is useful when technological and socio-cultural conditions between 
two countries with ITT implementation are dissimilar. In this thesis, such contrasting 
conditions and strengths are designated as gaps.  
The detailed consideration of the role of intermediaries should be analysed on the basis 
of several specific extensions of absorptive capacity theory. First, there is a multiplicity 
of actors addressing the multi-dimensional and sequential processes involved in 
technology transfer. Second, the SCTA may serve as a mechanism for overcoming ―lock 
in‖ to established processes of absorption shaped by prior experience, specifically the 
historical reliance of Korea on inward technology transfer from the triad economies. 
 
In this chapter, research questions and hypotheses are discussed with regard to the 
concept and key features of the SCTA. The SCTA is described as a multi-dimensional, 
and path-dependent, sequential process representing multiple actors‘ involvement. As a 
framework it directs research attention to the following issues: 1) barriers arising from 
dissimilar conditions surrounding innovations that have the potential to block successful 
ITT, 2) the empirical question of whether existing firm capabilities are sufficient to 
overcome these blocks, 3) the need to assess whether intermediaries play an essential 
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role in overcoming these blocks, and 4) how the intermediary is able to overcome these 
blocks. The first three of these numbered items constitute answers to the three research 
questions and conclusions regarding the first three hypotheses. The fourth numbered 
item involves a more detailed analysis of Hypothesis 4 and its implications for the 
design and conduct of SCTA activities. 
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CHAPTER 6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter sets out the research design and overall methodological approach for the 
thesis. Furthermore, it presents the details of data sources and methods for collecting 
and analysing data in this research. The primary aims of this study are twofold. First, to 
identify and understand the underlying processes and mechanisms that have led to 
successful instances of ITT between countries which share little “common ground”, 
specifically the contextual conditions identified in Chapter 4. Second, to assess whether 
the extension to the absorptive capacity literature represented by the SCTA is useful in 
explaining these instances of success or not. Because the second of these aims involves 
specific hypotheses about blockages to ITT processes and means of overcoming them, it 
is essential to find appropriate cases to elaborate and evaluate my hypotheses. In order 
to focus on the central theme and make my research more feasible, I limited the scope 
of my research to a single exchange context: Korean firms’ exploitation of Russian 
technology since the 1990s. The reasons for doing this are explained in the next section. 
 
6.2. CHOICE OF COUNTRIES 
For several reasons, it is concluded that the case of Korean firms‘ exploitation of 
Russian technology properly meets the conditions that this study intends to examine. 
First, Russia and Korea are different in almost every imaginable aspect geographically, 
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socio-economically, culturally, politically, and technologically. Korea and Russia 
officially agreed to end their past hostile relations in the early 1990s, mutually restarting 
scientific and technological exchanges in various fields. However, as a result of having 
had no interaction before and during forty years of the Cold War period, they seemed to 
have little or no common ground for ITT to successfully occur. It seems to be the case 
that Korean firms have experienced more difficulty in exploiting and absorbing Russian 
technology than technology from other countries that have shared similar cultural and 
political systems and structures. Despite Korea‘s successful experience and capability in 
exploiting and absorbing foreign technology, adapting and exploiting technology from 
Russia has proven to be very different in both context and nature. However, it is 
interesting and relevant to observe that while Korean firms face challenges in exploiting 
Russian technology, some of them, though not many, have succeeded in exploiting and 
commercialising Russian technology after agreeing to cooperate scientifically and 
technologically.  
 
In particular, it seems that Korean firms have experienced more difficulty in exploiting 
and absorbing Russian technology than technology from other countries that share 
similar cultural and political systems and structures. Despite Korea‘s successful 
experience and capability in exploiting and absorbing foreign technology, adapting and 
exploiting technology from Russia has proven to be qualitatively different from prior 
Korean ITT experience in ways that will be examined through the cases presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
While the hypotheses concerning ITT would suggest a severe blockage to such transfers 
in the case of Korean and Russia, it is, nonetheless observable that some of the firms, 
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though not many, have succeeded in exploiting and commercialising Russian 
technology after agreeing to cooperate scientifically and technologically. How the 
predictions following from a straightforward application of the problems of technology 
transfer are falsified in these cases is of inherent interest. 
 
Finally, as a researcher at KIST, I can access the relevant information to the cases. For 
all of the above reasons, I chose Korean-Russian technology transfer as my main target 
of investigation. 
 
6.3. CHOICE OF METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The thesis is based on a mixed approach including a survey (with a modest quantitative 
analysis) and case studies. In order to explore factors that can explain successful transfer 
of technology from Russia to Korea, an in-depth case study is necessary. At first, my 
methodology did not include a survey. However, during the course of analysis for the 
literature review and empirical chapter, it was realised that relying on interviews and 
case studies would raise concerns regarding the potential for generalisation of my case 
study findings. Thus, analysis of a survey is included. In addition, the survey provides a 
more comprehensive view to complement the micro view of case studies and interviews. 
It has been developed to test the hypotheses developed from the SCTA. 
 
These case studies have been used to understand the mechanisms by which the gaps 
have been overcome. Specifically, these case studies provide an in-depth analysis of 
successful ITT projects, with respect to the SCTA. Case studies have been selected of 
two intermediaries and four of the successful firm-level Russian technology transfer 
projects. The public agency programmes implemented by the Korean government to 
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assist domestic firms turned out to be a key feature in successful ITT from Russia to 
Korea in interviews as well as empirical investigation. From the empirical investigation, 
it is found that these public agency programmes provided the intermediation functions 
needed by domestic firms to bridge the gaps that would otherwise have prevented their 
acquisition of Russian technology. An examination of these public agency programmes 
is a necessary step toward developing an understanding of the context in which Korean 
firms acquired Russian technology and testing whether the SCTA is useful in 
representing the nature of Korean-Russian technology transfer.  
 
The project level case study has been designed to: (1) develop a deeper understanding of 
motivation, gaps, and processes of Russian technology transfer, (2) test the SCTA 
framework from a different perspective than the survey and (3) identify in greater detail 
the role of intermediary mechanisms in enhancing absorptive capacity. Only successful 
projects have been chosen as a target of analysis because of the rarity of such success. 
However, if time, resources, and the availability of cases would have supported it, it 
would have been desirable to consider cases in which one or more of the ―success‖ 
factors were present but success was not achieved. In this sense, further exploration of 
unsuccessful projects should be considered in order to more clearly identify what makes 
the difference between successful and unsuccessful projects. It is extremely difficult, 
however, to identify the extent of failure or to recover the details of failed projects. 
From my interviews with industry participants and government officials, it is observed 
that many projects had been stopped in the very early stages when Korean firms were 
searching for right partners. These interviews also revealed many examples of projects 
that were stopped in the process of negotiation. In some cases, Russian technology itself 
was transferred and mastered perfectly, but failed to be commercialised. In other cases, 
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Russian technology was commercialised, but the products with Russian technology 
content failed to attract consumers or win the market competition. Gathering 
information on all of these outcomes was beyond the feasibility of this research, given 
the difficulty of identifying the relatively few cases in which success has occurred. In 
short, only a very small proportion of attempts could overcome the many hurdles in 
achieving their expected goals or satisfaction so that it is concluded that direct 
comparison between successful and unsuccessful cases of the Korean Russian 
technology transfer would be less informative than a more in-depth investigation of 
those few cases that were successful. Interviews had also been implemented to better 
understand the background of the Korean-Russian technology transfer projects and to 
make a survey questionnaire.  
 
6.4. CHOICE OF SURVEYED FIRMS 
The survey collected information from survey responses to a series of questions that 
have been scored on a seven-point Likert scale. The survey has been implemented twice, 
using the same questionnaire each time. The first, questionnaire was sent to about 
30,157 Korean firms, through an online emailing system, registered with the Bank of 
Korea, which provides the largest and most accurate database of firms in Korea. Of the 
30,157 registered firms, 1,554 firms replied. Of these, only 31 firms have experiences 
with technology transfer from Russian partners. It is assumed that many Korean firms 
using adapted Russian technology are reluctant to reveal the fact of their Russian 
technology acquisition. Some of them want to hide the fact that they did not develop 
core technology themselves. Some of them exploited military-related technology and 
are prohibited from revealing the information by contracts.  
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I realised that a sample of 31 is too small. Consulting with my supervisors, I tried to 
extend the sample in order to improve the accuracy of the results. I sent out the same 
questionnaire again, with a more detailed explanation of the research purpose, omitting 
the 1,554 firms that had already answered. In order to increase the response rate, I 
randomly chose about twenty percent of firms from the same database and sent out the 
questionnaire again via postal mail. As a result, 1,196 answered surveys were received, 
including 63 firms with Russian technology transfer experience. With one response 
discarded as incomplete, a total of 93 completed surveys out of 2,750 replies have been 
analysed. The scarcity of such examples is itself evidence of the contribution of the 
intermediary in this technology transfer process. 
 
The sample size was still smaller than what was expected, but it represents a large 
enough sample to examine the range of experience of Korean firms in attempting to 
import Russian technology. As a way to obtain more samples, the alternative strategy of 
pursuing intermediaries, such as government programmes or industrial associations with 
an interest in promoting such exchanges, was considered. However, one of my 
important research goals is to find out how the intermediary role is necessary and 
important in the process of Korean-Russian technology transfer. Though these 
organisations are motivated to demonstrate their success, they are of less value in 
providing information. The randomly selected firms from the database would provide 
more objective results, even with a smaller sample size. 
 
One important question is whether the number of survey responses has yielded a 
selectivity bias. To assess this possibility, I compared the sampled firms by size and 
industry in relation to the size and industry of Korean firms more generally in order to 
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obtain an assessment of the sample‘s representativeness in the larger context of Korean 
industry. The result of this comparison is that the choice of the sample of surveyed firm 
is representative, an important goal of the survey. Thus, through successive 
administrations of the questionnaire it was possible to achieve a significant sample 
while preserving the representativeness of the sample for the entire population of 
Korean firms. 
 
6.5. SURVEY QUESTIONAIRE DESIGN 
In the process of finalising the questionnaire, focus group interviews were implemented 
twice with five managers or engineers from Korean firms with Russian technology 
transfer experience; twice with two administrative managers from government agencies 
undertaking the role of the intermediary, and twice with two experts from academia. 
These structured interviews were used to review all of the questionnaires, while taking 
into account existing gaps and motives. None of the interviewees were the same people 
who answered the questionnaire. 
 
6.6. CHOICE OF THE PARTICULAR CASE STUDIES 
In selecting the cases of successful ITT from Russia, the group of 93 firms or those 
participating in the focus group interview include were not part of the case studies that I 
conducted. These projects have been selected through the following process. Twenty 
years of articles from the press data base on the web were searched for successful 
Russian technology transfers. About two hundreds articles were selected. I tried to 
establish e-mail contacts with relevant staff including managers, engineers, and sales 
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persons who had participated in the technology transfer projects. About 47 firms 
responded, providing further information for this study.  
 
I decided that with limited time and resources, four successful cases would be a 
practical maximum number. In selecting these four successful projects out of 47, the 
first important criterion was that they should have support from intermediaries. Based 
on the survey results, it is interesting to observe that out of the 93 Korean firms with 
Russian technology transfer experience, 75 firms were supported by intermediaries in 
their technology transfer process. Also, in order to test the conceptual framework of the 
SCTA, one important purpose of case studies is to identify how firms‘ absorptive 
capacity is enhanced by the intermediaries‘ managerial and technological support. Of 
the 47 firms contacted by e-mail, 12 firms confirmed that they were supported by 
intermediaries. The remaining did not confirm me whether they get help from an 
intermediary or not. Among the 12 firms, the 4 successful projects were selected on the 
basis of diversity of industry, size of firms and type of intermediaries. 
  
Case studies were implemented according to interviews conducted with key personnel 
and document analysis provided by the Korean firms and their intermediary agencies. 
Frequent follow-up interviews, telephone conversations and emails were also 
undertaken in order to fill in the blanks and give structure to the case study. In order to 
avoid subjective judgment, information gathered from intermediaries was used solely 
for the purpose of cross-checking facts. A very limited amount of information from 
intermediaries was used, due to the concerns mentioned earlier about whether the 
intermediaries would have an incentive to bias the findings in a positive way with 
regard to their role. Case studies were then implemented on the basis of interviews 
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conducted with key personnel (see appendix 2). Analysis of documents provided by the 
Korean firms and their intermediary agencies was also carried out.  
 
6.7. INFORMATION GATHERING ABOUT PUBLIC 
AGENCY PROGRAMMES  
 
Eleven public agency programmes have been developed to promote Russian to Korean 
ITT. These public agency programmes were developed and operated by central 
government agencies and local governments. Most of the public agency programmes 
focus on collection and distribution of Russian S&T information and data by 
implementing document search and analysis as well as dispatching groups of experts. 
Only two programmes, the Core Technology Transfer Programme (hereafter CTTP) and 
Korean Russian Industrial Technology Programme (hereafter KRITP) involve more 
detailed ITT procedures. 
 
Table 6-1: Korean public agency programmes designed to promote Korean-Russian technology transfer 
(2005) 
Ministries Programmes (Starting Date) 
Budget 
(1,000₤) 
MOST 
Operating office in Moscow (1994) 500 
Assisting Korean- Russian joint R&D, investigating Russia‘s  
relevant technology (1998) 
420 
Core Technology Tranter Programme (1994) 1200 
MKE 
Creating the Russian industrial technology information system (2000) 175 
KRITP (1998) 1000 
Small & Medium 
Business 
Administration 
Organising seminars and forum relating to Russian technology and  
market (2003) 
150 
Russian technology information gathering (2003) 50 
Assisting SMBs‘ access to the Russian market (2001) 100 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
Government 
Assisting local firms‘ entering Russian market and adapting Russian 
technology (2002) 
75 
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Kyunggi 
Provincial 
Government 
Investigating Russian technology, recruiting Russian scientists,  
Joint R&D (2004) 
500 
Daejeon 
Metropolitan 
Government 
Assisting local firms‘ entering the Novosibirsk technology cluster  
(2004) 
50 
Source: Hong et al. (2007) 
 
As a result, CTTP, designed by MOST and KRITP, designed by MKE, have been 
chosen to be the main targets of this analysis. In addition, these two programmes have 
been selected because they have been operating for the longest period of time with the 
largest budget among the eleven public agency programmes. The two programmes have 
been role models that have motivated other central and local governments to launch 
similar programmes to perform their missions (Kim, Y, 2007). Furthermore, these two 
programmes represent the government ministries of MOST and MKE, the two main 
bodies for science and industrial policies. Hence, it is possible to compare how 
ministerial science and industrial policies reflect the intermediary role of supporting 
technology transfer from outside the country.   
 
Two of the public agency programmes are analysed mainly by examining documents 
provided by commissioned agencies as well as by interviews both inside and outside the 
agencies. During the interview process, SPRU alumni, working on MOST and MKE, 
assisted in retrieving specific information from those intermediaries and ministerial 
policies regarding the intermediary.  
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CHAPTER 7. SURVEY 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the utility of the SCTA based on the experience of individual 
firms‘ ITT activity with Russia, testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. The 
identification of gaps is examined for Hypothesis 1 using information 
drawn from various questionnaire items that refer to the difficulties that firms encounter 
in the process of ITT. The term ‗gaps‘ in this thesis represent difficulties and barriers in 
the ITT process, as defined in Chapter 5, and the questions referring to these gaps are 
highlighted in the Annex version of the questionnaire with the label ―Gaps_‖. Since the 
role of intermediaries is important for Hypotheses 2 and 3, an examination of the 
intermediaries‘ role and a classification of their organisational forms are required for 
better analysis. And throughout the four stages of the ITT process in the SCTA 
framework, different types of support from intermediaries are addressed in the survey. 
 
7.2. SURVEY DESIGN  
This section introduces a brief overview of the survey design. Table 7-1 shows the 
variables, definitions, and measurement scales adopted in the questionnaire. 
Demographic variables include size, age, and industrial classification of the surveyed 
firms. Prior experience in ITT from Russia (Question 12 of the questionnaire coded as 
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variable Exp_foreign) involves a binary response and is related to prior knowledge of 
the firms regarding ITT with Russia. 
 
For the purpose of adopting Russian technology (Obj_Coop), Question 9 of the 
questionnaire presents four choices, which are given with a multiple response option. 
The purposes can be developing a new product with transferred technology, combining 
the transferred technology with existing products, improving the cost effectiveness for 
an existing product, and solving current technological problems.  
 
For the motivations of adopting Russian technology, the importance of each variable is 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Motivation variables focus on why firms try to 
adopt Russian technology. Care needs to be taken in interpreting the response because 
what is measured is the level of importance of each variable. Also, it is noted that the 
motivation variables are specific to the context of the Korean-Russian ITT. 
 
Awareness variables are related to prior knowledge of the firms, especially the capacity 
for defining the internal needs in the problem-solving process, which is a dimension of 
absorptive capacity. Each of three variables in this category (Aware_problem, 
Aware_Rustech, Needs_outsource) is measured by a 7-point Likert scale. 
 
Variables regarding perceived gaps in the process of technology transfer are related to 
barriers and difficulties involved in the process of ITT. As described in Chapter 5, 
locality gaps and tacitness gaps are acknowledged in the hypotheses. The former means 
non-technological barriers arising from different culture, language, and socio-economic 
systems. The latter relates to differences in technological knowledge.  
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After reviewing an extensive amount of field interviews, empirical data, government 
reports, and literature reviews on technology transfer, I defined the gap variables in the 
process of Korean-Russian technology transfer. As mentioned early in the previous 
methodology chapter, the validity of these gap factors was confirmed through focus 
group interviews, with all of the interviewees agreeing that these factors represent 
common difficulties in implementing ITT with Russia. These gap factors are presented 
in the survey questionnaire.  
 
These variables are measured using a 7-point Likert scale. Gaps related to socio-cultural 
matters such as information, network, language, administration, cultural differences, and 
contract seems to be associated with locality concepts. They are not directly linked with 
technological matters, and are more barriers arising from the donor‘s locational 
characteristics. Other gaps seem to be more closely linked with technological barriers 
arising from the different nature of Russian technology, which are referred to as 
tacitness gaps. This survey adopted the pre-defined stages in the sequential model of 
absorption based on the SCTA, and asked about support by external entities including 
government agencies and R&D institutions, universities and private consulting firms. 
 
The following Table 7-1 shows all of the variables employed in the analysis: 
 
Table 7-1: Variables: explanations 
Variable Definition Values 
 
Size_emp 
Size_sales 
Age 
Industry 
Firm Characteristic (categorical variable) 
Firm size in terms of number of employees 
Firm size in terms of sales 
Age of the firm (years) 
SIC 2 digit industry classification 
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Exp_foreign Prior experience with ITT 1=yes; 0=no 
 Purpose (categorical variable)  
Obj_Coop 
1-Introducing 'the new' to the world of products 
2 Integrating it with already developed products 
3-Improving already h already developed products 
4-Solving current technological problems 
 
 Motive (opinion variables)  
Motive_cost 
Motive_excel 
Motive_originality 
Motive_Ipstr 
Motive_time 
Motive_comple 
Motive_active 
Relatively Cheaper to import 
Technological excellence in in certain fields 
Unique strength of Russian technology  
Easier to avoid IP disputes 
Shorter procedures in implementing technology transfer 
Capability and resource complimentary to Korean firms 
Russia‘s proactive attitude on technology transfer 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
7 pt. Likert scale 
Aware_problem Clear awareness of weaknesses and how to improve 7 pt. Likert scale 
Aware_Rustech 
Prior knowledge of Russian technology due to previous 
importation experiences 
7 pt. Likert scale 
Needs_outsource Clear awareness on what technology can be outsourced 7 pt. Likert scale 
 Gaps  
Gap_info Information relating Russian S&T, in general 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_network Human network introducing Russian institutions and researchers 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_admin 
Administrative difficulty in implementing technology  
transfer (residence, VISA, insurance etc.) 
7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_lang Language barrier 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_culture Cultural differences 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_transfer Differences in understanding of ITT and research collaboration 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_contract Difficulty in contract or negotiation 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_eval Difficulty in understanding and evaluating Russian technology 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_modify Difficulty in modifying or transforming Russian technology 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_cost Uncertainty in unexpected additional cost 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_time Uncertainty about time needed for technology development 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_reliability Level of unreliability of Russian technology 7 pt. Likert scale 
Gap_codification Degree of codification of technological knowledge 7 pt. Likert scale 
dummy_int The gap is bridged with support from intermediaries 1=yes; 0=no 
Type_int 
The types of intermediaries 
1 - Central government agency 
2 - Local government agency 
3 - Public R&D institution 
4 - University 
5 - Private consulting firm 
 
Support_Info Receiving information-related support 7 pt. Likert scale 
Support_Fund Receiving fund-related support 7 pt. Likert scale 
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Support_Tech Receiving technological support 7 pt. Likert scale 
Support_Cont Receiving contract or negotiation-related support 7 pt. Likert scale 
Support_Admin Receiving administrative services support 7 pt. Likert scale 
Per_support Level of satisfaction of intermediary support 7 pt. Likert scale 
Per_Rus Level of satisfaction of Russian technology transfer project 7 pt. Likert scale 
Proc_recog Active in support of the ‗recognizing the value‘ stage 1=yes; 0=no 
Proc_acq Active in support of the ‗acquisition‘ stage 1=yes; 0=no 
Proc_assim_trans Active in support of the ‗assimilation or transformation‘ stage 1=yes; 0=no 
Proc_exploit Active in support of the ‗exploitation‘ stage 1=yes; 0=no 
 
 
7.3. ANALYSING THE DATA PROFILE 
It is important to define the characteristics of our sample and to draw some implications 
regarding the differences between two groups of Korean firms. One consists of Korean 
firms with ITT experience with Russia and the other group without. As shown in Table 
7-2, among 2,750 Korean firms that replied to the questionnaire, only 93 firms have ITT 
experience with Russia. The size (number of employees) and age in years were 
investigated in an effort to understand the general profile of the surveyed firms. The 
table below provides demographic data on the firms which have pursued technology 
transfer from Russia. 
 
 
 
Table 7-2: Firms’ characteristics – age and size 
 N Min Max Mean std dev 
Firms 
Type A 
2,657     
Age - 2 98 19.623 9.983 
Size emp - 3 18,000 50.176 54.145 
Firms 
Type B 
93     
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Age - 4 71 15.555 10.093 
Size_emp - 50 12500 82.485 92.567 
Type A Firms: Those not acknowledging ITT experience with Russia 
Type B Firms: Those acknowledging ITT experience with Russia 
 
Table 7-3 describes the characteristics of the surveyed firms in terms of the industry 
distribution (SIC 2-digit code) of firms that had ITT experience with Russia. It shows 
that the sample covers almost every industry except the beverage and coke industries. It 
is quite similar to the industrial distribution of Korea, the data of which were obtained 
from National R&D Activity Survey in 2009, nearly contemporaneous with the timing 
of conducting this survey. Table 7-3 further shows that some of the more technology-
intensive industries, like chemicals, electronic computers, and medical and electrical 
equipment, as well as other machinery and computer programming, have a slightly 
greater representation in the sample than in Korean industry as a whole. This, however, 
seems to add to the argument that the more technologically-intensive industries are 
more likely to be interested and ultimately to engage in ITT. 
 
Table 7-3: Firms’ characteristics – industry distribution   
SIC2  Frequency 
Sample 
 (%) 
Korea 
(%) 
Food  2 2.15 5.12 
Beverages  0 0.00 1.06 
Textile  1 1.08 2.76 
Apparel  1 1.08 1.56 
Leather  1 1.08 1.5 
Wood  1 1.08 1.32 
Pulp  1 1.08 2.82 
Printing  3 3.23 2.44 
Coke  0 0.00 0.85 
Chemicals  8 8.60 5.82 
Pharmaceuticals  2 2.15 1.85 
Rubber  2 2.15 6.35 
Non-metallic  3 3.23 2.88 
Basic Metal  3 3.23 3.23 
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Metal  6 6.45 6.12 
Electronic_Computer  9 9.68 6.00 
Medical instrument  7 7.53 5.67 
Electrical equipment  9 9.68 6.00 
Other Machinery  8 8.60 6.56 
Vehicles  4 4.30 5.56 
Other Transport 
Equipment 
 3 3.23 2.29 
Furniture  1 1.08 2.26 
Other manufacturing  3 3.23 2.5 
Waste Collection  1 1.08 0.91 
Publishing  3 3.23 5.73 
Computer programming  4 4.30 2.62 
Information service  2 2.15 1.06 
RnD  2 2.15 2.47 
Architecture_etc  3 3.23 4.65 
Total  93 100 100 
 
 
7.4. IDENTIFYING THE GAPS 
It is very important to identify what kind of barriers or difficulties may hinder a 
successful technology transfer between Korea and Russia, Thus, identifying the gaps in 
the Korean-Russian technology transfer is one of the important research questions in 
this study.  
 
These gaps are presented as difficulties of technology transfer from the point of view of 
the technology recipient. Based upon the review of literature, focus group studies and 
interviews, the conclusion was that these gaps may be identified with the concepts of 
tacitness and locality, each of which might be candidates for assistance from 
intermediaries. Using these gaps as the basis for questionnaire questions, I sought to 
gather several pieces of evidence. First, which gaps were most strongly identified as 
being encountered in their transfer experiences? Second, was there a closer relationship 
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within the tacitness and locality variables than between them? Third, which, if any of 
the variables were significantly correlated, whether within or between the two groups? 
Some correlation between variables was found to be significant, and this helped to 
understand the overall pattern and characteristics of the transfer.  
 
The confidence of Korean firms may be reflected in the relatively lower values 
associated with time and cost variables (tacit components). Although they are important, 
concerns about the ―reliability‖ of Russian technology were the least strongly 
emphasized of these issues. These observations are impressionistic because the standard 
deviations of the answers are broad, preventing us from ascertaining the statistical 
significance of the differences between the answers. 
 
Table 7-4: Descriptive statistics of gaps that hinder technology transfer 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N  
Gap_lang 6.01 0.699 93  
Gap_culture 5.58 0.742 93  
Gap_modify 5.44 1.005 93  
Gap_admin 5.39 0.847 93  
Gap_info 5.38 0.859 93  
Gap_eval 5.33 1.087 93  
Gap_transfer 5.33 0.838 93  
Gap_network 5.32 0.969 93  
Gap_codification 5.20 0.951 93  
Gap_contract 5.16 0.912 93  
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Gap_time 4.77 0.979 93  
Gap_cost 4.70 0.942 93 
Gap_reliability 4.37 0.953 93 
Note: All thirteen gap-measuring variables shown are higher than 4 (the average on the 7-point Likert 
scale), showing perceptions of the difficulty of Russian technology transfer.  
 
The values of all thirteen gap-measuring variables are higher than 4 on average, which 
means that the firms perceived there to be difficulties related to all the gap variables 
provided. 
 
The mean value for the difficulty of communicating with Russian partners because of 
language barriers (Gap_lang) was the highest among the difficulty variables. As shown 
in Table 7-5, other variables with relatively high correlation coefficients with Gap_lang 
are Gap_info (0.57), Gap_contract (0.54), Gap_network (0.43), Gap_transfer (0.38), 
Gap_admin (0.38), and Gap_culture (0.37). Difficulty variables with relatively low  
correlation coefficients with Gap_lang are Gap_eval (-0.12), Gap_modifiy(-0.04), 
Gap_cost (0.04), Gap_time (0.02), Gap_reliability (-0.01), and Gap_codification (-0.04). 
There was no difficulty variable with a highly negative correlation coefficient. Basic 
observation based on correlation with the language barrier (Gap_lang) appears to reveal 
two groups of difficulties related to ITT. The first group of variables is generally related 
to non-technological factors and the second to technological ones. But the distinction is 
not very clear. For example, difficulty in collecting S&T related information (Gap_info) 
may be related to both technological and non-technological aspects. Therefore, this can 
be interpreted as being mainly related to non-technological or locality aspects. 
 
Difficulty variables with relatively high correlation coefficients generally, though not 
entirely, have higher mean values than the rest of the difficulty variables. This is the 
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perception of firms actually involved in ITT. This observation prompts certain questions. 
First, is this result peculiar to Russian-Korean ITT or can it be generalised to ITT 
between other countries? Second, are non-technological or culturally related difficulties 
more important or harder to overcome than difficulties related to technological matters? 
Third, what should be the focus of support from intermediaries, the technological side 
or the non-technological side, or should it vary according to the nature of specific 
company‘s absorptive capacity?  
Research by Lin and Berg (2001) provides an interesting comparison. They studied 
empirically the effects of cultural differences on technology-transfer projects using a 
sample of 180 Taiwanese manufacturing companies. Their empirical evidence suggested 
that cultural differences might not only impose barriers to technical communication but 
also have an interaction effect with the nature of the technology, interpreting the results 
of the regression analysis of their data (Lin and Berg, 2001:291). However, reviewing 
the models they tested, the model including cultural differences as an independent 
variable was slightly better than the one without, and another model composed of the 
interaction between technological maturity and tacitness instead of cultural difference 
was better still(see Table 3, Lin and Berg, 2001: 291). Therefore, in interpreting Table 7-
4 and Table 7-5 of this study, the interaction between non-technological, culture-related 
difficulties and technology-related difficulties may be an important point to be 
considered before attempting to identify implications for S&T policy and the role of 
intermediaries. 
 
Table 7-5: Correlation matrix: analysis result 
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Source: Author 
Factor analysis was conducted in order to confirm whether the thirteen gap-measuring 
variables actually divide themselves into the two main underlying factors of locality and 
tacitness gaps, as predicted by the correlation analysis. Accordingly, I adopted a specific 
criterion to determine the main variation patterns of the thirteen gap-measuring 
variables: namely, the component Eigenvalue had to be greater than 1. As shown in 
Table 7-6 below, up to two factors have Eigenvalues that are greater than 1 with the 
cumulative variance explained about 57%. Although this is a bit less than 60% (the ideal 
percentage to aim for in social science studies), the marginal increase of variance (about 
6.2%) of introducing a third underlying dimension does not significantly improve the 
predictive power. Thus, introducing a third underlying dimension was not necessary. 
Therefore I confirmed that only two groups were needed to represent the 13 gap- 
measuring variables in Korean-Russian technology transfer.  
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Table 7-6: Total variance explained 
Total Variance Explained
3.874 29.797 29.797 3.874 29.797 29.797 3.874 29.796 29.796
3.539 27.219 57.016 3.539 27.219 57.016 3.539 27.220 57.016
.803 6.177 63.193
.749 5.759 68.952
.707 5.439 74.391
.624 4.799 79.189
.571 4.391 83.581
.523 4.022 87.603
.464 3.572 91.175
.430 3.311 94.486
.344 2.648 97.134
.243 1.871 99.005
.129 .995 100.000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis
Source: Author 
 
We determined which of the thirteen gap-measuring variables belonged to which of the 
two groups (denoted as Component). As Table 7-7 shows, the factor loading scores after 
rotation of the variables. 
Table 7-7: Rotated component matrix 
 
Source: Author 
 
Based on this result, the Korean-Russian technology transfer gaps are grouped 
accordingly: 
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• Component 1 – Locality gap in technology transfer 
• Component 2 – Tacitness gap in technology transfer 
Descriptive statistics for the rotated factor scores are summarised below in Table 7-8. 
 
Table 7-8: Descriptive statistics: rotated factor scores 
 
Source: Author 
Note: After rotation, the mean and standard deviation of the two factors were adjusted to 0 and 1, 
respectively. 
 
As a result, these two factors are employed as latent constructs, representing a firm‘s 
perceived gaps in technology transfer, so that two groups of main hindrances to Korean-
Russian technology transfer can be conceptualised in terms of locality and tacitness 
gaps. 
 
Motives and Purpose 
Korean firms understand that the basic nature of Russian technology has been largely 
based upon R&D conducted for their military and mission-focused purposes. As such, 
Korean firms mostly had not expected Russian technology to be in a mature and 
packaged form that could be directly applicable to the commercial market. What, then, 
motivated Korean firms to attempt adoption of Russian technology? This is related to 
the second research question in this thesis. 
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According to the empirical research and the interviews, the most frequently mentioned 
motives can be divided into seven main categories: (1) relatively cheaper to import; (2) 
technological excellence in various fields; (3) unique strength in Russian technology; 
(4) easer to avoid IP disputes; (5) shorter procedures in implementing technology 
transfer; (6) complementary strengths lacking in Korean firms; and (7) Russia‘s 
proactive attitude to technology transfer.  
 
Table 7-9 presents a correlation analysis between these motive variables and the gap 
factors derived above by factor analysis, i.e, the locality and tacitness gap factors.  
Correlation coefficients between the motive variables were not found to be significant 
except for the motives for seeking capabilities and resources that are complementary to 
Korea‘s (Motive_comple). The variable Motive_comple has a relatively high correlation 
with three of the seven motive variables: cutting edge R&D capability in certain fields 
(Motive_excel), Russia‘s unique strength compared to western technology 
(Motive_originality) and shorter time to adopt the necessary technology (Motive_time). 
This result suggests that Russia‘s cutting edge R&D capability in certain fields and 
Russia‘s unique strength against western technology were part of the complementary 
strengths Korea was seeking.  
 
However, how can one interpret the fact that the motive for capabilities and resources 
that are complementary to Korea‘s is highly correlated with the motive for shorter time 
to adopt the necessary technology? Given that Russia‘s cutting edge R&D capability in 
certain fields was one area of Korea‘s search for complementary capabilities, this may 
mean that the cutting-edge technology Korea needed in certain fields was relatively 
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easier to transfer and adopt from Russia than from other technologically advanced 
countries.  
 
Table 7-9: Correlation coefficient: an analysis between motivations and gaps. 
 Motive_ 
cost 
Motive_ 
excel 
Motive_ 
originali
ty 
Motive_ 
Ipstr 
Motive_ 
time 
Motive_ 
comple 
Motive_ 
active 
Motive_ 
cost 
1       
Motive_ 
excel 
.15 1      
Motive_ 
originality 
-.14 .12 1     
Motive_ 
Ipstr 
-.03 .19 .01 1    
Motive_ 
time 
.04 -.02 .09 -.17 1   
Motive_ 
comple 
.04 -.37** -.34** .18 -.29** 1  
Motive_ 
active 
.05 -.04 .11 -.01 .07 -.06 1 
Locality gap -.57** -.36** -.31** -.08 .02 .18 -.18 
Tacitness gap -.09 -.02 .03 -.17 .05 -.19 -.41** 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  Source: Author  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a major pattern of industrialisation of latecomer economies 
has been the adoption and application of technology developed by Western advanced 
countries. But successful latecomers will ultimately confront the need for higher levels 
of technology, and at later stages of development, successful latecomers become 
potential rivals of leading countries. Therefore leading firms of Western countries which 
had previsouly been the primary source of technology for the technological follower 
may become reluctant to transfer more of their technology. The survey result shown by 
the correlation analysis of the motives for participation in Russian-Korean ITT  
suggests that Korea may have reached such a competitive position as explained above 
for latecomer firms. 
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And it is observed that there are negative correlations which are significant at the 1% 
level between the two factors locality gap and three of the motive variables. These 
variables are relatively lower cost of technology import (Motive_cost), cutting edge 
R&D capability in certain fields (Motive_excel), and Russia‘s unique strength against 
western technology (Motive_originality). All of the correlation coefficients between 
these variables and the factor locality gaps are negative, with that between the relatively 
lower cost of technology import and locality gap being the highest of the three 
correlation coefficients (-0.57).  
 
The factor locality gap stands for locality barriers to ITT. The highly negative 
correlation coefficient between locality gap and Motive_cost means the greater the 
perception about the cost advantage of Russian technology import, the lower the 
perception about the locality barriers to ITT. And regarding the other two negative 
correlations coefficients, they can be interpreted to mean that the higher the perception 
about cutting-edge R&D capabilities in certain fields (Motive_excel) and Russia‘s 
unique strength compared to western technology (Motive_originality), the lower the 
perception about the locality barriers. And only one variable, a proactive attitude from 
the Russian R&D community (Motive_active) has a correlation coefficient that is 
significant at the 1% level with the factor tacitness gap. This means that the more 
proactive the attitude from the Russian R&D community about the technology transfer 
project, the less the project is perceived as difficult with respect to tacitness barriers. In 
addition, Korean firms are motivated by Russia‘s proactive attitude, as it helps to reduce 
the tacitness gaps in the process of technology transfer. This can be interpreted as 
Russian partners with a proactive attitude can make the technology more adaptable to 
the needs of Korean firms. 
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In some sense, the motive variables are related to the relative advantages of Russian-
Korean ITT compared to technology transfer from advanced Western countries. Thus, 
negative correlation coefficients are expected between motive variables and the two 
barrier factors. Four of the seven motive variables have a relatively high correlation 
with the barrier factors, locality gap or tacitness gap, and the other three do not show 
any meaningful correlation with the barrier factors. These three variables are avoiding 
IP disputes (Motive_Ipstr), shorter time to adopt the necessary technology 
(Motive_time), and capabilities and resources that are complementary to Korea‘s 
(Motive_comple). All three variables seem to represent important advantages in the 
Russian-Korean ITT context. So why do these variables related to important advantages 
show little or no correlation with the barrier factors? A clue to the answer of this 
question may be that these variables are relatively indirect and complex in the specific 
context of importing Russian technology. For example, though shorter time to adopt the 
necessary technology is important, the uncertainty for Korean firms about 
commercialising knowledge that is principally in the form of scientific findings may 
well be much higher than that for adopting commercialised Western technology. 
 
In addition, from the survey analysis (see table 7-14), about 80% (75 out of 93 cases) of 
Russian technology adopted by Korean firms were utilised to solve technological 
problems in improving a process or product rather than making a new process or 
product. This shows a different aspect of Korean firms‘ motivation to adapt Russian 
technologies. It may be inferred that Russian technology is relatively science-oriented 
and developed mainly for military or special mission purposes. This less market-
oriented technology seems more easily applicable to improving already existing Korean 
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products or technologies rather than to introducing entirely new products or 
technologies. 
 
Table 7-10: Case summary: comparison analysis with regard to type of innovations 
Case Summary
Per_Rus
12 3.67 .778
51 4.29 1.045
6 4.17 .753
24 4.21 1.021
93 4.18 .999
Obj_Coop
new products
existing products
new process
existing process
Total
N Mean SD
 
Source: Author 
 
This table clearly shows that the pattern and nature of the Korean-Russian technology 
transfer is very different from that of Korean firms with advanced Western technology. 
We have found that the main purpose and motivation of Korean firms adapting Russian 
technology is not the transfer of technology that will lead to a new product entering the 
market. Instead, Korean firms use Russian technology to supplement their research 
efforts in order to improve a process or the specification of an already developed 
product. 
 
According to the absorptive capacity concept (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), recognising 
the potential value is the initial step of technological absorption from outside. However, 
recognising one`s own needs and problems are a prior condition for identifying the 
value of external knowledge. Table 7-11 indicates that the relationship between 
awareness of technological needs and perception of gaps. As shown in the table, the 
degree of a firm‘s awareness of its technological needs (or problems) 
(AWARE_PROBLEM) is negatively correlated with the tacitness-related gaps. This 
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result can be interpreted as meaning that when a firm is clearly aware of its 
technological needs, the hurdles to understanding the transferred technology is not such 
a significant matter. 
 
Table7-11: Correlation analysis for tacitness, locality and technological needs (Aware_Problem) 
  Locality gap Tacitness gap 
Aware_problem Corr. Coeff. .180 -.493** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .000 
 
Source: Author 
 
The survey results (see table 7-12) also show that firms with a greater understanding of 
their technological needs tend to be more satisfied with the adopted Russian technology. 
In addition, when firms have a clear awareness of the technology that needs to be 
outsourced, the solutions (NEEDS_OUTSOURCE) are perceived to be of higher quality. 
This results in higher satisfaction ratings of the technology transfer process (PER_RUS) 
(the correlation coefficient is significant and positive 0.34). 
Table 7-12: Correlations: analysis for problem awareness and performances 
  
Aware_ 
problem 
Needs_ 
outsource 
Aware_ 
Rustech 
Per_ 
support 
Per_Rus 
Aware_ 
problem 
Corr. Coeff. 1     
 Sig. (2-tailed)      
 N 93     
Needs_ 
outsource 
Corr. Coeff. .438** 1    
 Sig. (2-tailed) .000     
 N 93 93    
Aware_ 
Rustech 
Corr. Coeff. -.278** -.035 1   
 Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .737    
 N 93 93 93   
Per_ 
support 
Corr. Coeff. .194 -.046 -.215 1  
 Sig. (2-tailed) .096 .697 .064   
 N 75 75 75 75  
Per_Rus Corr. Coeff. .226* .342** -.077 .231* 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .001 .463 .047  
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 N 93 93 93 75 93 
Source: Author 
 
In summary, seven motives were identified from the empirical literature review and 
from interviews. Korean firms' locality gaps as less difficult to overcome. A large 
portion of Korean firms that adapted Russian technology utilised problem solving to 
adapt the existing processes or products, rather than creating an entirely new process or 
product. Also, when a firm is clearly aware of its technological needs, the hurdles to 
understanding the transferred technology is not such a significant issue. Such Korean 
firms tend to be more satisfied with technological transfer projects.  
 
Prior Knowledge and Experience 
Prior knowledge and experience with Russian entities are one of the gap-bridging 
instruments discussed in Hypothesis 2 in the previous chapter. Once Korean firms 
obtain experience in Korean-Russian technology transfer, do they gain the perception 
that it will be easier to overcome locality-related gaps next time? In regards to the 
concept of absorptive capacity, prior knowledge certainly plays an important role in 
assimilating external technology and knowledge. From the interviews, it would seem 
that having prior experience of Russian technology transfer helps to overcome these 
locality-related gaps. For example, firms become accustomed to Russia‘s business 
culture, gain access to their scientific community, and understand Russia‘s business 
administration procedures. Therefore, it is necessary to confirm whether or not this is a 
common tendency for Korean firms. 
 
Table 7-13: Case summary: differences in the perception of gaps depending on prior experience 
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Source: Author 
Note: Out of the 93 firms that replied, 54 have prior experience while 39 do not. The value 0 for the 
variable Exp_foreign denotes Korean firms with no previous contractual types of work with Russian 
scientists or institutes. 
 
Indeed, Table 7-13 shows that firms with a lack of Russian technology-transfer 
experience face difficulties with locality gaps compared to firms with significant 
experience. Though I was not able to statistically show that there was a significant 
difference in these perceptions as I was not able to collect a large enough sample (as 
noted earlier, the sample size is affected by reasons including the secretive and 
competitive nature of Korean firms.) to create a reliable confidence interval of the 
difference between the means, my main objective was to follow up on the views of my 
interviewees and discover whether this was a common perception prevalent among 
Korean firms participating in Korean-Russian technology transfer. 
 
I employed non-parametric statistical tests on the same data set. According to the data 
displayed in Table 7-11, the null hypothesis, that both groups are equally distributed, is 
rejected. Thus we may infer that locality, perceived satisfaction with the support from 
intermediaries and perceived satisfaction with the technology transfer from Russia were 
all significantly different depending on prior experience. 
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Table 7-14: Non-parametric tests: differences in the perception of gaps depending on prior experience 
 Locality gap Tacitness gap Per_support Per_Rus 
Mann-Whitney U 710.000 851.000 252.000 731.500 
Wilcoxon W 2195.000 1631.000 1428.000 1511.500 
Z -2.670 -1.573 -4.583 -2.614 
Significance .008 .116 .000 .009 
Group variable: Exp_foreign 
 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is that, once firms find a way to access the 
Russian scientific community, or to overcome Russia‘s locational and sociocultural 
differences, these no longer represent barriers. However, such prior experience does not 
make a significant difference in bridging gaps relating to tacitness. Moreover, prior 
experience seems to have an impact on the success of technology transfer projects 
(PER_RUS), as measured by Korean firms‘ satisfaction ratings. Prior knowledge of 
socio-cultural and geographical issues greatly enhances a firm‘s absorptive capacity. In 
this respect, Hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
 
7.5. ROLE OF THE INTERMEDIARIES 
One important goal of this study was to find out how some of Korean firms managed to 
overcome the gaps encountered in transferring Russia‘s contrasting technology. It was 
hypothesised that the role of an intermediary might facilitate the technology transfer. 
Analysis was therefore conducted to identify the role and contribution of intermediaries. 
Out of the 93 Korean firms with Russian technology-transfer experience, 75 firms were 
supported by intermediaries. Their satisfaction with the assistance on technology 
transfer is rather high (a mean of 4.35) compared to that of the comparison group (with 
a mean of 3.50) with no such support (see table 7-15). 
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 Table 7-15: Case Summary: comparison analysis with regard to involvement of intermediaries 
Case Summary
Per_Rus
18 3.50 .707
75 4.35 .993
93 4.18 .999
dummy_int
not supported
supported
total
N Mean SD
 
Source: Author 
 
Since our sample, especially firms‘ experienced in Russian technology transfer with the 
involvement of intermediaries, is not large enough to draw any parametric statistical 
inferences, we employed the non-parametric test again. Based on data displayed in 
Table 7-16, we may conclude that differences between groups with intermediaries and 
those without intermediaries are significant (p-value = 0.001). 
 
 
 
Table 7-16: Non-parametric test: comparison analysis with regard to involvement of intermediaries 
 Per_Rus 
Mann-Whitney U 343.500 
Wilcoxon W 514.500 
Z -3.366 
Significance .001 
Group variable: dummy_int 
Source: Author 
 
Through the interviews, we found that firms without support had other linkages with 
Russia in terms of human networks, established relationships between partners, etc. This 
seems to indicate that these firms had succeeded in overcoming locality gaps without 
assistance from intermediaries. 
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Table 7-17 shows that public sector intermediaries such as central government agencies, 
local government agencies, and public research institutes offer a relatively higher 
quality of support. This is especially noticeable with regard to the intermediary role of 
public research institutes. It is assumed that a public research institute provides not only 
administrative support but also technological assistance. As a result, both locality and 
tacitness can be bridged in a balanced way. 
 
Hypothesis 3 is conclusively supported in that about 80 percent of Korean firms with 
Russian technology transfer have been supported by intermediaries and their perceived 
level of satisfaction with regard to technology transfer projects was higher than that for 
those without intermediary support. 
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 Table 7-17: Case summary: types of intermediaries 
 
Source: Author 
 
Intermediary Support at the stage of ITT 
Table 7-18 shows the correlation analysis results between provision of intermediary 
support and gap-related items. The statistical significance between pairs such as 
GAP_INFO & SUPPORT_ADMIN and GAP_NETWORK & SUPPORT_ADMIN 
indicates that firms facing locality-related issues receive administrative support from 
their corresponding intermediaries. It is notable that the overall satisfaction with private 
consultants was much lower (3.83) than that for public intermediaries (5.67), and also 
that local government agencies (4.57) and even central agencies (4.24) in table 7-17. 
These patterns remain valid when the perceived level of satisfaction with the support 
provided by the specific intermediary is examined (designated Per_support). 
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On the other hand, difficulties in tacitness (GAP_MODIFY, GAP_CODIFICATION) 
were highly correlated with intermediaries' support with regard to technological aspects 
(SUPPORT_TECH). Interestingly, firms facing barriers in networking and contracts 
have a tendency to rescure support for securing funds (SUPPORT_FUND). We can infer 
that funding support from intermediaries can help firms to overcome certain types of 
locality issues. 
 
 Table 7-18: Correlation coefficient 
Correlation Coefficient
.196 .208 -.025 .319** .286*
.092 .073 .830 .005 .013
.191 .274* .078 .228* .144
.100 .017 .504 .050 .217
.024 .196 .058 .212 .348**
.841 .092 .622 .068 .002
.192 .240* .033 .400** .116
.099 .038 .781 .000 .321
.252* .045 .073 .173 .059
.029 .702 .531 .139 .617
.173 .038 .213 .128 .290*
.138 .744 .067 .275 .012
.176 .286* .057 .249* .249*
.130 .013 .627 .031 .031
-.067 .030 .147 -.151 -.228*
.567 .797 .207 .195 .049
.036 .022 .327** -.264* -.155
.756 .854 .004 .022 .184
.069 -.077 .256* -.266* -.206
.559 .511 .027 .021 .077
-.027 .011 .326** -.250* -.222
.819 .924 .004 .030 .056
-.102 .045 .206 -.297** -.212
.384 .701 .077 .010 .068
-.109 .059 .395** -.313** .044
.353 .617 .000 .006 .711
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Correlation Coeff
Sig (2-tai led)
Gap_info_L
Gap_network_L
Gap_admin_L
Gap_lang_L
Gap_culture_L
Gap_transfer_L
Gap_contract_L
Gap_eval_T
Gap_modify_T
Gap_cost_T
Gap_time_T
Gap_reliabil i ty_T
Gap_codification_T
Support_Info Support_Fund Support_T ech Support_Cont
Support_
Admin
Correlation is significant at the 1% level**. 
Correlation is significant at the 5% level*. 
 
Source: Author 
 
In the SCTA framework, ITT is viewed as a sequential process involving several stages. 
It is assumed that each stage needs different types of support from intermediaries. As we 
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saw in previous chapters, the four stages used to describe the SCTA as a process are: 
recognition, acquisition, assimilation/transformation, and exploitation. 
 
Table 7-19 shows that Korean firms supported in the recognition stage have a relatively 
higher value of locality (0.497) compared to that of the other firms not supported (-
0.546).  
 
Table 7-19: Comparison analysis of the recognition stage 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7-20 shows that Korean firms supported in the acquisition stage have a relatively 
higher value of locality (0.874) compared to that of the other firms not supported (-
0.957). 
 
Table 7-21 shows the assimilation and transformation stage differs with respect to the 
tacitness dimension. It would seem that the locality gap is more critical when searching 
for the right partners and technology, but that technological matters are more important 
during the on-going transfer process.  
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Table 7-20: Case summary: comparison analysis of the acquisition stage 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7-21: Comparison analysis of the assimilation and transformation stage 
 
Source: Author 
 
Table 7-22 shows that the role of intermediaries during the exploitation stage is rather 
limited compared with other stages. The difference in the satisfaction levels between 
firms with an intermediary and firms without is not present in the exploitation stage. 
Indeed, the not-supported group (5.06) expressed a higher overall satisfaction than the 
supported group (4.88). 
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 Table 7-22: Comparison analysis of the exploitation stage 
Case Summary
55 55 55 55
.04 .15 5.06 4.24
.769 1.143 .966 1.091
20 20 20 20
.04 -.19 4.88 4.38
1.406 .964 .991 1.408
75 75 75 75
.04 .04 5.00 4.28
.985 1.081 .957 1.173
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
N
Mean
SD
Proc_exploit
0
1
Total
TACIT LOCAL Per_support Per_Rus
 
Source: Author 
 
These results indicate that there might be an important selection effect operating among 
those firms that seek out intermediary services. While it is important to note that the 
majority of firms have been involved with intermediaries, those that have not often 
perceive locality gaps and sometimes tacitness gaps as to be of lesser significance. In 
effect, this is a measure of the confidence of firms. 
 
In summary, the role and contribution of intermediaries seem quite notable with a  
major share of firms (75 out of 93 firms) having been supported by intermediaries and 
expressing higher satisfaction with the assistance. Public agencies including R&D 
institutes and local entities make better performance on assistance. There are differences 
in intermediaries‘ roles and their level of contribution in each stage of technology 
transfer. 
 
7.6. SUMMARY 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the survey was designed to understand the macro 
view of ITT between Korea and Russia, in such a way as to complement the micro view 
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supplied by case studies and interviews. Additionally, the survey was developed to test 
certain hypotheses underlying the SCTA framework, and to verify some of the findings 
from interviews. The survey specifically focused on identifying the connection between 
the gap that Korean firms face when transferring Russian technology and on exploring 
the concepts of locality and tacitness. It also focused on identifying the connections 
between the gaps Korean firms perceive in the ITT process from the locality and 
tacitness perspectives. Finally, it focused on examining the role of intermediaries, and 
whether they made a positive difference at the different stages of transferring Russian 
technology. Four hypotheses are supported by the survey, and some of the key findings 
from the survey can be summarised as follows: 
 The survey results show that thirteen different gaps uncovered in the interviews 
and empirical findings represent, as a group, the details of the concepts of 
tacitness and locality, and that these are sufficiently problematic to require 
assistance from intermediaries.  
 About 80 percent of Korean firms were supported by one or more 
intermediaries in the process of ITT with Russia. At each stage, a different type 
of intermediary support is required in order to bridge the gaps faced by each 
firm. Those Korean firms assisted by intermediaries manifest a higher level of 
satisfaction with ITT projects than those without intermediary support.  
 A large portion of Korean firms utilised Russian technology for problem 
solving connected with their existing processes or products rather than creating 
a new process or product. This is due to the fact that Russian technology, as a 
general rule, has not been ―market tested‖. Russian technology becomes more 
practical when it is combined with technologies developed in Korea. 
 Prior knowledge of socio-cultural and geographical (locality) differences 
172 
 
 
  
between countries greatly enhances a firm‘s absorptive capacity. Once firms 
find a way to access the Russian community of scientists and research 
organisations, locality gaps diminish. This change is leveraged by the firms in 
future interactions with Russian scientists. However, such prior experience does 
not make a significant difference in bridging gaps relating to tacitness. 
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 CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY PART ONE: 
 PUBPIC AGENCY PROGRAMMES 
CHAPTER 8. CASE STUDY PART ONE: 
PUBLIC AGENCY PROGRAMMES 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines case studies concerning the transfer of technology between 
Korea and Russia. These include two case studies from the intermediary‘s point of view 
and four case studies from the firm‘s point of view. The case studies selected are those 
that provide important insights into the impact that key players have on the technology 
transfer process.  
 
The two intermediaries are public agency programmes designed by the Korean 
government, MOST and MKE. These two programmes have been models for other 
central and local governments launching similar programmes (Kim, 2007). The public 
agency programmes implemented by the Korean government to assist domestic firms 
turned out to be a key feature in successful ITT from Russia to Korea in both the 
interviews and the survey results. According to my results, the transfer of Russian 
technology to Korean firms is tightly linked and associated with the role of an 
intermediary in the form of public agency programmes.  
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A major share of Korean firms responding to the survey reported having benefitted from 
the public agency programmes in various ways in the process of technology transfer. 
These government-designed public agency programmes directly reflect the nature of 
Korean innovation systems and the government‘s policy position of supporting 
domestic firms in their acquisition of Russian technology. An examination of these 
public agency programmes is a necessary step toward developing an understanding of 
the context in which Korean firms are acquiring Russian technology and testing whether 
the SCTA is useful in representing the nature of the Korean-Russian technology transfer. 
The more general aim is to ask whether the Korean experience can then be used to 
advance a more general understanding of the public role in leveraging the private 
sector‘s absorptive capacity for outside technology absorption. The public agency 
programmes that my study analyses include: (1) CTTP, designed by MOST, and (2) 
KRITP, designed by MKE. These two public agency programmes have been analysed 
mainly by reviews of documents provided by the agencies, as well as interviews inside 
and outside those agencies 
 
8.2. THE CORE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER  
PROGRAMME (CTTP)    
The CTTP, developed by MOST and implemented by KIST which served as the 
commissioning agent, has played a pivotal role in technology transfer since the 
inception of the Korean-Russian agreement to build a collaborative relationship in 
science and technology. The CTTP was developed to coordinate Korea‘s competencies 
in engineering-based research with Russia‘s strength in basic science and special-
purpose technology. Following the dismantling of the Soviet system, the Korean 
government developed the expectation that Russia could be an important source of 
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knowledge, a sort of ―Treasure Island‖ of strategically valuable technology both for 
civilian and military purposes. Russia was also enthusiastic about cooperating with 
Korea at the time (MOST, 2004), and their enthusiasm has served as a growth engine 
for CTTP‘s efforts.  
After the sudden collapse of the Soviet system, Russian scientists were anxious to find 
means for continuing their research. KIST‘s scientific knowledge seems to have 
provided an important foundation for recognising the value of Russian technology (Kim, 
2008). Because KIST`s research activities have focused on fundamental technology, it 
has developed a stronger understanding and a wider spectrum of S&T knowledge than 
private firms in Korea (KIST, 2011). The CTTP has taken on the supporting role by 
formulating a framework for supporting Korean firms, as well as by building strategic 
partnerships with important Russian research institutes (Kim, 2008). 
 
Based on documents provided by KIST and interviews with programme managers and 
researchers, a typical modus operandi of CTTP can be described as follows. First, the 
overall process and framework of the CTTP is designed by MOST, including a budget 
for activities. MOST then contracts for KIST implementation services. One part of this 
activity involves infrastructural activities provided by the KIST subdivision, the 
Korean-Russian Scientific and Technological Centre (hereafter KRSTC), located in 
Moscow. KRSTC monitors S&T activities along with the output of the Russian 
scientific community. This is followed by interactions between members of KRSTC and 
KIST‘s domestic Korean research community. As a by-product of this process, material 
for Korean seminars and presentations, available to the public and to the private Korean 
research community, is generated. 
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Another part of KRSTC‘s activity involves following up on general monitoring with a 
more specific process ―that of KRSTC recruiting ―Technology Search Groups‖ from 
Korean firms. As useful Russian technologies are identified, and a number of firms 
show interest, the KRSTC and KIST organise ―Technology Search Groups‖ from the 
Korean private sector to visit the Russian research institutes and universities where 
those technologies originate. The purpose of these visits is both to confirm the value of 
identified technologies and help to build a network between the research communities 
of the two countries. The CTTP underwrites a portion of the expenses for the visits. This 
visit guided by KRSTC provides Korean firms with an opportunity to understand the 
network of the Russian scientific community and the nature of Russian technology.  
 
If the visiting Korean firms show an interest in further exploring the identified Russian 
technology, the KRSTC and KIST provide consultation on specific strategies and 
processes to be used based on the firm‘s request including language, legal assistance, 
and administrative support. This can extend as far as launching private-public projects 
to develop and transform Russian technology that cannot yet be absorbed solely by 
Korean firms. Once the acquired technologies have been absorbed by the Korean firms, 
KIST stands aside, allowing the private sector to have autonomy in applying the 
acquired technology. This allows firms to do what they do best, using technology to 
bring new products into the market or to improve their existing process or products. 
This division of responsibilities is what is taken to be appropriate for attaining 
competitive market conditions in the Korean context. However, some Korean firms 
requested KIST to work together to further develop and transform the newly acquired 
Russian technology. In these cases, the firm and KIST concluded separate contracts for 
specific research projects. Some technology has been developed in Russia for a long 
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time without having a specific civilian application. KIST, which is able to understand 
both scientific knowledge and industrial application, aids in maturing and developing 
this technology. 
CTTP not only waits for Korean firms to request help in adapting Russian technology. 
Through its operator, KIST, it is also continually scouting for strategic Russian 
technology (D. Hyun, personal communication, October 7, 2008). KIST researchers 
have access to primary Russian scientific sources through KRSTC. Upon locating 
potentially valuable technology, KRSTC staff contact the in Russian counterparts and 
negotiate to acquire the technology. During its twenty years in operation, more than 
three hundred technology acquisition projects have been implemented by KIST under 
the CTTP budget.  
 
CTTP also invites Russian scientists to visit Korean firms. Russian scientists have an 
approach to research that is unique from a Korean perspective. Combining their unique 
research approaches with a Korean firm‘s knowledge, they have been able to solve 
several stubborn research problems with many publications of papers and patents (D. 
Hyun, personal communication, October 7, 2008). This form of collaboration is not 
necessarily directly involved with the formation of specific projects but instead offers 
Korean firms the opportunity to absorb research knowhow that Russian scientists have 
accumulated over their entire professional life. According to David Dyker, one of the 
peculiar features of Russian S&T is that scientific knowledge created in Russia, in 
general, is more often held tacitly than codified, meaning that knowledge transfer 
requires human interaction (Dyker, 2001). CTTP assists Korean firms in overcoming 
locality and tacitness gaps.  
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8.3. THE KOREAN-RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL  
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMME (KRITP) 
8.3. THE KOREAN-RUSSIAN INDUSTRIAL  
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMME (KRITP) 
The second public agency programme selected for closer investigation is KRITP, 
sponsored by MKE, which is responsible for industrial policy in Korea. MKE began 
to implement policies for the transfer of Russian technology in the early 2000s, about 
a decade after MOST. In the early stages of cooperating with Russia in the 1990s, 
Korea‘s policy approach was more focused on acquiring Russia‘s strategic and 
military technology rather than industrial technology (Kim, 2007). Some Russian 
technologies can be used for dual application —i.e. military and commercial purposes. 
MOST is in charge of implementing a national strategy for both purposes. In the early 
1990s, only the largest Korean firms showed any interest in using Russian technology. 
 
In 2000s, many large Korean firms accumulated prior knowledge and know-how for 
approaching Russian technology so that MKE focused on small and medium-sized firms 
without such Russia-related knowledge and experience. MKE has established KRITP at 
the state-run Korea Polytechnic University located in Ansan, about one hour away from 
Seoul. MKE funds Korea Polytechnic University to operate KRITP in a similar way as 
MOST funds KIST to run CTTP. MKE evaluates KRITP‘s performance annually in 
terms of the quantity of assistance it supplies to Korean firms as a way to maintain the 
quality of the programme. If the performance of KRITP is below expectations, MKE 
Formatted: After:  0.42 cm, Line
spacing:  Double
Formatted: Indent: Before:  0 cm
180 
 
 
  
has the option to change to other universities or public research institutes for the KRITP 
operating contract.  
 
In order to reduce the accessibility gap, KRITP‘s main role is follow-up (D. Oh, 
personal communication, November 19, 2010). First, KRITP provides relevant 
information about Russian technology. This information is more focused on industrially 
applicable technology rather than on basic science. The information is provided by e-
mail mailing lists, monthly magazines, and seminars. Based on this routine, KRITP 
arranges a technology investigation delegation six times a year. The delegation includes 
both Korean firms and experts in the fields of management consulting, engineering, 
legal counsel, and industrial associations, as well as government officials. These experts 
help Korean firms to quickly understand the Russian context of targeted technology, as 
well as the socio-economic system related to technology transfer. This support makes it 
easy for Korean firms to identify areas of interest in the Russian R&D complex. These 
delegations are sometimes organised by areas of technological interest, and sometimes 
by geographical regions. Korean firms can therefore choose the type of delegation that 
suits their needs. KRITP also support some part of travel fees for the delegation (J. 
Kwon, personal communication, November 17, 2010). 
 
Second, KRITP also invites scientists and engineers from Russian universities or public 
research institutes to Korea on a regular basis, to participate in technology information 
sessions with Korean firms. These sessions allow for both the transfer of information 
and the formation of networks. It also allows groups of Russian scientists to visit 
Korean firms to discuss technological problems and possible solutions. In some cases, 
Russian scientists have stayed with the Korean firms for several months to provide 
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technical consultancy. KRITP also provides technology consulting services to Korean 
firms, focusing in particular on those firms that have participated in technology 
delegations. There is even an on-line technology consulting service for simple issues. 
However, KRITP‘s technology consulting services are difficult to extend to complex 
issues. KRITP may refer more complex issues to other organisations with the specific 
expertise required. 
 
There are two major types of supporting programmes that KRITP provides specifically 
to Korean firms undertaking Russian technology transfer (J. Kwon, personal 
communication, November 17, 2010). When Korean firms initiate technology transfer 
projects and ask for assistance, KRITP provides a variety of various managerial, legal, 
and language assistance with the contract. Because KRITP is sponsored by the 
government, it results in a lower cost when compared to private consulting firms. 
KRITP also operates the ―Russian technology development programme‖ that funds 
Korean firms‘ adaptation and the further development of Russian technology. KRITP 
releases the request for proposals, inviting Korean firms to invest in the cost of 
importing the technology. KRITP carefully selects the firms‘ projects with technological 
and financial credibility in mind. There is a great strategic importance in targeting 
Russian technology. Every year, about US$ 500 million are spent on these projects 
(Bang, 2010). 
 
KRITP is a type of intermediary that aids in bridging mostly locality gaps, since it is 
operated by a university as a contract-based programme. Its orientation is more focused 
on small firms that lack the capability to absorb Russian technology. KRITP bridges 
locality gaps with simple technical support. This intermediary role is greatly influenced 
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by the government agency since it is regarded as the implementing measure for 
government policies (C. Bang, personal communication, November 18, 2010). 
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8.4. DISCUSSION 
Both CTTP and KRITP are organised as ministry-sponsored mission-oriented agencies. 
CTTP operates mainly on the basis of utilising KIST‘s technological and managerial 
capabilities. KIST finds Russian technology that is seen as appropriate from a Korean 
national perspective by using its accumulated scientific knowledge base and links to the 
Korean scientific research community. CTTP targets sophisticated technology that 
requires a high level of technological absorptive capacity. KRITP is operated by Korea 
Polytechnic University under a contract from MKE and aims to support small and 
medium-sized enterprises that lack both information and technical capability. KRITP 
provides financial and managerial assistance, targeting Russian technologies that are 
readily applicable. This suggests that the intermediary role in public agency 
programmes is very closely associated with the sponsoring of ministries‘ missions. In 
other words, the Korean NIS has established an ITT support structure which is aligned 
with existing ministries, and that attempts to improve the performance of Korean firms‘ 
in adopting and adapting Russian technology. In both cases, the intermediaries provide 
services that leverage the assets of private firms by providing infrastructural and 
complementary capabilities in the absorptive process. The following are project-level 
cases that could explain how firms‘ absorptive capacity is enhanced by this leveraging 
of the intermediary role. 
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CHAPTER 9. CASE STUDY PART TWO: KOREAN-
RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROJECTS 
CHAPTER 9. CASE STUDY PART TWO: 
KOREAN-RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
PROJECTS 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The project-level case study has been designed : (1) to develop a deeper understanding 
of motivation, gaps, and processes of Russian technology transfer, (2) to examine 
whether the SCTA framework‘s focus on the sequential stages of the absorption process 
can be traced to the experience of individual projects and thereby provide some 
validation of this element of the framework, and (3) to confirm the role of intermediary 
mechanisms in enhancing absorptive capacity, the larger aspect of the SCTA framework. 
 
In presenting the case studies, the sequential activities that the SCTA framework uses, 
are employed, namely 1) recognition of value, 2) acquisition, 3) transformation 
(adaptation) and 4) exploitation. 
 
Case studies were then implemented according to interviews conducted with key 
personnel (see appendix 2). Document analysis provided by the Korean firms and their 
intermediary agencies took place. Even though all four cases were supported with 
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information from intermediaries, in order to minimize subjective judgment, information 
gathered from intermediaries was used solely for the purpose of cross-checking facts.  
 
9.2. LG ELECTRONICS AIR-CONDITIONER 
The case of LG Electronics‘ Whisen air-conditioner is thought to be one of the most 
successful examples of Korean-Russian technology transfer. LG Electronics was a late 
entrant in the air-conditioner market, introducing their first air-conditioner in the early 
1990s. From the time of their entry into the market, they continued to have quality-
related difficulties in keeping the heat exchanger surface dry. Dampness collects on the 
exchanger, causing serious problems in cooling efficiency. LG Electronics‘ solutions for 
these problems were less effective than their competitors‘ solutions, including those of 
Samsung Electronics, Daewoo Electronics, and Mando Whinia. At the time, LG 
Electronics was the third-ranked player in the Korean air-conditioner market in terms of 
market share, and they had not adopted a strategy for actively attempting to penetrate 
the global market. LG Electronics‘ ―Technology Team‖ exerted their best efforts to 
solve this problem, but their efforts met with continuous failure. In order to address this 
persistent problem, the firm adopted a strategy of searching overseas for possible 
solutions (J. Suh, personal communication, June 18, 2007). However, they had difficulty 
in finding decent partners in Western countries because they did not want to expose 
their technical problem to rival firms. Also, existing foreign technology involved 
approaches that were similar to what LG Electronics had already tried. As a result, their 
efforts at collaboration with the triad countries produced dismal results (T. Jung, 
personal communication, July 15, 2007). 
 
9.2.1 Recognise the Value 
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KIST researchers were aware of Russia‘s plasma technology from an internal report 
provided by KRSTC and believed that they could apply this plasma technology to metal 
coating processes. Since KIST is not a private firm, it did not know where to apply this 
plasma technology specifically. KIST researchers believed that this Russian plasma 
technology could have a potentially huge number of applications in various industrial 
areas, but would need to go through additional nurturing stages of R&D. In particular, 
the KIST research team acknowledged that this Russian technical capability was a 
unique result developed under Russia‘s special circumstances. Such an approach had 
not even been published in academic journals. As noted earlier, KIST is a government 
research institute that has quite a large scope of research which includes physics, 
materials science and mechanical engineering. The KIST research team had the 
capability not only to nurture the development of plasma technology but also to apply it 
in everyday production as a metal surface coating. The Russian research team had the 
best knowledge of the underlying scientific principles, but did not know how to apply it. 
 
9.2.2 Acquire 
KIST contacted the Russian institute through KRSTC, KIST‘s Russian-based office. As 
noted earlier, KRSTC has established a network with the Russian S&T community, 
especially the public sector. The collaborative agreement between Korea and Russia 
empowers KRSTC to officially contact Russian citizens and to collect information. The 
negotiation was very simple, as KIST decided to invite several key scientists, and also 
provided some research funds for remaining scientists. This was because there was not 
much in the way of concrete results such as patents, and the scientists were willing to 
continue their research in a more stable environment. The research institute paid no 
particular heed to the negotiation. KIST launched a two-year project using funds from 
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CTTP, sponsored by MOST, and introduced a prototype of a plasma process for very 
thin coating of metal surfaces.  
 
KIST introduced the prototype at a MOST-sponsored technology fair in Seoul during  
May 1996. It was mandatory that technologies developed under CTTP had to reveal 
their research results after the completion of a project. MOST‘s intention and mission 
were to disseminate Russian technology more widely into Korean business society. The 
LG Electronics Technology Team, struggling with their heat-exchanger drying issue, 
discovered the plasma coating technology at the fair, and recognised that it could 
possibly solve their long-standing technological problem. LG Electronics approached 
KIST, and KIST explained the general details of the plasma technology, including 
information regarding the situation of the Russian research community and the quality 
of their science and technology. As a result, LG tried to apply this plasma technology to 
their air-conditioner‘s heat-exchanger surface by licensing this technology from KIST.  
 
9.2.3 Transform 
LG Electronics signed a licensing contract with KIST, and with help from KRSTC, also 
approached the Russian research institutes in order to obtain a detailed, deeper 
understanding of plasma technology. Many Russian scientists visited the LG Electronics 
research centre located in Seoul to give advice on the scientific principles of plasma 
technology. However, LG Electronics realised that it was almost impossible for their 
researchers to understand the basic principles of plasma physics completely. This was so 
because most LG Electronics researchers had electronic or mechanical engineering 
backgrounds. The nature of the research work to be undertaken was also very different 
from Korean experience, since Russian scientists were not familiar with performing 
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research work that had many constraints such as weight, price, design, and schedule . 
The gaps between LG Electronics researchers and Russian scientists were too big. As a 
result, LG Electronics and KIST launched a three-year joint research project, asking 
participants to establish links between Russian scientists and LG Electronics engineers. 
They also asked that KIST make Russian knowledge of plasma physics more tangible 
and concrete, with an orientation toward electronics and material engineering. KIST has 
many researchers with physics backgrounds, and holds patents in the core technology 
for plasma coating. KIST also had a clear understanding of what technological problems 
LG Electronics needed to solve. 
 
9.2.4 Exploit 
The results were very positive. LG Electronics developed the technology that could coat 
the surface of the air-conditioner heat-exchanger. Plasma gas is inserted inside the 
coating layer in a way that allows complete control of the surface condition by 
manipulating the character of the plasma. As a by-product of the research project, LG 
Electronics also achieved additional research goals that improved the device‘s energy 
saving performance. With this new technology, LG Electronics introduced a new brand 
of air-conditioner product called ―Whisen‖, which was launched in 2000. It became the 
world‘s bestselling air-conditioner in 2001, taking 11.6% of the world market for air-
conditioners (J. Min, personal communication, July 1, 2007). It is important to bear in 
mind, again, that before adopting and applying plasma technology, LG Electronics was 
only the third biggest player in the Korean air-conditioner market. However, since then 
it has been the global leader in the air-conditioner market for eight consecutive years. 
By 2007, its worldwide market share for air-conditioners reached 19.6%. Plasma 
technology is not the only factor in the success of Whisen -- LG Electronics also 
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introduced a new design and employed aggressive marketing campaigns in the global 
market (T. Jung, personal communication, July 15, 2007). However, the main driver of 
revenue growth was a dramatic improvement in cooling efficacy, the core function of 
the air-conditioner, using transferred Russian technology. 
 
190 
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9.2.5 Summary and Discussion  
As outlined in the SCTA, locality, tacitness gaps, and the role of intermediaries affect 
the process of technology transfer. KRSTP, a subdivision of KIST, an intermediary 
agency specialising in bridging locality gaps, first recognised the value of Russian-
developed plasma technology. KIST nurtured and partly transformed it to meet specific 
application needs. It is very rare for intermediary agencies to provide relevant 
information or services to Korean firms when they are asked, as a matter of course. 
CTTP is designed to provide Russian S&T information that is highly valuable in 
satisfying military and industrial purposes. The Korean government wished to obtain 
Russian technology to support the more strategic aspects of their national plan. In the 
early 1990s, most Korean firms were not able to see past the condition of the original 
form of Russian technology and recognizing its true value. Russian technologies were 
too unique, and Korean firms possessed almost no prior knowledge about of them. It is 
necessary to nurture technology so that its more refined form emerges, allowing Korean 
firms to more easily understand how the technology could meet their own needs. In the 
early stages, intermediaries helped Korean firms‘ recognize of the value of transferred 
technology. 
 
LG Electronics would not have found out that Russia‘s plasma technology even existed 
at all, without the facilitating role of the intermediaries, including KRSTC and KIST. In 
an interview with the chief of the LG Electronics Technology Team (air-conditioner 
division), he said that ―I can‘t speak for the possibility of LG on a general level – which 
covers various product portfolios – having had experiences cooperating with Russian 
scientists, but the air-conditioner division never even imagined incorporating Russian 
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technology. It was hugely fortunate we ended up participating in the technology fair. 
KIST‘s prior experiences with Russian plasma scientists reduced trial and error greatly. 
The project could utilise Russian knowledge to align with LG resources and capabilities. 
More importantly, working together with KIST gives the technology team powers of 
persuasion over the firm‘s top management.‖ 
 
In the process of applying Russian technology licensed from KIST to their technological 
problem, LG Electronics encountered serious problems in understanding and absorbing 
Russian knowledge. They understood that Russian knowledge is highly tacit and 
embodied in humans, so they invited many Russian scientists along with technology 
licensors from KIST. However, there are large differences in the nature of research 
between the two groups. Russian scientists, in general, do not believe that the goal of 
their work is to achieve specific, desired and targeted results by using their knowledge. 
Instead, their intention is to continuously make new discoveries in plasma physics. This 
is an important difference between applied research and basic research. To overcome 
this cultural difference among scientists and engineers, LG Electronics utilised KIST as 
an intermediary to leverage Russian knowledge, and to concentrate on their desired 
research outcome. 
 
It is important to note that many of the good ideas in organisations may not be 
implemented because of conflicts between new insights and initiatives on the one hand, 
and established mental models on the other. Mental models can dominate business 
decisions, and these models are often tacit and contradictory with regard to openly 
stated points of view (Senge, 1990). In this case, LG Electronics and KRSTC might 
have had different mental models, and the latter could see what the former could not. 
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Therefore, intermediaries also expand the range of mental models that private firms can 
access, in order to recognise the true value of external knowledge. 
 
Through a combination of LG Electronics‘ internal absorptive capacity and the 
facilitating capabilities of the intermediaries, LG Electronics was able to recognise the 
value of Russia‘s plasma technology and transform it into a coating technology that 
could be applied to their products. But it must be emphasised that in order for them to 
successfully apply this scientific knowledge of plasma physics to their air-conditioners, 
LG participated in a joint research project with KIST and Russian scientists. KIST had a 
better understanding of plasma physics. In addition, some of the locality gap was 
bridged by CTTP (described in section 2.1), which assisted Korean firms in accessing 
and acquiring Russian technology. 
 
9.3. SCAN-TYPE DIGITAL X-RAY DETECTOR 
Advanced Digital Technology is a medium-sized firm with annual revenues of US$ 25 
million that was looking for a new business opportunity. This firm found that digital 
radiography is a fast growing business and it already had some degree of technological 
capability in a related area. It began considering the possibility of branching out into the 
digital X-ray business, carefully analysing all the existing and emerging technologies in 
that field. Afterwards, it concluded that it would be very difficult to compete, even in 
the local market, without advancing their original core technology. 
 
Digital radiography involves a sophisticated system that consists of a detector, X-ray 
tube, generator, software, and mechanical system, along with auxiliary equipment. Most 
digital radiography system makers in Korea had depended on outsourcing to obtain 
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detectors, X-ray tubes, and generator technology. The market was considered very 
competitive, and the profit potential quite low. About 45 to 55% of a digital radiography 
system‘s cost was due to the cost of the detector (Y. Choi, personal communication, 
February 1, 2011). Because it was too risky to develop all the relevant technologies, the 
firm became interested in importing the technologies from other countries. After several 
months of investigation, they considered Russia to be one of the most advanced 
countries in this field. Also, the cost of technology cooperation with Russia was 
expected to be relatively low.  
 
9.3.1. Recognise the Value 
Advanced Digital Technology‘s next step was to try to reach out to research institutes in 
Russia. In this process, the firm contacted KRITP for assistance. After acquiring the 
necessary information from KRITP to contact prospective partners in Russia, they 
visited two candidate organisations in Moscow and two in Novosibirsk. They decided 
on one in Novosibirsk, called the Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics, as a preferred 
partner. At the time, the Budker Institute employed about 3,000 scientists and engineers, 
having been established in 1959. It concentrates on high-energy physics, particularly 
plasma and particle physics. As part of its basic science capability in physics, it 
developed various X-ray technologies. KRITP highly recommended the Budker 
Institute‘s core and applied X-ray technologies as suitable for Advanced Digital 
Technology. In doing this, KRITP and Advanced Digital Technology utilised several 
Korean experts in this area to narrow down the technological and contractual matters (H. 
Lee, personal communication, January 28, 2007). 
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Advanced Digital Technology applied to KRITP projects for support funds for adapting 
and further developing Russian technology. KRITP deemed that X-ray technology could 
also be used in several other industries and accepted the proposal for research funding. 
  
9.3.2. Acquire 
The Budker Institute initially showed little interest in facilitating a technology transfer 
with Advanced Digital Technology because it is a small-sized firm in Korea. Russian 
institutes were sceptical of the firm‘s ability to conduct the necessary technology 
development and commercialisation. KRITP explained to the Budker Institute that 
Advanced Digital Technology had been preparing for this business and had the potential 
to make it successful. KRITP as a government agency could provide the necessary 
confidence to the Budker Institute. 
 
The Budker Institute was willing to transfer a low-resolution detector (1024, 400µm) 
technology that had already been commercialised and introduced in the market. 
However, Advanced Digital Technology was seeking to be the first mover in the market, 
and requested the transfer of technology for a higher-resolution detector (2048, 200µm) 
from Budker. There were three main points that the firm used to persuade Budker to 
make the transfer: 1) intense competition in the low-resolution market reduced the 
possible gain from a transfer, 2) the firm‘s technological capability and standard was 
high enough to catch up with the more advanced technology, and 3) the market prospect 
data for the high-resolution market was very promising. Budker concluded the 
technology transfer agreement, which included giving Advanced Digital Technology 
exclusive rights to the more high-resolution technology. 
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9.3.3. Transform 
Since Advanced Digital Technology‘s role was to adapt Russian technology in the 
technology transfer, they could shorten their time and cost in taking the first step in 
developing X-ray technology by availing themselves of KRITP‘s assistance. The firm 
tried to internalise products with their own skills when they were receiving technology 
from Budker. Moreover, they collaborated with Yonsei University in Korea for further 
aid in developing applied technology such as digital signal processor software and 
hardware, image processing, and control systems.  
 
The transfer process started with the Budker Institute. They transferred the detector 
development technology, system design know-how, and system manufacturing know-
how to the firm. With those source technologies, combined with the industry-university 
cooperation, Advanced Digital Technology was able to successfully develop the X-ray 
detector. Their new X-ray detector, Scan Detector Radiography, provided a high quality 
image at a low radiation dose, which offered a competitive selling point. Attributes such 
as direct transformation detection and the absence of a dead zone in the imaging field 
contributed to a high quality image. This resulted in no scattering, no practical 
limitation in the length of picture taking, and low distortion of the image (H. Song, 
personal communication, March 4, 2011). 
 
In creating a closed relationship among Advanced Digital Technology, the Budker 
Institute, and Yonsei University, KRITP mainly took the role of the connector and 
supporter in this joint project. KRITP was positioned as the moderator of negotiations 
between the firm and the Institute, and encouraged the university to join in the project. 
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9.3.4. Exploit 
After four years of attempting to enter the high-resolution market, Advanced Digital 
Technology succeeded in developing its own technology. According to documents 
provided by the firm, and interviews with two managers from product development 
divisions, the firm has now successfully entered this market. They applied their Scan 
Detector Radiography technology to a range of products. They developed Detector 
Radiography for Chest, Multipurpose Detector Radiography, Detector Radiography for 
Emergency, and Detector Radiography for Long Bone/Full Spine. These products were 
presented to potential customers at the Korea International Medical and Hospital 
Equipment Show in 2005 and in 2006, and at the Radiological Society of North 
America 2006 exhibition in Chicago. The firm also completed product concept designs 
for Detector Radiography for Animals and Detector Radiography for Security. They are 
currently developing Mammography, Panorama for Dental and Dental CT by applying 
this same Scan Detector Radiography technology.  
 
9.3.5. Summary and Discussion 
This case is representative of the critical role of an intermediary in adapting foreign 
technology. As mentioned above, the intermediary helped to successfully complete the 
transfer process. The intermediary‘s main activities during this case can be summarised 
as: 1) helping to persuade the Russian partner to trust a small-sized Korean firm‘s 
ability to develop the technology, 2) funding Advanced Digital Technology during the 
transfer of technology, 3) encouraging universities to collaborate on research projects 
with the firm, and 4) reducing cultural difficulties, moderating negotiations, and 
developing domestic technology.  
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9.4. BIOGAS PRODUCTION AND PROCESSING FROM 
    LIVESTOCK WASTE  
Since its establishment in 2001, the Korean Trade Commission Co., Ltd. has engaged in 
the production of solvent-free paint and adhesion materials using Low Density 
Polyethylene. Despite the Korean Trade Commission‘s total sales in 2010 being 
estimated at US$10 billion, the uniqueness of their product was cause for a limited 
growth potential (K. Lee, personal communication, April 3, 2010). 
 
In 2007, Korea‘s newly elected President Myung Bak Lee focused on the development 
of eco-friendly, or green, energy as a part of the national agenda. The new ―Low-Carbon 
Green Growth‖ policy concentrated on expansion of green energy and reduction of 
carbon emission levels. With active government support for green energy and the firm‘s 
confidence in the successful adaptation of new technology, the Korean Trade 
Commission made an attempt to utilise their own green approach in new areas of 
industry. However, the lack of enthusiastic business partners delayed their expansion of 
the new technology. In the 1970s, Korea had started to research the activation of 
methane bacteria in processing livestock waste by means of anaerobic fermentation. 
Simultaneous research was carried out on facilities emitting methane gas. In 1995, 
Korea imported 49 anaerobic fermentation facilities for livestock farms and 35 
industrial plants that were similar to the regulation-compliant European Biogas Induced 
Mixing Arrangement method, a principal process for treating livestock wastewater. 
However, most of these facilities had not been worked continuously due to a lack of 
core technological capability. 
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The conditions for this technology changed in 2007 when Korea launched its policy on 
green energy. The new policy resulted in the direct importation of products from 
advanced countries and efforts to repair and upgrade older systems. 
 
Biogas is the term used to refer to the mixture of gasses produced from the breakdown 
of organic matter through process anaerobic digestion or fermentation. It is typically 
composed of 50-80% methane, 20-50% carbon dioxide, and minute amounts of other 
gases, including hydrogen, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen (Y. Ha, personal 
communication, March 15, 2010). 
Biogas can be used for cooking, lighting, heat and steam and electrical generation, 
chemical production, etc. The purity level of biogas can be set to a certain level through 
compression or liquefaction of the gas. Such processes can also be used as delivery 
methods e.g. Compressed Natural Gas or Liquefied Natural Gas, which are green 
alternatives for vehicle fuel. 
 
By 2008, the livestock waste produced in Korea is estimated at 47 million tons 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, 2010). The waste is discharged at sea. 
This includes areas that are only 60 to 200 km away from some of Korea‘s major cities. 
When no processing of the waste is done, the discharge is ―raw‖. In most Western 
countries some degree of processing of livestock waste is generally required before 
discharge. If the waste were to be processed to form biogas, it is estimated that about 
430 MW (megawatts) of electricity could be produced annually (Y. Ha, personal 
communication, March 15, 2010). 
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In addition, the reduction of methane gas would contribute to the Clean Development 
Mechanism business sector by increasing its expected income by about US$ 5.5 
billion.(Rural Development Administration of Korea, 2010) 
 
9.4.1. Recognise the Value 
To support the government‘s policy and to obtain nationally needed advanced 
technology, KRITP was given a mission by their sponsor ministry, MKE, to find a firm 
or institution in Russia that could transfer more advanced technology. Before that time, 
Korea was still using old systems that processed using low temperatures, having high 
risk for creating viruses. For this reason, KRITP actively tried to find organisations 
within their networks and database system for the adaption of advanced green 
technology. KRITP sought a partner firm that possessed technology using a high-
temperature system, resulting in better sterilizing action. After about a year of search, 
KRITP found the Russian State Agricultural University had an original technology with 
a high temperature system. 
The University was founded in 1930 around a core of seven PhDs who worked 
alongside selected students and other experts in its green technology department 
(Russian State Agricultural University, personal communication, April 26, 2010). These 
researchers utilised a high-temperature processing system for livestock wastewater that 
contained 100-ton scale facilities. In 1993, the Physics-Sun Academy of Sciences in 
Uzbekistan developed a new technology for heat treatment based on research from the 
Russian university‘s core technology. In 2009, KRSTC judged that this newly advanced 
technology would have positive effects on Korea‘s economy, and would strongly 
support their green energy policy. 
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9.4.2. Acquire  
KRSTC contracted with two foreign organisations in April, 2010 to acquire their 
already advanced technology and their abilities to assist Korea in creating new 
technology. KRSTC contacted Physics-Sun Academy for core target technology 
adaption, but regarded the Russian university as the technical advisor. KRSTC sent their 
experts to the Uzbekistan institute to learn the basic heating system of Dry Ceramic 
Technology. During this time, a group of Korean experts including research scientists in 
a public research institute learned from Uzbekistani experts that information on the high 
temperature processing of livestock wastewater had been shared with experts from 
KRSTC. KIST used this information to their advantage, after the delegation‘s return, to 
draft a technology cooperation agreement with the Uzbekistan researchers. KRSTC 
published an advertisement seeking a firm eager to join the project. At that time, the 
Korean Trade Commission was actively looking for future business partners to develop 
new technology, and decided to join the project. In turn, they invited five Uzbekistani 
scientists to travel to Korea to assist KRSTC in the design and development of a pilot 
system. (M. Seong, personal communication, April 1, 2010). 
 
From the outset, the firms faced difficulties in technology transfer from Russia and 
Uzbekistan. Due to environmental and conditional differences, the Russian technology 
could not be applied to Korea‘s terrain. The firms made the decision to develop a more 
advanced system based on their existing domestic technology. 
 
9.4.3. Transform 
Since the Korean Trade Commission was not knowledgeable on green technology, 
KRSTC sought an additional research institute that could help in developing and 
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transferring the needed new technology. The Korean Institute of Energy Research, a 
government research institute under MKE, responded to the KRSTC‘s request and 
joined the project. KRSTC, the Korean Institute of Energy Research, and the Korean 
Trade Commission jointly funded the project. KRSTC has some funds to assist firms 
when additional research is necessary to improve transferred technology. The Korean 
Institute of Energy Research has research funds for assisting small- and medium-sized 
firms. During this process, the Korean Trade Commission focused on absorbing the 
transferred technology, while the Korean Institute of Energy Research concentrated 
more on adapting Russian technology to the Korean environment. Uzbekistani scientists 
participated as main partners, and Russians as technical advisors. The four organisations 
combined their efforts to successfully transfer the technology 
 
9.4.4. Exploitation 
At first, the pilot system was able to process approximately 0.5 tons of livestock waste 
per day. Four months later, with the next step in place, the system was able to process 
50 tons of livestock waste per day (Y. Ha, personal communication, March 15, 2010). 
During this time, Korean researchers visited Russia and Uzbekistan for detailed 
technological information on biogas production and wastewater processing to be 
transferred to scientists in Korea.  
 
With the new technology in hand, the Korean Trade Commission succeeded in 
processing livestock waste. This was an important contribution toward fulfilling the 
London Convention and Kyoto Protocol agreements, and provided a solution to serious 
economic and environmental problems. The higher temperature system could compost 
materials and treat livestock waste three to four times more quickly than the old system. 
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As the market continued to have positive reactions to the new technology, continued 
financial investments were made (K. Kim, personal communication, April 3, 2010). 
 
9.4.5. Summary and Discussion 
As mentioned above, the role of the government intermediary had a decisive effect on 
this project. The new ―Green Energy‖ policy encouraged domestic firms to start new 
businesses. It led to the transfer of advanced foreign technology and the exploitation of 
Korea‘s own technology. The main governmental roles were in supporting green 
technology industries with policies and funds, in appointing KRITP to assist and 
organise the technology transfer project, and in troubleshooting the international 
agreement between countries.  
 
This case serves as an example showing how technology collaboration must be targeted, 
depending on the nature of the technology. Despite their initial lack of skills, Korea‘s 
industrial collaboration in the transformation to green technology now allows for self-
reliant energy production. With hard work and a passionate interest in green energy, the 
Korean government was able to provide abundant funding for this project and to adopt 
supportive policies.  
 
9.5. LASER SURFACE CLEANING TECHNOLOGY  
Seepel, founded in 2000, had mainly been engaged in the manufacture of electronic 
materials and components related to thermo-electric energy conversion technology. Its 
measurement systems and remote control systems had used radio data communication 
technology since their establishment. Seepel is the ―typical‖ small-to medium-sized firm. 
In 2010, they averaged US$ 15 billion per year in total sales. Seepel decided to expand 
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their focus on laser technology linked to existing technology for environmental and 
economic benefits through business partnerships with Samsung and Hyundai (M. Jung, 
personal communication, May 6, 2012). 
 
However, much of the laser industry, and in particular high-power lasers, has not yet 
been developed in Korea. There are several reasons for the delayed Korean absorption 
of laser technology, including that it had been classified as a defence technology. The 
development of laser technology had been actively researched by Korea‘s military, but 
never for commercialisation. Within the relationship established between the United 
States and Korea, military-use laser products were imported from the United States. 
While Korea continued to import laser products, the basis for a domestic laser market 
could not develop.  
 
The industrial application of laser technology, such as industrial surface cleaning, 
developed beyond simple cutting and welding. Laser technology provided for more cost 
effective and environmentally responsive solutions in comparison to conventional 
cleaning technology. Research on flexible and reliable laser systems for cleaning 
operations began in the late 1980s, but the results (modified welding and cutting lasers) 
did not meet the requirements for surface preparation. After years of research and 
experimentation, laser systems have only now been adapted by various industries for a 
range of surface preparation tasks, from automated mould cleaning to oxide removal. 
 
The manufacturing of semiconductor devices is one of the most important areas in 
which efficient and environmentally responsive surface-cleaning technology is needed. 
It is extremely important to reduce particle, metallic, organic, and inorganic 
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contamination in the semiconductor manufacturing process, since these are the principal 
source of device defects. The cleaning methods used in the semiconductor industry 
demand costly chemicals that burden the environment with pollution. Since many of the 
chemicals used are solvents (which disperse very efficiently), they can have a major 
impact on groundwater quality. An example of a conventional cleaning method adopted 
in semiconductor manufacturing lines is a ―wafer cleaning method‖ that uses large scale 
multi-tank immersion units. Twenty-five to fifty wafers are immersed into two mixtures: 
one consists of ammonium hydroxide, hydrogen peroxide and water, and the other 
consists of hydrochloric acid, hydrogen peroxide and water. These are then heated in 
dilute hydrofluoric acid to remove particles, metallic contamination, and organic 
contamination from the wafer surface. Since this process uses an abundance of 
chemicals and pure water, there is a strong need for more environmentally responsible 
technology (such as laser surface cleaning), for the removal of contaminants during the 
manufacturing of semiconductors. By 2011, the market share of Korean semiconductors  
in the global semiconductor market reached about 70% (D. Park, personal 
communication, May 3, 2012). For this reason, Korea now needs to develop micro-
cleaning technology for the reduction of pollution from semiconductor manufacturing 
lines. 
 
9.5.1. Recognise the Value 
To initiate the development of laser technology, Seepel organised its own advisory 
committee to develop a future business plan. Upon consideration, the committee 
concluded that Seepel needed to collaborate with Russian firms, due to its limited 
technological capability. Seepel found that firms with a laser technological capability in 
Russia would be the best partners to aid their situation since Russia possessed advanced 
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laser technology. In addition, the related technology fee was cheaper in Russia than in 
the United States. Russia had also developed their laser technology in the defence 
industry. It was, however, hard to find the right Russian firm. Seepel decided to seek 
help from KRSTP.  
 
Since Seepel requested help in locating a Russian laser firm, KRSTC assisted in the task. 
Their first role was in finding a firm that could work with Seepel‘s technology. Among 
the firms considered, Volo Ltd., established by Russian scientists in close relation with 
the Russian Science Academy, had an interest in Seepel. KRSTC played a pivotal role in 
setting up the technology transfer process. They connected Seepel to Volo, serving as a 
moderator and a supporter. 
 
9.5.2 Acquire 
To create a close relationship between Seepel and Volo, KRSTC provided the firms with 
each other‘s approved key technical information and with the appropriate level of 
technology. Furthermore, KRSTC acted as a liaison in dealing with the firms‘ 
administrative and cultural differences. Both firms approved their collaboration in 
transferring laser technology. Professors at Korea Polytechnic University also joined the 
partnership.  
 
Before their collaboration, Volo had not recognised the necessity for cooperation with 
Seepel. After much debate, Volo visited Korea at Seepel‘s request. Despite having 
superior laser technology, the operating profit of Volo had not been sufficient. Upon 
visiting, Volo recognised that the firm in Korea had a superior ability to commercialise 
and expand the business. Seepel‘s persuasiveness, expressed in ―Commercialisation and 
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Synergy Effect‖ changed Volo‘s attitude (K. Hwang, personal communication, 
September 16, 2011). 
 
With the assistance of KRSTC, Seepel and Volo agreed to create the Seepel-Volo Joint 
Venture. Through the Joint Venture, Seepel would have a stable, long-term contract with 
opportunity to import technology packages from Volo. They also built a consortium 
consisting of ten domestic firms (including Hyundai Motor) to ensure financial support. 
Beginning with the Seepel-Volo Joint Venture, the business relationship between Russia 
and Korea has grown increasingly stronger.  
 
9.5.3 Exploit 
Seepel is currently working on three main laser projects in the medical and industrial 
fields. They could be commercialised within the next one to two years (M. Park, 
personal communication, September 25, 2012). As seen in previous cases, a positive 
global response to their projects results in ongoing financial investment.  
 
9.5.4 Summary and Discussion 
As mentioned above, the role of the Korean government and KRITP has had a decisive 
effect in cementing collaboration between two countries and their firms. The 
government of Korea built the basic infrastructure for the laser industry where the firms 
began. To have active communication at the diplomatic level, they founded KRITP. 
KRITP‘s main roles were in connecting Korean and Russian business concurrently, 
resulting in saved time and costs. They also led the negotiation process between the two 
countries, taking care of legal and administrative issues, which eased the establishment 
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of incorporation. They arranged capital, taxation, and investment support for the 
promotion of domestic firms in starting new business.  
 
This case is different from other Korean-Russian Technology Transfer models in several 
ways. Both firms focused on the process of technology transfer, not on the technology 
itself, which would require continuous skill development. Despite use of an unrefined 
method, Seepel-Volo mutually achieved their goals by balancing out each other‘s 
weaknesses. Each organisation put forward their best efforts, resulting in great success. 
  
9.6. CROSS CUTTING DISCUSSION  
The case studies presented above reveal important aspects of the SCTA function in the 
process of technology transfer. Korean firms could utilise Russian technology to 
enhance their technological capability, and to develop new products and processes. 
Firms‘ absorptive capacity is enhanced by the combination of their own technological 
capability and by the intermediaries‘ managerial and technological support.  
The intermediary‘s role is identified and understood through the project-level case 
studies within the sequence of the SCTA. Among the types of assistance provided by 
intermediaries, four can be highlighted. The intermediaries provided technology vision 
to the firms during the process of technology transfer. The intermediaries enhanced 
absorptive and transformative capacity to overcome bottlenecks. The intermediaries 
built increased trust between Russian technology sources and Korean firms, so that the 
projects could continue. Finally, the intermediaries reduced the transaction costs 
involved in the technology transfer process. These four aspects of the intermediary role 
may explain some of the mechanisms through which Korea‘s systemic absorptive 
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capacity was raised, so that Korean firms might be able to overcome the locality and 
tacitness barriers.  
 
9.6.1 Recognise the Value - Technology Vision 
In the case of LG Electronics‘ Whisen Air Conditioner, KIST found the information 
about the plasma technology and believed that it might be applied to coating. KIST 
contacted the technology source in Russia through KRSTC and also introduced the 
prototype at a MOST-sponsored technology fair in Seoul, where the LG Electronics‘ 
technology team discovered the plasma coating technology. Then LG Electronics started 
making efforts to industrialise the technology by contacting KIST. LG Electronics‘ 
absorptive capacity became operative only after KIST provided leadership in the 
transfer of the plasma technology.  
 
9.6.2 Assimilate or Transformation - Bottleneck Breaking 
Absorptive capacity can be viewed as a process consisting of recognising value, 
acquiring, transforming, and exploiting foreign technology. Though LG Electronics 
recognised the potential for industrial application of Russian plasma technology, it was 
very hard for them to proceed to the transforming stage of the process.  
 
LG Electronics signed a licensing contract with KIST and the Russian scientists joined 
the LG Electronics research centre to help the firm gain a deeper understanding of the 
technology. But it turned out that LG Electronics lacked sufficient technological 
capability to absorb Russian scientists‘ advice, because most of LG Electronics‘ 
scientists had electronic or mechanical engineering backgrounds. The absorption 
process was blocked due to a lack of capability. This hurdle could be overcame by 
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KIST‘s technological capability, because many of KIST‘s scientists had physics 
backgrounds and the institution had patents for the core technology of plasma coating 
technology. In this way, the systemic absorptive capacity could streamline the 
absorptive capacity by removing a bottleneck in the process of technology transfer.  
 
9.6.3 Acquire - Trust Bridging 
In the case of Advanced Digital Technology, the Russian counterpart, the Budker 
Institute, showed little interest because the firm was just a medium-sized firm in Korea. 
Budker was established in 1959 and is a major research institution in Nuclear Physics. 
The Institute could not trust Advanced Digital Technology as a partner that could 
commercialise its technology in the areas of funding and of technological capability. 
KRITC, a Korean government agency, and Yonsei University provided the missing 
capacities for a successful partnership in this technology transfer. Though Advanced 
Digital Technology had the necessary capability for the commercialisation of laser 
technology, it could not utilise the Russian technology because it did not inspire the 
necessary confidence for technological cooperation. Without confidence, technological 
capability and commercialisation of foreign technology was not possible. For small- and 
medium-sized firms, this problem might always undermine ITT process. Trust is a 
necessary part of absorptive capacity and the intermediary role will be especially 
important in nurturing growth of technology. 
 
9.6.4 Overall Process - Reduction of Transaction Cost 
In the case of Biogas Production and Processing from Livestock Waste, KRSTP tried to 
find organisations that could provide advanced green technology. It contacted 
candidates and sent experts to Russian institutions. Russian scientists visited Korea, 
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invited by KRSTP. Then, KRSTP published information about the technology 
absorption project. If the Korean Trade Commission and other Korean organisations had 
not invested in this kind of search process, the transaction costs would have been 
tremendous. But the intermediary performed these costly activities for all the 
organisations that had an interest in technology transfer from foreign technology 
sources with advanced green technology, reducing the transaction cost involved in the 
transfer process. Systemic absorptive capacity reduced Korea‘s social cost for the 
utilization of foreign technology through the role of intermediaries.  
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CHAPTER 10. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
10.1. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
In an era of open innovation and globalisation, exploiting external knowledge and 
cooperating with complementary partners should never be limited to domestic 
boundaries or to familiar regions with traditional counterparts. This argument is not only 
important for latecomer firms, but also front-runner firms in advanced countries in 
sustaining their technological competitiveness. In the context of global competition, my 
work focuses on how to exploit external knowledge from foreign partners, overcoming 
the gaps that could make technological adaptation difficult.  
 
This thesis aims to explain how some Korean firms have successfully exploited Russian 
technology, overcoming the wide gaps between the two countries, something that is 
thought to be very difficult to do. Despite Korean firms‘ past successful experience, 
legacy, and capability in exploiting foreign technology, adapting technology from 
Russia is considered a more difficult task, because of the different contexts and the 
nature of the divides between the two countries. Those technologies Korea had been 
successfully exploiting earlier in its industrial development phase were relatively more 
packaged and more mature, acquired from the triad countries that have many 
commonalities with Korea. Moreover, Russia is a country with fifty years of a hostile 
relationship with Korea, and its research capability is largely scientifically oriented and 
developed for military purposes. 
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In the more than two decades since the Russian scientific community opened up to the 
Western world, many entities, both countries and firms, have tried, with varying success, 
to import Russian technological knowledge and adapt it to commercial use. This 
military and mission-focused body of technological knowledge does not come ready-
made to be exploited in the market-place, yet there are several advantages it offers to 
those who are able to make use of it. Korean firms quickly recognised and discovered 
that Russian technology could be successfully used to improve their products and 
services already on the market, by nurturing, transforming, and combining those 
Russian technologies with Korea‘s technological capability. Furthermore, it is often 
cheaper to import technology from Russia than from the West, and it comes with fewer 
legal entanglements, for example, intellectual property restrictions.  
 
Not many Korean firms have tried to import Russian technologies, and of those only a 
small portion seems to have succeeded. It is important to know what makes the 
difference between success and failure in this effort. Firms that are successful in 
importing and adapting Russian technology might overcome gaps arising from the 
Russian context. If the reasons why some firms fail and others succeed in this effort can 
be identified, it may be possible to expand the scope of this technology transfer, thereby 
benefitting not only some of Korean society, but also other latecomer countries that lack 
fundamental knowledge of S&T or have complementary capability with Russia. Also, it 
will help to suggest to those countries with strong legacy of basic science a way to 
utilise their S&T knowledge that is more commercially useful. 
 
Exploiting technology from Russia involves overcoming wide technological and socio-
cultural differences. The nature of these differences is characterised in this study in 
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terms of tacitness and locality gaps. As discussed earlier, tacitness represents the 
human-embedded nature of technological compatibility and proximity based on a 
country‘s innovation system, and locality represents country-specific features of Russia: 
socio-cultural and geographical proximity including language, business practice, and 
information access issues. This method of characterisation helps to systematise an 
examination of the nature of gaps and the ability to overcome them.  
 
The conceptual framework named the SCTA has been developed to explain how the 
Korean- Russian divide is bridged regardless of gaps. It rests on the hypotheses that (1) 
the success of technology transfer is a function of tacitness and locality, with large gaps 
in these constituting hindrances to successful technology transfer; (2) higher levels of 
collective prior knowledge and experience support more effective bridging of tacitness 
and locality gaps during the ITT process; (3) the bigger the gaps, the more important the 
role of intermediaries; and (4) from the perspective of absorptive capacity consisting of 
the stages of Recognition, Acquisition, Assimilation & Transformation, and Exploitation, 
each stage requires different types of support from intermediaries in bridging the gaps in 
the process of internal technology transfer. The SCTA also covers the sequential process 
of technology transfer projects, the gaps existing in this process, the firms‘ capabilities 
and the role of the intermediary in leveraging these capabilities. Based on my 
investigation, the Korean public sector (programmes or agencies) commonly plays an 
intermediary role, by implementing supportive public policies. I define such a public 
involvement as a key component in the SCTA. Because exploiting Russian technology 
is relatively market driven and it is linked with governmental agreement, the role of 
private consulting firms is smaller than that of public ones. 
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The SCTA suggests that the extra capacity generated by the interaction process between 
private sector firms and the public sector intermediary enhances a local firm‘s abilities 
to overcome barriers and difficulties in absorbing external knowledge from a source 
where tacitness and locality gaps are large. And to be specific, this process, guided by 
public policies, includes the systematic linkage and dynamic interplay between public 
and private sectors during the process of technology acquisition and absorption. This 
study has been achieved through a survey and case studies. Interviews were 
implemented with experts from government, academia, and private firms in order to 
understand the background to the Korean Russia technology transfer and to supplement 
some parts of the survey and case studies. 
 
10.2. MAJOR FINDINGS  
10.2.1. Nature of the Gaps 
In a very short period of time, Korea has had outstanding success in catching up with 
technologically front-running countries. This suggests that Korea has been particularly 
good both at learning new technology and in absorbing and adapting technologies that 
were originally invented elsewhere. What is notable about the Korean process of 
acquiring and utilising Russian technology is that it has not involved technologies that 
have been ―market tested‖. These technologies from Russian were not originally 
developed with the aim of optimising price and performance relative to competitive 
market conditions, nor have they been integrated into a large scale production and 
distribution system aiming to address global markets.  
 
The context of Russian technology development means that there are likely to be greater 
uncertainties and a greater need for adaptation than for technology acquired from other 
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contexts where market processes dominate. At the same time, because the context of 
their development has been less constrained by the need to satisfy market demands, 
these technologies may have features or characteristics that have not been adequately 
explored or developed. In other words, if other factors such as technological originality 
are given priority in the development, the resulting technology may be quite ―inventive‖. 
This inventiveness or novelty might be a basis for differentiated or superior 
development of technology. The ability of firms to filter novelty (winnowing out 
novelties that are commercially unpromising) is a different challenge than that of 
adapting technologies which have already demonstrated commercial potential. 
 
According to the empirical literature, there are also practical difficulties in the Korean-
Russian technology transfer process. First, the language barrier presents problems in the 
process of technology transfer projects. Russian scientists normally do not speak 
English, so the communication gap negatively affects the process of building mutual 
trust between collaborative partners. Second, the Russian S&T community is a 
relatively closed society in comparison to the corresponding communities in Western 
capitalistic societies. Even though the Korean government has made several bilateral 
agreements with its Russian counterparts, collecting information about the Russian S&T 
community is still a difficult task. As a result, the progress of technology transfer 
projects depends not only on managerial and technological skill, but also on luck or 
political connections, resulting in relatively longer periods required to develop the 
projects. Third, Korean partners perceive an unsatisfactory legal framework, political 
instability, and a unique technology culture as major perceived difficulties in 
cooperating with Russian partners. Russian scientific and industrial leaders still tend to 
view Korean firms with some suspicion. They fear having their valuable intellectual 
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property stolen. Fourth, Russian technology is mostly embedded in Russian scientists‘ 
understanding and memories and is less codified, so opportunities for cooperation are 
naturally limited by the number and extent of personal contacts in which the Russian 
scientists are able to engage.  
 
10.2.2. Korean Firms’ Motivation to Meet the Challenges 
From a broader perspective, since the early 1990s, some of the largest Korean firms  
began to compete on the basis of their own leading-edge products and systems (Hobday 
et al., 2004). Korea was forced to seek new sources of innovation knowledge, 
complementing its traditional sources from the triad countries. Even though Russia and 
Korea are two sharply contrasting countries, they fortunately share some 
complementary strengths and resources. This seems to have motivated Korean firms to 
adopt Russian technology as a supplemental or alternative source of external knowledge. 
Russia has a high level of advanced scientific knowledge, but little of it is commercially 
linked (Dyker, 2001; Michailova, 2011). Korea has extensive capabilities in advanced 
industrial applications, but possesses a weak scientific knowledge base. 
 
Korean firms basically understood that the nature of Russian technology was largely 
based upon basic scientific research that was military or mission-oriented. As such, 
Korean firms did not expect mature or packaged technology that could immediately lead 
to commercialisation and marketable products. Thus, what then motivated them to 
attempt to adopt Russian technology? Evidence from the survey analysis provides some 
answers to this question. Korean firms are motivated by the relatively lower cost of 
importing some of Russia‘s unique, complementary, excellent technology, along with 
flexible and simple technology transfer procedures, including intellectual property 
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concerns. The motivation of Korean firms is strong enough to counteract their concern 
over the gaps. 
In addition, according to the survey analysis, a large portion of Korean firms utilised 
Russian technology as problem-solving tools on their existing processes or products 
product rather than creating new processes or products. This shows that the nature of 
Russian technology is that it has not involved technologies that have been ―market 
tested‖. Russian technology becomes more useful, from a consumer point of view, when 
it is combined with technologies already developed in Korea. Korean firms are 
motivated by the advantages of using Russian technologies to improve their already 
existing technologies or to solve technological problems.  
 
10.2.3. Korean Strengths in Overcoming the Gaps 
Throughout the study, we have sought to find the key capability that enables Korean 
firms to utilise Russian technology. In the process of transferring Russian technology, 
Korean firms‘ behaviours and strategies are heavily influenced by their past patterns and 
experience in the Korean NIS. Russian technology that was transferred to Korea reflects 
the characteristics of Russia‘s former Communist system. The Korean use of Russian 
technology followed a different pattern and process than those which usually occur in 
technology transfers between developing and developed countries. Technology transfer 
normally depends upon numerous complex processes, upon having favourable 
conditions, and upon the recipient‘s capability. Korean firms have a demonstrated 
capability to absorb Russian technology, which seems largely determined by a history of 
depending on the ―catching-up‖ mode to grow in technological and industrial capacity.  
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Within this legacy, Korean firms have a particularly strong organisational culture and a 
capability for grasping ideas from outside. They are not accustomed to creating 
something from nothing, even though some of the large Korean conglomerates lead the 
global market in some industries. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Korean innovation 
pattern has had a path-following or catching up style. Korean firms excel at linking 
external knowledge to their internal needs, focusing on upgrading this knowledge to 
achieve competitive products. They have accumulated a strong capacity not only to 
identify value from the outside, but also to link externally acquired technology to their 
needs for improving own technologies.  
 
For Linsu Kim and Richard Nelson (2000), creative imitation is the second stage of 
industrial learning, and it is defined as the production of imitative products with new 
performance features. The first stage of industrial learning, duplicative imitation, 
sustains the competitiveness of a country fundamentally on the imitator‘s low wage cost. 
On the other hand, creative imitation is meant to give the imitator a tangible advantage 
based on strictly technological enhancements and not only cheap labour. This is why, in 
a sense, creative imitation can have similar characteristics with the third and final stage 
of industrial learning, innovation, and its meant to challenge (and not only catch-up) 
advanced industrial countries. This is so because, as Kim and Nelson point out, most 
innovations do not take the form of breakthrough inventions, but instead are deeply 
rooted in existing ones. 
 
Before 1990, Korean firms focused on simply adapting external knowledge. In recent 
years, they have accumulated their own capability and knowledge stock, and now focus 
on complementing their internal weaknesses. For example, it was Korean firms that 
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found useful high power laser technology in Russia, since Russia had world-class laser 
technology capability, developed mainly for military applications. Korean firms lacked 
fundamental knowledge of this technology, but have utilised it in many business areas 
by adding more research and combining it with existing knowledge of other 
technologies. Russian laser technology is used by Korean firms to carve sculptures, to 
medically remove discolorations from the human face, in fibre optics, in surgery, etc. 
When Russian scientists saw how their fundamental knowledge of lasers was modified 
and applied for value-added business purposes, they said they never had imagined that 
their technology could be used and applied in such a way. 
 
I found from the Korean experience with Russian technology exploitation that key tasks 
in Russian technology acquisition are: to find appropriate technology and partners, and 
then to successfully integrate and transform those technologies so that they are 
integrated as well as native technology. The primary focus in external technology 
acquisition is not in finding and acquiring the technology, but in successfully nurturing 
and exploiting it after it has been acquired. The bridging and integrating role of public 
R&D institutes is more effective when firms have strong internal problem-solving 
capabilities, which must be present in order to properly ―fine-tune‖ the transferred 
technology. The ability to absorb external knowledge effectively depends to a great 
extent on the ability to properly evaluate the new external knowledge. 
 
Because of these past successes, the technology transfer pattern of Korean firms has 
changed. Now they know how to start by clarifying the problem, identifying possible 
technology to apply, and always maintain their hunger for solving problems. These are 
the critical success factors in the Korean-Russian technology transfer. First, Korean 
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firms with a clear market focus have the ability to identify appropriate technology from 
Russia. This is not about the technology in general, but about the specific technology 
which can provide solutions to their needs. Second, Korean firms have the capacity to 
find and utilise Russian scientific knowledge that is applicable to their specific 
problems. This capacity is largely based on Korean path dependency – following the 
path of adopting and exploiting externally acquired technology -- because Korean firms 
might lack the necessary foundations to create entirely new scientific knowledge. 
However, they are optimised to modify, transform, and nurture knowledge which will be 
useful in providing solutions to already identified problems. Korean firms are 
characterised as ―fast followers‖. Once they have sufficient experience in building 
technical capacity through reverse engineering, they then concentrate on improving the 
transferred technology. This capability is called creative imitation. This works quite 
effectively for adapting Russian technology, and also reduces unneeded functionality. 
 
10.2.4. Intermediary Role 
Direct foreign investment, joint ventures, licensing agreements, original equipment 
manufacturer and similar arrangements have been instrumental to the industrial 
successes of developing countries. However, lacking local capability to absorb and 
assimilate foreign technology, most of the developing countries could not duplicate the 
process of building technological capability internally, and only some of them benefited 
from foreign supplies of technology. This local capability, often described as 
―absorptive capacity‖, is the ability to exploit and utilise external knowledge (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Many previous discussions of the technology transfer process 
have emphasised that creation of a local ―absorptive capacity‖ is essential to an 
economy's exploitation of technology transferred from abroad. The stage of 
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development of an economy affects the role of its NIS and of its innovation policy in 
technology transfer and absorption (Mowery and Oxley, 1995). Absorptive capacity 
alone is not sufficient to smoothly adapt technology developed in different common 
contexts. This is reason I have extended the absorptive capacity framework to recognise 
the systemic elements and intermediary functions that area employed the SCTA. 
 
Based on the survey results, it is interesting to observe that out of the 93 Korean firms 
with Russian technology transfer experience, 75 firms were supported by intermediaries 
in their technology transfer process. According to interviews with managers (both from 
CTTP and KRITP), the primary reason for firms to seek intermediary assistance is that 
they have a lack of basic information of how to start, who to contact, where to visit. 
Access to the Russian S&T community is an urgent issue. Within the two countries‘  
governmental agreements, the public sector has more information and a better position 
to approach the Russian S&T community. Public agency programmes are designed to 
provide such information and assistance in a more systemic way. 
 
Traditionally, the role of the government in ITT is to provide a proper institutional and 
infrastructural environment. The significance of the role of government policy and the 
public sector is more visible when Korean firms are dealing with ITT from Russia than 
from developed countries. The private sector relies more heavily on the public sector 
when Korean firms are dealing with ITT from Russia than developed countries. They 
rely on government agencies and public agency programmes in seeking out the right 
partners and technology in Russia. These public agency programmes, including the 
MOST and the MKE, were designed to provide technical assistance to help bridge the 
gaps between Russian scientists and Korean firms, by means of Korean government 
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agencies. And it is important to note that these programmes were initiated because of 
the long period of separation between the two countries, which meant that Korean firms 
had no prior information or channels of exchange with the Russian S&T community. 
Also, the private sector expects the public sector to play a role in helping to interpret 
and transform Russia‘s scientific knowledge into something that can be used for 
commercial applications. The active role of Korea‘s public research institutes in this is 
one of the factors responsible for Korea‘s success in catching up. 
 
Russian technology is very effective when used in solving technological problems. 
Technological knowledge by itself is very hard to sell directly, because, in the case of 
Russia, it has often been developed without any consideration for markets. However, the 
uniqueness of Russian technology provides complementary or unexpected dimensions 
of knowledge, so that it helps to solve problems that could not have been answered with 
an ordinary approach. Intermediaries like public research institutes, having a broader 
spectrum of scientific knowledge, play a significant role in bridging the gaps between 
the science-based knowledge of the Russian scientific community and the market-based 
knowledge of Korean firms. 
 
The intermediary‘s role is identified and understood through the project-level case 
studies with a focus on how it contributed to the success of ITT. First, intermediaries 
provided a technology vision to firms during the process of technology transfer. Second, 
intermediaries enhanced the absorptive and transformative capacity to overcome 
bottlenecks. Third, intermediaries built increased trust between Russian technology 
sources and Korean firms to continue the project. Finally, intermediaries reduced the 
transaction costs involved in the technology transfer process. In this respect, it is 
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interesting to notice that, despite the survey research and the extensive interviews with 
key stakeholders, no instance of technology transfer from Korea to Russia was 
identified. Although this certainly does not provide conclusive evidence, it is indeed 
suggestive of the contribution of intermediaries in transfer processes with partners of 
contrasting backgrounds. 
 
10.2.5. The Differences between Two Types of ITTs  
Through my empirical investigation, several interesting results were found by 
comparing the technology transfer from Russia with that from the triad countries. In the 
early stages of industrialisation, Korea acquired mature foreign technologies from 
advanced countries, which in their packaged form included assembly processes and 
product specifications. The Korean firms mostly exploited S&T knowledge from Russia 
in the form of scientific knowledge or military-based technology. Understanding and 
mastering knowledge of the technology was very important when Korea adapted it from 
the triad countries. However, the more decisive issue in the case of succeeding in the 
Korean-Russian technology transfer was to understand how to access, nurture, and 
integrate those aspects with a firm‘s existing technology, in order to improve product 
quality or solve a technological problem.  
 
In the Korean-Russian technology transfer, the external knowledge Korean firms 
wanted to exploit was mainly scientifically based. Small and medium sized enterprises 
naturally lacked a deep understanding of how exactly the firms could apply scientific 
knowledge to their innovation processes. Technology from developed countries could be 
transferred through channels such as patent licensing, turnkey plants, and technical 
assistance. However, Russian technology is mostly transferred through human channels 
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because it is more scientifically based. Russian scientists were invited to work with 
Korean R&D teams when Korean firms launched technology transfer projects with 
Russian partners. Russian scientific knowledge has a greater tacitness in the sense that 
transferring the knowledge relies more on the human channel. As a result, a recipient‘s 
capability to absorb knowledge is most important. 
 
Table 10-1: Comparison between advanced countries and Russia  
Advanced countries Russia 
Large part of technologies are available for transfer Small part of technologies are available for transfer 
Systemised technology information Fragmented technology information 
Easy access to available technology  Difficult to search in a systematic way  
Predictable cost of technology transfer 
Unpredictable cost of technology transfer when 
contacting researchers directly 
Technology often embedded in patents (explicit) 
Technology generally embedded in human capital 
and organisations (tacit) 
Horizontal cooperation between private sector 
firms 
Vertical cooperation between the public and private 
sector 
Source: Author 
 
Korea has been quite actively implementing S&T cooperation with Russia since the 
early nineties, with a clear goal of obtaining Russia‘s state-of-the-art technology from 
both the military and private sectors. The two countries initiated S&T cooperation in 
1990, when Korea and Russia signed their agreement on S&T cooperation. Even though 
the actual outcome from the cooperative agreement has not been comprehensively and 
systematically monitored or traced, nevertheless it is widely believed that the agreement 
has produced some meaningful outcomes, although not very many. There have been 
several public agency programmes developed to promote Korean-Russian ITT which 
have played a critical role in ITT successes. Such public agency programmes are 
developed and operated by central government agencies and local governments. Most of 
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the public agency programmes focus on collecting and distributing Russian S&T 
information and data through document search and analysis, as well as by sending 
groups of experts abroad. A few programmes, such as CTTP and KRITP, involve more 
extensive procedures to support ITT initiatives. 
 
10.3. DISCUSSION 
10.3.1. Contribution 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the primary aim of this study is to identify and understand 
the underlying processes and mechanisms that make ITT successful under such difficult 
and differing circumstances. This challenge would create an opportunity to draw 
meaningful implications which would further aid in exploiting and extending S&T 
knowledge stock from countries with dissimilar innovation systems.  
 
The concept of the SCTA can be useful as a conceptual framework to examine the 
technological transfers between dissimilar innovation systems such as Korea and Russia. 
The Korean government contributed by bridging tacitness and locality gaps through 
helping firms to identify appropriate partners and technology, and assisting firms to 
master, deepen, and transform Russia‘s unfamiliar knowledge for commercialisation. 
This concept is based on the following conceptual elements: (1) the absorptive capacity 
related to ITT; (2) the role of the NIS in assisting domestic firms in absorbing external 
knowledge; and (3) the tacit and localised character of technology and technology 
transfer process. 
 
The SCTA enhances a clear understanding of the ideas of absorptive capacity drawn 
from the NIS approach, while addressing institutional and public policies. It 
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complements and reinforces the firm-level absorptive capacity concept and emphasises 
the role of intermediaries which may also play a complementary role to firm-level 
absorptive capacity. As a result, the SCTA is defined as a mechanism and process of 
public involvement combined with the absorptive capacity of firms in order to enhance 
local firms‘ abilities to absorb external knowledge. It is guided by public policy on the 
process of technology acquisition and absorption. 
 
In this study, I explained that the SCTA can be distinguished from firm-level and 
national-level absorptive capacity. It is ―meso-level‖ absorptive capacity, where direct 
public involvement can create absorptive capacity that encourages and enables firms in 
adapting unfamiliar foreign technology. From an open innovation perspective, the 
supply of external knowledge is largely determined by a well-equipped and functioning 
NIS. Even for firms trying to adopt external knowledge from other countries, a well-
functioning NIS plays an important role in providing various indirect policy measures, 
as has been noted in some latecomer countries. The Korean approach to Russian 
technologies that includes governmental assistance to domestic firms that are exploiting 
Russian technology can be considered to be a process of national-level open innovation.  
This concept of the SCTA and the Korean approach to Russian technology naturally 
leads to the concept of national absorptive capacity, which is the enhancement of a 
country‘s ability to absorb and adapt foreign technology through public policies, and 
investments in education and infrastructure. The level of national absorptive capacity is 
not an aggregate of firms‘ absorptive capacity, but rather a nation‘s systemic capacity. 
This is because a nation‘s social and institutional norms, standards, and framework in 
conjunction with public policies and strategies help firms to create and increase the 
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capacity to absorb external knowledge. The development and enhancement of national 
absorptive capacity still relies greatly on public policies and involvement. 
 
The SCTA is rooted in a latecomer firm‘s technological capability, combined with the 
intermediary role of government and the public sector. The thesis extends existing 
latecomer innovation research by exploring the effects of different partners, wide 
variances in the nature of technological knowledge, and differing channels of adaptation. 
The SCTA may provide a useful framework by which policy implications can be drawn 
for other latecomers, who are coping with adapting technology from new partner 
countries who are not their traditional counterparts. 
 
10.3.2. Boundaries and Limitations of the Study  
Regardless of my extensive work, there needs to be further study on this issue. One of 
the important goals of my study was to uncover the factors and mechanisms that allow 
Korean firms to acquire and adapt Russian technology successfully, regardless of the 
gaps that would impede success. However, it is extremely difficult to define success 
exactly. Public agency programme managers, government officials, research scientists, 
and company executives all have different definitions and concepts of success and 
perceptions of to what degree it has been attained. There are many cases where it is 
much harder to judge whether or not there has been success than in projects such as LG 
Whisen air-conditioner. In some cases, Russian technology itself was transferred and 
mastered perfectly by Korean firms, but failed to be commercialised. In other cases, 
Russian technology was commercialised, but products with Russian technology content 
failed to attract consumers or to win the market competition. In still other cases, it is 
hard to measure how much transferred Russian technology contributed to market 
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success of the products. Some products might have succeeded anyway, without any 
Russian technologies. According to my interview results, it is even the case that 
personnel within a single firm may have differing opinions from division to division. 
Marketing, production, and distribution capabilities of firms vary greatly, further adding 
to the difficulty of comparison. In this thesis, a technology transfer project is regarded 
as a success if the firms had a high level of satisfaction with the results of the 
technology transfer. In the survey, the degree of satisfaction was used as a proxy 
variable for success in ITT. 
 
Complementarities between Korean and Russian technologies were among the motives 
of S&T cooperation between the two countries. And the cooperation from the Russian 
side was important in overcoming the barriers of tacitness and locality, whether it was 
provided to Korean firms or intermediaries. Russian S&T organisations involved in this 
process are expected to have improved technological capacity through this process. 
Therefore, one of the limitations on this study concerns the effects of ITT on national 
absorptive capacity on the Russian side, which needs to be studied in the future. It is 
necessary to study how the interaction with Korean firms with a strong explicit and 
horizontal collaboration in the private sector scheme has altered the Russian technology 
and innovation system. In addition, a more extensive study of projects with partial 
success or that fail despite exhibiting some of the features of successful projects would 
provide a complete and robust picture of the nature of the technology process and the 
role of intermediaries in facilitating technology transfer. 
 
Finally, in such a study, an international comparison is necessary to determine how 
crucial Korean government policies and public programs are necessary for Korean firms 
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to adapt Russian technologies. With limited time and resources, I confined my analysis 
to only Korean firms. Industry or technology-level comparison would also be a useful 
addition to this work if a sufficiently large sample can be obtained. 
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 Appendix 1. Survey Questionnaire 
1. Name of your company? 
2. Field of industry that your company belongs to? (SIC 2 digit classifications) 
(Industry) 
3. How many employees does your company have in total? (Size_emp) 
4. Your company's total sales? (KRW, using the year of Korea-Russian cooperation as 
the base year) (Size_sales) 
5. How many among your company‘s total number of human resources are engaged in 
research development (R&D)?  
6. What is your company's research and development expense? (KRW, using the year of 
Korea-Russian cooperation as the base year) 
7. Does your company have an attached research institute or an exclusive department 
for R&D? (yes / no) 
8. When does your company established? 
II. Purpose of and Reasons for Cooperation with Russia 
9. What is your company's purpose of adapting Russian technology? (Multiple choice) 
(Obj_Coop) 
• Introducing ―the new‖ to the world of products 
• Exploring the possibility of integrating it with already ―developed products‖ to 
produce niche products or services 
• Improving specifications and cost effectiveness for already ―developed 
products‖. 
• Solving current technological problems 
10. What are the motivations for adapting Russia technology?  
Rank the following reasons in order of importance. (1: most important – 7: least 
important) 
(1) Relatively cheaper to import (  ) (Motive_cost) 
(2) Cutting edge R&D capability in certain fields (  ) (Motive_excel) 
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(3) Russia‘s unique strength against western technology (  ) (Motive_originality) 
(4) Easier to avoid IP disputes (  ) (Motive_Ipstr) 
(5) Shorter time to adapt necessary technology (  ) (Motive_time) 
(6) Capabilities and resources that are complementary to Korea‘s (  ) (Motive_comple) 
(7) Proactive attitude from Russian R&D community (  ) (Motive_active) 
11. Does your company have experience of adopting technology from domestically? 
(yes / no) 
12. Does your company have experience of adopting technology from overseas (besides 
Russia)? (yes / no) 
13. Does your company have experience of adopting technology from Russia? (yes / no) 
(Exp_foreign) 
14. How clearly were you aware of technological weakness and the way to improve? 
(7 point scale) (Aware_problem) 
15. What is the level of your company's prior knowledge on the Russian technology? 
(7 point scale) (Aware_Rustech) 
16. How clearly were you aware of what technology can be outsourced? (7 point scale) 
(Needs_outsource) 
17. What is your company‘s success rate of development of all projects compared to its 
number of technology development projects? (%) 
18. What is your company‘s success rate of commercialisation of all projects compared 
to its number of technology development projects? (%) 
19. It is difficult to collect S&T related information (7 point scale) (Gap_info) 
20. It is difficult to connect with Russian institutes and researchers (7 point scale) 
(Gap_network) 
21. It is difficult to implement ITT with Russia due to administrative matters such as 
residence, VISA, insurance etc.(7 point scale) (Gap_admin) 
22. It is difficult to communicate with Russian partners (language barrier). (7 point 
scale) (Gap_lang) 
23. It is difficult work with Russian partners because of cultural difference. (7 point 
scale) (Gap_culture) 
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24. It is difficult to share understanding of ITT and research collaboration (7 point scale) 
(Gap_transfer) 
25. It is difficult to make contracting or negotiation. (7 point scale) (Gap_contract) 
26. It is difficult to understand and evaluate Russian technology. (7 point scale) 
(Gap_eval) 
27. It is difficult to modify and transform imported Russian technology. (7 point scale) 
(Gap_modify) 
28. There is a big uncertainty of unexpected costs. (7 point scale) (Gap_cost) 
29. There is a big uncertainty of duration for technology development. (7 point scale) 
(Gap_time) 
30. Low level of reliability of Russian technology (7 point scale) (Gap_reliability) 
31. Technology exists as human embodied know-how (7 point scale) (Gap_codification) 
32. Did your company get external assistance in the process of Russian technology 
transfer? (Multiple choice) (dummy_int) 
• No support  
• Support from private entities  
• Support from public entities 
33. What support did your company get? (Overlapping multiple choice)  
• Information (Support_Info) 
• Funds (Support_Fund) 
• Technology (Support_Tech) 
• Contract or Negotiation (Support_Cont) 
• Administrative support such as exchange or transfer of human resources 
(Support_Admin) 
34. What is the type of intermediary that your company is supported? (Overlapping 
multiple choice) (Type_int) 
• Central government agency 
• Local government agency 
• Public R&D institution 
• University  
• Private consulting firm 
35. At what stage did your company receive the support? (Overlapping multiple choice) 
• Recognising the value (Proc_recog) 
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• Acquisition (Proc_acq) 
• Assimilating or transforming (Proc_assim_trans) 
• Exploiting (Proc_exploit) 
36. How satisfied are you with support from intermediary? (7 point scale) (Per_support) 
37. How satisfied are you with the results of Russian technology transfer? (7 point 
scale) (Per_Rus) 
VII. Questions on the Russian Technology and Institute 
38. What is the technology that your company transferred? 
(Name of technology) 
39. What is the nature of technology that your company transferred? (Multiple choice) 
• Basic Science  
• Applied technology  
• Development (Production) Technology 
40. What is the type of the Russian organisation your company cooperated with? 
(Multiple choice) 
• Private enterprise 
• Government research institute 
• College 
• Other  
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 Appendix 2. List of Interviewees 
 
1. Interview for Empirical Background and Case Studies 
 
Number Organisation Position Name Date 
1 ADT Director Younghee Choi 
1
st
 February 
2011 
2 ADT Executive Manager Minju Lee 
10
th
 February 
2011 
3 ADT Junior Researcher Hyungwook Song 4
th
 March 2011 
4 
Korean Institute of 
Energy Research 
Senior Researcher Yeonho Choi 3
rd
 May 2006 
5 
Korean Institute of 
Energy Research 
General Manager Soyoung Kim 10
th
 May 2006 
6 
Korean Institute of 
Energy Research 
Junior Researcher Sungyong Kim 13
th
 May 2006 
7 KIET Senior Researcher Woori Kim 24
th
 July 2006 
8 KIET Junior Researcher Jangbum Park 26
th
 July 2006 
9 KIET Junior Researcher Hansol Lee 1
st
 August 2006 
10 KISTEP Senior Researcher Minki Kim 
26
th
 January 
2007 
11 KISTEP Senior Researcher Hongmin Lee 
28
th
 January 
2007 
12 KISTEP Associate Researcher Sunjin Lee 
2
nd
 
February2007 
13 KIST (CTTP) Program Manager Yonghwan Kim 
6
th
 October 
2008 
14 KIST (CTTP) Principal Researcher Dobin Hyun 7
th
 October2008 
15 KISTI Senior Researcher Hojin Kim 19
th
 April 2009 
16 KISTI Senior Researcher Junghee Yoon 20
th
 April 2009 
17 KISTI Junior Researcher Yoonjung Bae 28
th
 April2009 
18 Korea Univ. Professor Youngrak Choi 9
th
 August 2009 
19 KORUSTEC Director General Sanghyun Lim 
14
th
 September 
2009 
20 
Korea Polytechnic 
University (KRITP) 
Executive CTO Junghee Kwon 
17
th 
November 
2010 
21 
Korea Polytechnic 
University (KRITP) 
Senior Administrator Changyong Bang 
18
th
 November 
2010 
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22 
Korea Polytechnic 
University (KRITP) 
Leader in Operation Dongjin Oh 
19
th
 November 
2010 
23 
Korea Ship Safety 
Technology Authority 
Division Director Kwangmin Lee 6
th
 May 2011 
24 
Korea Ship Safety 
Technology Authority 
General Manager Yejin Kim 24
th
 May 2011 
25 
Korea Ship Safety 
Technology Authority 
Manager Hanna Lee 2
nd
 June 2011 
26 
Korean Trade 
Commission 
Technical Director Youngjoon Ha 
15
th
 March 
2010 
27 
Korean Trade 
Commission 
General Manager Minha Lee 
18
th
 March 
2010 
28 
Korean Trade 
Commission 
Manager Dongil Seong 1
st
 April 2010 
29 
Korean Trade 
Commission 
Manager Kangmin Kim 3
rd
 April 2010 
30 LG Electronics Technical Director Jinwook Suh 18
th
 June 2007 
31 LG Electronics General Manager Junghyun Min 1
st
 July 2007 
32 LG Electronics Manager Taekwoon Jung 15
th
 July 2007 
33 MKE Deputy Director General Hongchul Park 
17
th
 November 
2011 
34 MKE General Manager Kinam Jeong 
18
th
 November 
2011 
35 MOST General Manager Dongju Lim 
1
st
 December 
2011 
36 MOST Manager Sanghee Jang  
3
rd
 December 
2011 
37 NSTC General Manager Minkwan Kim 
7
th
 December 
2011 
38 NSTC Manager Minho Lee 
8
th
 December 
2011 
39 Seepel Executive Director Dongyoung Park 3
rd
 May 2012 
40 Seepel Technical Director Minhye Jung 6
th
 May 2012 
41 STEPI Senior Researcher Jiyoon Park 7
th
 July 2012 
42 STEPI Junior Researcher Donghoon Seo 8
th
 July 2012 
43 STEPI Junior Researcher Inhwan Min 
10
th
 August 
2012 
44 Volo Assistant Manager Kyungsin Hwang 
16
th
 September 
2011 
45 Volo Assistant Manager Minhyung Park 
25
th
 September 
2011 
46 KIST Visited Scientists Anton Brodovich 
4
th
 September 
2012 
47 ETRI Visited Scientists Alexi Kogan 
16
th
 September 
2012 
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48 KIMM Visited Scientists Ivan Barilov 
24
th
 October 
2012 
49 University of Sussex Professor Dyker, D.A 3
rd
 August 2007 
50 
Former Samsung  
Electronics 
Managing Director Sunkyu Hwang 15
th
 April 2010 
51 RSAU Administer staff Unidentified 26
th
 April 2010 
* Interviewed by Author 
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2. Interview for Survey (Focused Group Interview) 
 
Number Organisation Position Name Date 
1 LG Electronics Director Jeewon Jung 26thJune 2012 
2 Goldstar Central Institution Former researcher Wonkyu Park 26th June 2012 
3 OCI Managing director Kihong Kim 26th June 2012 
4 Millinet Solar General manager Dongwoo Shin 26th June 2012 
5 Lucky Materials and Siltron Former researcher Jean Cho 26th June 2012 
6 MKE Former assistant director Jaehong Lee 26th June 2012 
7 MOST Assistant director Ilyoung Oh 26th June 2012 
8 Korea Univ. Professor Sanosoon Bae 26th June 2012 
9 Yonsei Univ. Professor Dongsup Kim 26th June 2012 
* Interviewed by Author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
